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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
TA TE OF IDAflO, ) 
) 








ORDER GRANTING AMENDED 
MOTION TO AUOM RECORD 
upn!llle Court Doc:ltct o. 3903)-2011 
{39034-2011139035-2011/39036-2011) 
Valley ty Doc:kct No. 2011-14 
(2011-4612011-4712011-48) 
An AM OED MOTi N TO AUGMENT RECORD wu filed by counsel for 
Responder\ ppellants oo March 13, 2012. Therefore, pxf cause appcari.og. 
IT HEREBY I ORDERED that Respondcnts/Cross-AppclJllllt!' AMENDED M TI N TO 
AUGMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmcnmtion record shall include the 
documc:n below, file stamped cop· of which accompanied this M tioo: 
I. Defendant's Objection to Motion for Temporary Restrainln Order ( V2 11 -14 ). 
me-stamped April 25. 2011; 
2. Affidavit of Paul J. Fitzer in upport of Defendant's Objec:tlon to Motion for Temporary 
Reslralnina Order ( V201 l-46C), wi1h attachmcn file-stamped April 25, 2011 ; 
3. Joint Memorandum in Upport of Motion to Di . or in the temativc 
Judgmenl (CV201 l-46C/47 ), 61e- pcd March IS, 2011 : 
4. fflda ·1 of Lomia Bdmke in Suppon of Joiat Motion to Dismiss 
( V201 l-46C/47C/4 • file-stamped March IS, 2011; 
S. flidavit of Patrick Cowt in upport of Joint Motion 10 Dismi 
( Oll-46C/47C/4 , with anach.mto ffie-Slampcd March IS, 2011; 
6. Affidavit of Paul J. fil7.er in upport of J Int Mo · n to 
V02011-46C/47C/4 C). with nnachment, me-stamped Match IS, 2011 ; 
7. Amended Joint Memoraodum In upport of Motion for ummary Judgment 
( V20 I l-46C/4 7C/4 I file- pcd April 26, 201 1; 
I . Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for WJll1W)I Judgm nt 
CV2011-46C/47C/4 C/14 file- tampcdM y 19, 20ll;and 
9. Defendm:n Yvette Davis· Respome to 's Motion for ~limilllll)' lnjwict.ion 
Disqualification (CV201 l-46C), filo-swnpcd April 25, 201 1. 
DA T1!D this ?-0 day of Mardi, 2012. 
For the Supreme Coun 
cc: Counsel of Record 
.. 
RDER GRANTING AMENDED M TIO T AUGMENT RECORD- Doctct No. 39033-2011 
OF IDAHO, ) 
) 










MOTION TO AUGMENT 
Supreme Court No. 1 
(39034-2011139035-201 l/39036-2011) 
Valley County 2011 1 
(2011-46/2011-4 7 /20 l l-48) 
AMENDED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD was filed by 
Respondents/Cross Appellants on March 13, 2012. Therefore, good cause appean 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents/Cross-Appellants' AMENDED 
AUGMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation 
documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Defendant's Objection to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
file-stamped April 25, 201 l; 
2. Affidavit of Paul J. Fitzer in Support of Defendant's Objection to Motion 
Restraining Order (CV201 l-46C), with attachment, file-stamped April 1; 
3. Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative "'"""u''"" r 
Judgment (CV2011-46C/47C/48C), file-stamped March 15, 2011; 
4. Affidavit of Lorena Behnke in Support of Joint Motion to 
(CV2011-46C/47C/48C), file-stamped March 15, 2011; 
5. Affidavit of Patrick Cowles in Support of Joint to 
(CV2011-46C/4 7C/48C), with attachments, file-stamped March l 
Affidavit of Paul J. Fitzer in Support of Joint Motion to 
(CV02011-46C/47C/48C), with attachment, file-stamped March 15, l; 
7. Amended Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
(CV201 l-46C/47C/48C/148C), file-stamped April 26, 2011; 
8. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
(CV2011-46C/47C/48C/148C), file-stamped May 19, 2011; and 
Defendant Yvette Davis' Response to State's Motion for Preliminary 
Disqualification (CV2011-46C), file-stamped April 201 l. 
GRANTING AMENDED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - Docket No. 1 
DATED this f/D day of March, 2012. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING AMENDED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - Docket 1 
EXHIBIT ''A'' 
Paul J. Fitzer, ISB #5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRCKE, CHARTERED 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
ISB Nos.: 5675, 6563 
Email: pjj@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Supreme Court Docket No. 39033-2011 




DONALD MICHAEL KEITHLY, ) 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Supreme Court Docket No. 39034-2011 




YVETTE DA VIS,· )· 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Supreme Court Docket No. 39035-2011 




PATRICK COWLES, ) 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant. ) 
) 
STA TE OF IDAHO, ) Supreme Court Docket No. 39036-2011 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, ) Case No. CV2011-48C 
) 
v. ) NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
) 
MICHAEL SMITH, ) 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant. ) 
) 
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL - 1 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT STATE OF 
IDAHO, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTJNG 
ATTORNEY, MATTHEW WILLIAMS, P.O. BOX 1350, CASCADE, ID 83611, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT (ADMINISTRATNE AGENCY). 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT: 
1. The above named Cross-Appellants, Yvette Davis, Patrick Cowles, Michael 
Smith and Donald Michael Keithly, cross appeal against the above-named cross respondents to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment certified pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) entitled 
Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 17th day of June, 2011, Honorable Judge 
Michael McLauglin presiding. 
2. The Cross-Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment and order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment and order under 
and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l), l.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Cross-Appellant now 
intend to assert in the appeal is as folJows: 
**** 
1. Idaho Code § 12-117 - Attorney Fees: The District Court abused its discretion in 
finding that Defendants/Cross-Appellants were not entitled to make an application for attorney 
fees based upon its finding that Plaintiff/Cross-Respondent acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law, "[f]or the reasons set forth" in the Court's final order. 
***** 
2. No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL - 2 
3. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested of the April 28, 2011 and May 26, 2011 
hearings. 
(b) The Cross Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript: The reporter's standard transcript as defined in 
Rule 25(c), I.A.R. 
4. Cross Appellants request that those documents which are automatically included 
under Rule 28, I.AR., be included in the clerk's record. 
5. (a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set 
out below: 
Francis J. Morris 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Diane Cromwell 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
(b) That Cross Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee 
because Section 67-2301, Idaho Code, provides that no filing fee shall be 
charged for services rendered to any state officer in the performance of his 
official duties. 
( d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL - 3 
Respectfully submitted this l tgus~ 2011. 
MOORE SMITII BUXTON & TuRCKE, CHARTERED 
( 
41 
~Paul J. Fitzer 
)('W°mey for Defendants/Cross Appellants 
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL - 4 
VICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of August, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Diane Cromwell 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Francis J. Morris 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Lawrence Wasden 




__ Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile: (208)382-7124 




















Facsimile: 700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 ~&+t-z-
(/__, Paul J. Fitzer 
~~ NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL - 5 
EXHIBIT ''B'' 
Stephanie J. Bonney, ISB #6037 
Paul J. Fitzer, ISB #5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRcKE, CHAR1ERED 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
ISB Nos.: 5675, 6563 
Email: pjj@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
ARCHIE N. dANBUHr, ~LERI\ 
BY. EPUTY 
APR 2 5 2011 
Case No ---inst.No. __ _ 
Flied -AM, ___ _.P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV2011-148C 
) 
v. ) DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION 
) FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
DONALD MICHAEL KEITHLY, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant Donald Michael Keithly hereby objects to the State of Idaho's Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Notice of Hearing, filed in this matter on April 18, 2011. The 
State's Motion is not supported by any evidence and therefore the State has failed to establish the 
elements necessary to entitle it to the relief it requests. The Motion also violates Idaho R. Civ. P. 
11 and sanctions against the Valley County Prosecuting Attorney are in order. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Temporary restraining orders will not issue merely for the asking. Indeed, a temporary 
restraining order may issue "only if ... it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit 
or by the verified compliant that an immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING O~.ff;'_ (J, f ~ =~ 
~~/ti 
fothe applicantoeforethe aa.verse part}' or-the party's attorney can be fieard iii opposition .... " 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(h). 
ARGUMENT 
a. The Court must deny the State's Motion for a temporary restraining order 
against Mr. Keithly. 
First to the motion for a temporary restraining order against Mr. Keithly. The Motion 
fails every element necessary to establish a right to a temporary restraining order. First, the 
Motion asserts bare facts with no support, as no affidavit is filed i~ support of the Motion. 
Second, the Motion does not assert that the facts supporting it are in the Complaint filed in this 
matter, and anyway, the Complaint is not verified. Third, while Motion asserts irreparable harm 
will occur if Mr. Keithly is not ousted from his office in the form of "the unlawful operation of a 
political subdivision," Mot. T.R.O. & Not. Hrg., p. 1, this bare, unsupported assertion (a) fails to 
establish that any alleged harm will in fact occur; and (h) fails to specify what the alleged 
irreparable harm is. 
Even if the Complaint in this matter is the basis for the State's Motion, those facts are 
insufficient to establish a right to a temporary restraining order. For starters, the State alleges 
that Mr. Keithly is unlawfully holding his office because he was appointed by other District 
board members who are also unlawfully holding their respective offices. Compl. for Usurpation 
of Office, pp. 2-3. The question of the lawfulness and status of the other District board members 
is the subject of other actions in this Court, namely, State v. Davis, Valley County No. CV-2011-
46-C, State v. Cowles, Valley County No. CV-2011-47-C, and State v. Smith, Valley County No. 
CV-2011-48-C. The lawfulness of Mr. Keithly's position as a District Board member depends in 
part, therefore, on the outcome of those three cases. But even if those board members are deemed 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 2 
to be holding office unlawfully, Mr. Keithly is entitled to hold office pursuant to the de facto 
officer doctrine. 
The VCP A asserts that the SVCRD is "void of leadership" in that all three directors are 
usurpers and thus any appointment was undertaken without authority of law. "[T]here are no 
viable and legally established directors remaining with the SVCRD to fill positions or to hold 
office ... "1 As stated herein, while Pat Cowles, who was appointed in May 2010, obviously 
could not have participated in any of the SVCRD's purported procedural errors asserted herein, 
the VCP A nonetheless asserts that he is a usurper in that: 
The other two board members who appointed Patrick Cowles were not valid 
board members at the time of the appointment (holding and exercising the office 
without authority of law) and therefore said appointment was made without 
authority of law. 2 
So, an unchallenged procedural error may serve as a basis to void every action, policy, or 
decision taken by a director, councilman, mayor, or even the President, including appointments, 
as exercised by one without authority of law? Moreover, a complainant may simply lie in wait 
and spring such an action at the end of the usurper's term thereby reversing four years of policy? 
The VCPA's position is absurd. Even assuming arguendo that the SVCRD directors do not 
lawfully hold office as de jure directors, the VCP A patently ignores the de facto officer doctrine. 
Idaho has long recognized that a legal defect in a person's holding of a particular office 
does not necessarily invalidate that person's official acts: 
A de facto officer is "one who actually assumes and exercises the duties of a 
public office under color of a known and authorized appointment or election, but 
who has failed to comply with all the requirements of the law prescribed as a 
precedent to the performance of the duties of the office."3 
1 Complaint, 'If IX. 
2 Davis Complaint, 'If IX. 
3 State v. Dailing, 128 Idaho 203, 205-206, 911 P.2d 1115, 1117-1118 (1996) citing State v. Whelan, 103 Idaho 
651, 655, 651P.2d916, 920 (1982). 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 3 
A de facto officer performs his duties under color of right of an actual officer 
qualified in law so to act, both being distinguished from the mere usurper who has 
neither lawful title nor color of right.4 
... Generally, the de facto officer doctrine has been applied in the situation where 
an individual's authority to act has been challenged due to some defect, error, or 
irregularity in the individual's appointment to the position. 5 
Broadly speaking, an officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the 
officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. More 
particularly, a de facto officer is a person who is surrounded by the insignia of 
office and seems to act with authority or one who is exercising the duties of an 
officer under a color of title, right, or authority, or under color of an appointment 
or election. As otherwise defined, a de facto officer is one whose title is not good 
in law but who is in fact in unobstructed possession of an office and who is 
discharging the duties thereof in such a manner as not to present the appearance of 
an intruder or a usurper. 6 
The acts of a de facto officer are as valid as those of an office de jure; this rule is based on 
considerations of "public policy, necessity, justice, or convenience."7 
Where a person is appointed as a member of the board of highway 
commissioners ... and such person is ineligible to hold such office, and such 
person accepts such office and acts in that capacity, untiJ such eligibility of such 
officer is called in question, he acts as a de facto officer, and the action of the 
board is not illegal or void by reason of the fact that such de facto officers as a 
member of such board. 8 
"As an officer de facto, he must be submitted to as such until displaced by a regular direct 
proceeding for that purpose."9 Until then, to hold as the VCPA argues that an irregular 
appointment of a director "renders his subsequent official actions null and void", would unduly 
disrupt the orderly function of government. 10 "Necessity and public policy compels us to declare 
otherwise. "11 
4 Whelan, 103 Idaho at 655, 651 P.2d at 920. 
5 Dailing, 128 Idaho at205-206, 911 P.2d at 1117-1118 (1996). 
6 67 C.J.S. Officers§ 266, pp.801-02 (1978). 
7 Id.,§ 276, pp.812-13. 
8 Shoshone Highway District v. Anderson, 22 Idaho 109, _,125 P. 219, 220 (1912). 
9 Barrett-Smith v. Barrett-Smith, 110 Wash.App. 87, 91, 38 P.3d 1030, 1033 (2009). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. See also Gorman v. Commissioners of Boise County, 1 Idaho 655, 658-659 ( 1877). The county commissioners 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 4 
By reputation and indicia of office, the directors, the sole applicants duly declared as the 
elected directors pursuant to LC. § 31-4306, have discharged their duties faithfully under color of 
title, right, or authority and under color of an appointment or election in such a manner as not to 
present the appearance of an intruder or a usurper. From a public policy standpoint, the actions 
of a de facto officer are valid, including appointments upon a vacancy. In such a landscape, 
mere de minimus irregularities in the election process cannot void the actions of de facto officers 
in the discharge of their duties years after the fact. 12 To suggest otherwise would unravel legal 
precedent, the vested rights of applicants, and all but preclude governmental stability. 
Because this record and the state of the other three cases demonstrate that there is serious 
doubt as to the State's claims that Mr. Keithly is holding his office unlawfully, there can be no 
"clear[ ]" showing that any harm will occur. Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(b). Nevertheless, the Motion 
also fails to establish that any injury or loss or damage that might occur is "immediate and 
irreparable" or that it will occur before opportunity for a hearing on the State's claims. In fact, 
irreparable harm will fall upon the District and its patrons if a temporary restraining order or 
removed the incumbent assessor, Gorman, and appointed Davis. Gorman sought payment of the compensation that 
had been paid to Davis during the time he exercised the duties of the office. In rejecting Gorman, the court noted: 
[Davis'] official acts, while acting as an officer de facto, under color of an appointment by the 
board, were binding upon third persons, and upon the people, and no inquiry could be had as to his 
right to compensation for his services so long as he was the acting officer. .. Davis was not a mere 
intruder, without any claim or color of title. He received his appointment from a body authorized 
by law to make it, and was clothed with all the indicia of office. He made the collection in a legal 
manner, and in doing so, his acts were as binding upon the public as they would have been had he 
been acting as an officer de jure. 
12 Ironically, a perusal of the case law reveals that the de facto officer doctrine is most often cited by convicted 
felons challenging the authority of the special prosecutor. Mr. Williams' contract with the City of Cascade expired 
on September 30, 2010. The agreement unequivocally provides that "[t]he City of Cascade must appoint legal 
counsel each October." They didn't. As the prosecutor bears the burden of proof in all cases and Mr. Williams, sans 
a contract, is "without authority of law", is Mr. Williams prepared to disavow the de facto officer doctrine and 
dismiss the cases between October 1, 2010 and when his contract is renewed? Would he not be a usurper under his 
theory under the law? 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 5 
other pre-judgment relief is issued as the Prosecuting Attorney seeks. The District will be 
precluded from exercising its lawful duties and the patrons will effectively be disenfranchised. 
b. The Court must deny the State's Motion for a restraining order disqualifying 
the law firm Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke. 
As to the argument that the law firm Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd. must be 
disqualified, it is perhaps even more frivolous than the pursuit of a temporary restraining order 
against Mr. Keithly. The Valley County Prosecuting Attorney's attempt to interfere with the 
contractual and attorney-client relationship between Mr. Keithly and the firm must fail because 
he can neither demonstrate a conflict exists nor that if a conflict exists, disqualification is the 
appropriate remedy. Because there is no merit to the claim, the Valley County Prosecuting 
Attorney cannot demonstrate the requisite irreparable harm, and so no temporary restraining 
order may issue. 
The claim is that the firm must be disqualified "due to their [sic] apparent direct and 
indirect conflicts of interest .... " The decision to disqualify counsel is a matter committed to 
the district court's discretion. Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110, 114 (Ct. 
App. 1991). When, as here, the motion to disqualify comes not from a client or former client of 
the targeted attorney, "the motion [to disqualify] should be viewed with caution." Id. at 697, 819 
P.2d at 115. The first problem with the Prosecuting Attorney's attempt to disqualify the firm is 
that it fails to demonstrate a conflict. There is no assertion of fact or citation to authority to 
demonstrate that the firm's representation in this matter actually is a conflict. 
c. The Prosecuting Attorney should be sanctioned pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 11 
for bringing this Motion solely to harass the defendant. 
By filling this Motion, the Prosecuting Attorney's conduct violates Idaho R. Civ. P. 11. 
That rule states: 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 6 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or 
party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost oflitigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, 
it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed 
in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The State's motion constitutes harassment of Mr. Keithly. There is no factual basis for 
the temporary restraining order against him. There is no citation to authority or to evidence that 
disqualification of the firm is appropriate. But there is more. Not only does the Motion patently 
fail the standards necessary to obtain an injunction against him, and not only is it an attempt to 
interfere with Mr. Keithly's choice of counsel, without so much as a trace of authority or 
evidence, but it comes on the heels of the Prosecuting Attorney's and Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney's misuses of the office outside this Motion. Specifically, the Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, Kenneth Arment, sent Mr. Keithly a letter on March 23, 2011, threatening felony 
criminal action against him unless he met with the prosecutors. See Fitzer Aff. Ex. A With no 
factual basis for the Motion, and in light of the context of his conduct outside this Motion, he 
should be sanctioned by paying attorney fees and/or a fine sufficient to deter this kind of 
conduct. 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 7 
DATED this ___ day of April, 2011. 
Steph . o e 
Paul J. itzer 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of April, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile: (208)382-7124 




__ Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile: (208)287-7529 
E-mail: dcmclaum@adaweb.net 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 8 

Paul J. Fitzer, ISB #5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
>\H(jHU: N. tiANtjUHY, liLERl\ 
BY. EPUTV 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
APR 2 5 2011 
ISB Nos.: 5675 caseNo. __ .. lnst.No, __ _ 
Email: pjj@msbtlaw.com !=fled A.M ___ _.P.M 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DONALD MICHAEL KEITHLY, 
Defendant 
) 
) Case No. CV2011-46C 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN 
) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
) OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
PAUL J. FITZER, being first duly sworn, sayeth as follows: 
1. This affiant is an attorney with the law firm MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, 
CHARTERED, Boise, Idaho, attorneys of record for Defendants, which was retained for the 
purpose of defending this lawsuit. 
2. I am familiar with the files generated in this case and I have knowledge of the 
contents thereof, and I make this Affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. F1TZER - 1 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of correspondence from 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Kenneth Arment to Defendant dated March 23, 2011. 
Further this affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this ·t Lday of April, 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER - 2 
blic for Idaho 
esiding at: Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires: 08/08/2012 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .'.l~day of April, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER - 3 
~Mail 
Hand Delivered 









Valley County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
CAROL A. BROCK\1.A"'N 
Chief Deputy Pm.m~utor 
March 23, 2011 
D. Mike Keithly 
23 Joshua Drive 
Cascade, ID 83611 
MATTHEW C. WILLIAMS 
Prosecuting Attorney 
KE!'i'NETH R. ARMENT 
Depwr Prosecrttor 
RE: Holding of Board Position~ Contrary to Law, LC. § 6-602 
Dear Mr. Keithly: 
DEBBIE K. HASKINS 
Victim Witness Coordinawr 
I am writing this letter on behalf of the Valley County Prosecuting Attorney to invite you, 
as an individual, to talk with Mr. Williams and myself regarding you holiling the official 
elected position for subdistrict (l) as a director of the Southern Valley County 
Recreational District ("SVCRD"). You should.be aware that this office has sued Pat 
Cowels; Yvette Davis and Mike Smith (I Understand it was Mike's office that you have 
accepted appointment to fill out the predecessor term of office) individually for 
usurpation of their respective offices. We do not want this to be hostile situation and we 
believe you have done nothing wrong, but we believe the two other board members have. 
We believe you can help bring this issue to a resolution on your case and would like to 
discuss this with you. 
These suits were filed in accordance With Idiiho Code § 6-602. As it appears you 
were appointed by two board members which we have previously brought action against 
for holding an official position contrary to law. our pesition is that your appointment is 
also contrary to law and that you bold your position without authority of law. We are 
offering you the opportunity to meet with us prior t-0 the filing of your lawsuit to see if we 
can reach agreement on how that suit should be handled between ll.5· Our position is that 
it does not have to be as hostile, expensive and argumentative like the on-going 
individual litigations. Are you willing to explore this possibility with us? 
The other individual defendants decided not to meet with us and we had no 
alternative but fulfill the duties required Under Idaho Code§ 6-602. It appears that the 
other defendants are being represented by the SVCRD's own attorneys, perhaps at public 
expense (we do not have any official record of any such actions to date). If this 
refe.renced expense is not for a public purpose, however. and public funds have been paid 
for private defenses. then the law is clear that such action would be a misuse of p11hlic 
P.O. Box 1350 • 219 N. Main Street• Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Telephone (208) 382-7120 •Facsimile (208) 382-7124 
EXHIBIT 
~ 
moneys by public officers in violation of Idaho Codes§§ 18-5701 and 18-5702 (which 
provides for a felony charge if there has been a misappropriation in excess of $300). 
You are not required to meet with us. If you do meet with us it can be with your 
personal legal counsel. That is your choice is yours, but please recognize this is an 
opportunity as well. Please let us know within the next week if you want to accept or 
explore our invitation. If not, we are wiJling to work with you or your legal counsel for 
acceptance of service of process if you so desire. If you have any comments or questions, 
please do not hesitate to contact us. 
~zd~ 
Kenneth R. Arment 

Paul J. Fitzer, ISB #5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
ISB Nos.: 5675, 6563 
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
:~CHIEN. BANBURY, CLERK 
llAR 1 5 2011--Deputy 
Case No_ 
Filed_ ----Inst. No ___ _ 
-AM._ -P.M. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CV2011-48C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE 
MICHAEL SMITH, ) ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
Defendant. ) 
JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
COME NOW, Defendants Yvette Davis, Patrick Cowles, and Michael Smith 
("Directors'}, by and through their attorneys of record, MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRcKE, 
CHARTERED, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6) or in the alternative Summary Judgment pursuant to IRCP 
56(b ). This Memorandum is supported by the pleadings, and, to the extent the Court takes 
judicial notice or considers evidence in addition to the pleadings, the attached exhibits and 
affidavits of Lorena Behnke and Pat Cowles. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. ACTION FOR USURPATION OF OFFICE. 
Pursuant to J.C. § 6-60z!, the VCPA seeks to have Pat Cowles, Mike Smith, and Yvette 
Davis declared as usurpers, holders, and/or intruders upon the office of director for the Southern 
Valley County Recreation District ("SVCRD") ''without authority of law".2 The VCPA seeks to 
fine each director in their individual capacity in an amount not to exceed $5,000.00, holding the 
SVCRD harmless from the statutory penalty. 3 Further, the VCPA claims that any action taken 
by the directors is void as exercised by one without authority oflaw. 4 
II. SUB DISTRICT (1) AND (2). 
The VCPA's sole and purely political basis to oust Mr. Cowles and Mr. Smith is not an 
attribute of either director or any action on their part, but by the SVCRD's purportedly erroneous 
publication, three years earlier, of its 2008 notice of candidate filing deadline. The notice was 
1 I.C. § 6-602 provides in part: 
An action may be brought in the name of the people of the state against any person who usurps, 
intrudes into, holds or exercises any office or franchise, real or pretended, within this state, 
without authority oflaw. 
2 Complaint, 1 I. 
3 Complaint, 1 Prayer for Relief ( 4 ). 
4 Complaint, 1 IX. ("The other two board members who appointed Patrick Cowles were not valid board members at 
the time of the appointment (holding and exercising the office without authority of law) and therefore said 
appointment was made without authority oflaw.") See also 11 XII. 
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published five days ear/y.5 Further, pursuant to I.C. § 34-1405, the notice of filing deadline is 
required to include not less than "the name of the political subdivision, the place where filing for 
each office takes place, and a notice of the availability of declarations of candidacy." The 
SVCRD's notice of candidate filing deadline clearly stated that ... 6 
declarations of candidacy for the office of Board of Directors of the Southern 
Valley County Recreation District must be filed with the district clerk/secretary 
whose address is ... no later than 5:00 p.m. the 1st day of September, 2008. 
The VCPA contends that the entire election process is void and that the directors are usurpers 
merely because the notice did not specify "sub district (1) and (2Y'.7 
III. WITH "AUTHORITY OF LAW'': ONE CANDIDATE = ELECTION 
CANCELLATION. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 31-4306(2), if only one candidate has been nominated for each director 
position to be filled and no declaration of intent is filed for a write-in candidate, the election shall 
be cancelled. In such instances, the Board "shall ... declare such candidate elected as director, 
and the secretary ... shall immediately make and deliver to such person a certificate of election." 
Only one declaration of candidacy was filed for each sub district; Michael Smith for district (1) 
and Jim Roberts for district (2).8 No declaration of intent was received from a qualified write-in 
candidate. Alas, since the SVCRD's inception, there has never been an election as there has 
5 Complaint, ii IX. See also Exhibit C. For the 2009-2013 term for sub district (1) and (2), the SVCRD published its 
Notice of Election Filing Deadline for the November 4, 2008 election in the August 13, 2008 edition of the Long 
Valley Advocate. Ironically, it was the County's Election Officer, Jo Ann Fly that specified that the SVCRD's 
notice must be filed in the August 13lh, 2008 edition of the Advocate. In 2008, I.C. § 34-1405 provided that "the 
county clerk shall cause to be published the election calendar for the county for the following calendar year." Ms. 
Fly provided the SVCRD the 2008 Local Election Calendar and specified to the SVCRD that it must publish its 
Notice of Election Filing Deadline at least seven days prior to the deadline specified therein, which was August 25. 
As the Long Valley Advocate is a weekly paper, the only edition that was at least seven days prior to the August 25th 
deadline was the August 13111 edition. Ms. Fly receives her legal advice from the VCPA, who was, at the time, Matt 
Williams. See Affidavit of Lorena Behnke, i19- l 0 
6 Id. Ms. Fly also specifically approved the text of the Notice of Filing Deadline. 
7 Complaint, ii IX. 
8 Behnke Affidavit, iiiJ 9-11. 
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never been more than one candidate.9 The SVCRD directors are volunteers who have sought to 
provide recreational opportunities for the citizens of the district. Other than the directors, no one 
else has ever expressed a willingness to volunteer their time by becoming a director. 10 The 
SVCRD published a notice of cancellation of the election on October 22, 2008 in the Long 
Valley Advocate and Mr. Smith and Mr. Roberts were "declared elected as director". 11 No one 
challenged the election process or asserted a denial of due process either as an elector or as a 
potential, but estranged, candidate. 12 The VCP A, Matt Williams, did nothing. 
IV. SUB DISTRICT (3). 
A. 2007-2011 Term: Cured by February, 2007 Election Process 
Similarly, the VCPA seeks to oust the sub district (3) director, Yvette Davis, on the basis 
that the SVCRD failed to timely publish a notice of election in 2006 and 2010.13 Ms. Davis has 
been the director since the SVCRD's inception having been appointed by the Governor, the 
Honorable Phil Batt.14 No one has ever run against her. While the SVCRD did not publish a 
notice of election in November, 2006, it rescheduled the election to February, 2007.15 The notice 
of filing deadline was published on December 20 and December 27, 2006.16 Only one 
declaration of candidacy was filed, and the election was similarly cancelled without objection. 17 
B. 2011-2015 Term: Election in May, 2011; In Interim by Appointment 
Pursuant to l.C. § 31-4305, the director position is a four year term and "shall continue 
until a successor is elected and has qualified." As the 2007-2011 term began in February 2007, 
9 Id. See Complaint, ii VI. 
10 Behnke Affidavit, mf 5, 9-11 
II Id. 
12 ld. 
13 Complaint,~ V, VIII; See also Behnke Affidavit, ft 6-8. 
14 ld. 
15 Id. See also Exhibit A. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. The election official at the time, ironically, was Archie Banbury, the current County Clerk. 
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there was some confusion as to when this term would end. 18 Since the legislature has recently 
vacated the February, 2011 election date, the earliest election is scheduled for May 2011. 19 In 
coordination and cooperation with County's Election Officer, Jo Ann Fry, the Idaho Attorney 
General's Office (Brian Kane, Assistant Chief Deputy) and the Idaho Secretary of State's office 
(Tim Hurst, Chief Deputy), the SVCRD declared that the sub district (3) director position would 
expire at the end of the term, which, erring on the side of caution, was deemed to be January 1, 
2011. 20 In the interim, whether labeled as usurpation, expiration, or otherwise, a vacancy in 
office existed. Pursuant to J.C.§ 31-4305, the board is required to appoint a replacement for a 
vacancy, which it did by interim appointment on January 11, 2011 to serve until the May 2011 
election. 21 
STANDARD 
"[T]he following defenses shall be made by motion: ... (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[. ]"22 
When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6), we apply the same standard of review we apply to a motion for 
summary judgment. After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in 
favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has 
been stated. 23 ••• 
"[T]he question is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, 
which if true, would entitle him to relief."24 The court looks only at the pleadings, and all 
inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party.25 I.R.C.P. 12(b) further provides: 
18 /d. 
19 See I.C. § 34-601 as amended. 
20 Complaint, 1 V, VIIl; See also Behnke Affidavit, ,, 6-8. 
21 Id. See also Exhibit B. 
22 I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
23 Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, _, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010) citing to Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 
672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008) 
24 Orock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 213 P.3d 398, 403 (2009) quoting Rincover v. Department of Finance, 
128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996). 
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If, on a motion . . . to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment 
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 .... 26 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c) .... [I]f the nonmoving party fails to provide a sufficient 
showing to establish the essential elements of his or her case, judgment shall be 
granted to the moving party.27 
ARGUMENT 
Regardless of the label the VCP A attaches to this action, this is an election contest as the 
VCP A's usurpation claim is based solely upon a purported procedural irregularity which 
transpired during an election process. In contrast, a usurpation action is a substantive inquiry 
into an incumbent's eligibility to hold office (felony convictions, residency requirements, etc.) 
measured at the time the action is brought. Having missed the applicable statute oflimitations to 
file an election contest, the VCPA's attempt to do an end-around the exclusive election contest 
statutes is violative of public policy. Exalting form over substance,28 usurpation actions are not 
intended as a substitute for the exclusive statutory election contest process.29 
I. THE VCPA LACKS JURISDICTION TO BRING A USURPATION ACTION 
AGAINST A DISTINCT BODY POLITIC OF THE STATE. 
Pursuant to the plain text of LC. § 6-602, the State of Idaho, by and through the Office of 
the Attorney General, has sole statutory authority to bring a usurpation action against a 
recreation district or other such body politic of the state. Pursuant to LC. § 6-602, a county 
25 Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) 
26 Taylor, 149 Idaho at_, 243 P.3d at 648. 
27 Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Timothy Hoagland, 147 Idaho 774, 779, 215 P.3d 494, 499 (2009) 
~internal citations omitted); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91L.Ed.2d265 (1986) 
8 Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 849, 693 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1984). 
29 Johnson v. Boundary School District# 101, 138 Idaho 331, 63 P.3d 457 (2003) (the remedy provided by the 
statute governing procedure for the contest of an election is exclusive as to matters that might be contested.); See 
also Tiegs v. Patterson, 19 Idaho 365, 368, 318 P.2d 588, 589 (1957). 
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prosecuting attorney's jurisdiction is limited to an "office or franchise [that] relates to a county, 
precinct or city". Contrary to the VCP A's assertion, a government officer, whether it be a 
federal judge, state senator, or recreation district director, is not an "office ... [that] relates to a 
county, precinct, or city'' merely because, for example, the judge's chambers are physically 
located in a particular county. In matters of statutory interpretation, this Court exercises free 
review.30 
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and "give effect to 
legislative intent." Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of a 
statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent. The words of a 
statute should be given their plain meaning, unless a contrary legislative purpose 
is expressed or the plain meaning creates an absurd result. "31 · 
A recreation district is a distinct independent body politic and public corporation of the 
State of Idaho.32 The legislature has conferred multiple derivative powers to recreation districts 
none of which "relates" to a "county, precinct, or city". 33 A district may sue or be sued, make 
and execute all contracts, buy and sell property, and enact and enforce all rules and regulations 
for the operation and use of the district's facilities.34 It may incur debt,35 levy and apply taxes,36 
and is even empowered to annex territory irrespective of county lines.37 
Prior to this action, the SVCRD has coordinated and duly cooperated with the true 
jurisdictional authority, the Idaho Attorney General's Office (Brian Kane, Assistant Chief 
Deputy) and the Idaho Secretary of State's office (Tim Hurst, Chief Deputy) with regard to these 
issues. The VCP A, despite our repeated requests, refuses to even contact much less cooperate 
with the Attorney General. This is not surprising as, to be discussed supra, the VCP A is 
30 State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 327, 208 P.3d 730, 731 (2009). 
31 KGF Development, LLCv. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 236 P.3d 1284 (2010)(intemal citations omitted). 
32 I.C. § 31-4317. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
3s I.C. § 31-4314 
36 LC.§ 31-4318. 
37 LC. § 31-4319. 
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bringing this action for improper political reasons in violation of IRCP 11 and numerous Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
I. ELECTON CONTESTS 
Challenging solely procedural errors at the time of an election, the VCPA's usurpation 
action is but an election contest. Yet, the VCP A does not have standing to even bring an election 
contest; its action is untimely, and, as a matter oflaw, whether by usurpation or election contest, 
the procedural irregularity, even if true, does not a fairly traceable causal connection to an injury 
or deprivation of procedural due process to either an elector or potential candidate. In fact, the 
VCP A fails to assert any impact to the election process. The purpose of the election contest 
statutes is to inquire 
... into the regularity of election proceedings, and to insure that those proceedings 
confonn to the statutory requirements for the holding of [an] election in the State 
of Idaho... [Therefore,] a method was enacted by the legislature whereby an 
individual could bring [an] action to detennine if such elections were held in 
accordance with those statutory requirements. 38 
The focus in such an inquiry is the facts and conditions that existed at the time of the election or 
transpired at the election itself. 39 
A. The VCPA lacks standing 
The right to challenge a procedural irregularity is vested in the individual. This is 
because, as its name implies, procedural due process deals solely with the procedural rights of 
the particular litigant as opposed to the state.40 I.C. § 34-2007 unequivocally affords standing to 
38 Tiegs, 19 Idaho at 368, 318 P.2d at 589. 
39 Tiegs, 79 Idaho at 369, 318 P.2d at 590. 
40 See l.C. § 34-2007; regarding procedural due process, see U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV, § 1; Idaho Const. art. I, 
§ 13. As its name implies, procedural due process deals with the procedural rights of the particular litigant. 
"Procedural due process requires that some process be provided to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily 
deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions." Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 
Idaho 448, 454, 180 P .3d 487, 493 (2008). 
JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 8 
only a qualified elector to contest a procedural error in an election. The VCPA is not an elector. 
Therefore, the VCP A does not have standing to bring what is in all respects an election contest. 
B. A Matter of Public Policy: Statute of Limitation Periods are strictly 
construed. 
The VCP A is attempting to challenge the election process years after the fact. Pursuant 
to I.C. § 34-2008 a contestant is required to file an election contest within twenty days after the 
votes are canvassed. This reflects an important public policy preference for the pre-election 
resolution of most election-related problems. When pre-election relief is unavailable, such as 
when procedural irregularities occur immediately before an election, post-election relief in the 
form of recounts or election contests may be possible, but the statute of limitations for election 
contests are short and strictly construed. The failure to bring a challenge in a timely fashion will 
render even a valid challenge as waived, lost, or barred by laches.41 
The reasons for this cannot be overstated as there are imperative public policy 
considerations supporting timely election contests. Public policy favors electoral stability. 
"Courts must take care in post-election challenges to avoid disenfranchising votes without clear 
statutory warrant."42 
The public has an interest in the speedy determination of controversies affecting 
elections, and provisions of the statute limiting the time within which steps may 
be taken are universally regarded as mandatory. Unless they are strictly complied 
with, the court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter. 43 
The VCP A believes that a usurpation action can sidestep this rule. The VCPA would 
have this Court believe that, pursuant to a citizen's mere complaint, it is authorized to oust an 
41 McNa.mara v. Wayne, 61Idaho410, 414, 182 P.2d 960, _ (1947)(Where there was ample time and opportunity 
between the primary and the general election to have had any of the alleged disqualifications of the candidate for the 
office of the prosecuting attorney beard or passed on, but contestant neglected to take any action whatever until after 
the election, contestant could not be heard to urge said objections, which, ifpennitted, would disfranchise thousands 
oflegal voters. ) 
42 Norman v. Ambler, 35 Fla.L.Weekly D2409, 46 So.3d 178, 181 (2010). 
43 Mansfleldv. McShurley, 911N.E.2d581, 585 (2009). 
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incumbent years after the fact based solely upon a procedural irregularity in the election process. 
This is patently incorrect and would render the election contest statutes, notably statutes of 
limitation, meaningless.44 More importantly, it would undennine the very public policy of 
ensuring stability in the electoral process. The VCPA's theory, if true, would lead to absurd and 
chaotic results.45 By the VCPA's interpretation, one could observe a de minimis procedural error 
in a judicial, prosecutorial, mayoral, or even the presidential election process, and lie in wait for 
four years only then springing a usurpation action to oust the incumbent. Incredulously, the 
VCP A further asserts that every act, policy, or decision rendered by the incumbent during the 
term is void as undertaken ''without authority oflaw".46 In allowing a political opponent to "roll 
the clock back" four years, the impact to the law and to the vested rights of the citizenry is 
incalculable whether it be a councilman's approval of a land use application, a pro tern judge's 
sentencing of a felon, or the policies enacted by the President of the United States. 
C. De Minimis Error: Substantial Compliance in Elections 
Even if the Court were to assume arguendo that this was a validly filed election contest, 
the considerable case law in this arena aptly demonstrates that the remedy for such de minimus 
procedural errors would not have been to void the election and certainly not to oust the 
incumbents years after the fact. While voters are certainly entitled to reasonable notice of the 
44 The objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the 
act. Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d477, 
483 (1999). Constructions that would lead to absurd or tmreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Friends of Farm 
to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002). "Language of a particular section need not be 
viewed in a vacuum." Id. Statutes and ordinances must be construed so as to give effect to all their provisions and 
not to render any part superfluous or insignificant. Id. 
4S Id. 
46 In the Complaint, 1f IX, the VCPA argues that Pat Cowles, who was only appointed in May, 2010, is nonetheless a 
usurper subject to the personal $5,000 fme in that: 
The other two board members who appointed Patrick Cowles were not valid board members at the 
time of the appointment (holding and exercising the office without authority of law) and therefore 
said appointment was made without authority oflaw. 
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election and the issues involved, a compliance with the spirit and purpose of the law in such 
manner to afford the public an opportunity to know when and where the election is to be held, 
and the object of the same, is all that is necessary.47 
[W]e are of the opinion that the correct rule, and the one supported by the great 
weight of authority, may be stated as follows: Statutory directions as to the time 
and manner of giving notice of elections are mandatory upon the officers charged 
with the duty of the calling the election, and will be upheld strictly in a direct 
action instituted before an election; but after an election has been held, such 
statutory requirements are directory, unless it appears that the failure to give 
notice for the full time specified by the statute has prevented electors from giving 
a full and free expression of their will at the election .... 48 
Where the "notice was sufficient to apprise voters of the purpose of the election", a notice of 
election will not invalidated.49 "We conclude that the notices of election were sufficient to 
provide reasonable notice of the chief features of the proposal."50 
A showing that election officials failed to follow every election procedure 
precisely, without more, is insufficient under I.C. § 34-2101(1). Noble's evidence 
does not demonstrate that the election process was unfair or that the results are 
contrary to the actual will of the electorate. 51 
[T]he burden is upon the party contesting the election to make a prima facie 
showing, to the effect that sufficient illegal votes were cast, or legal votes 
rejected, to change the result of the election, or that serious wrong or fraud existed 
as to make the result of the election doubtful. .... While it is apparent that there 
were irregularities in the conduct of the election in Idaho Falls, they do not seem 
to make the result of the election doubtful, nor is this court convinced that there 
was intentional wrongdoing or fraud such as to vitiate the election. 52 
The VCP A fails to present evidence or even allege that the purported procedural errors 
have a "fairly traceable causal connection" to the deprivation of an elector or estranged 
candidate's procedural due process rights or otherwise materially impacted the election 
47 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, §40.07 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1970). 
48 Harrison v. Bannock County, 68 Idaho 463, 469470, 198 P.2d 1013, 1016-1017 (1948). 
49 Lind v. Rockland School District, 120 Idaho 928, 931, 821 P.2d 983, 986 (1991). 
so Id. ~ Durand v. Cline, 63 Idaho 304, 119 P .2d 891 ( 1941 ); Corker v. Village of Mountain Home, 20 Idaho 32, 
116 P. 108 (1911); 15 E. McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations§ 40.07 (3d ed. rev. vol 1970). 
51 Noble v. Ada County, 135 Idaho 495, 504, 20 P.3d 679, 688 (2000). 
52 Huffaker v. Edgington, 30 Idaho 179, 163 P. 793, 794 ( 1917). 
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process. 53 Without more, the impact of a procedural error is de minimus and entirely 
speculative. 
Il. ACTIONS FOR THE USURPATION OF OFFICE 
In contrast to an election contest which, if timely brought, may focus on procedural 
irregularities in the election process, an action for the usurpation of office (at common law, a writ 
of quo warranto) is a substantive examination of the incumbent himself; his or her eligibility to 
lawfully hold title to an office.54 For example the usurpation statute is the remedy to oust an 
incumbent who refuses to vacate his office when he/she is convicted of a felony or infamous 
crime, for violating a corrupt practices act, for failing to adhere to residency requirements, and 
other substantive conditions for an incumbent to lawfully hold a particular office.55 Where an 
election contest addresses the facts and conditions that transpired at the time of the election, a 
usurpation action focuses on the conditions that exist at the time the action is brought. 56 Thus, 
usurpation actions do not have a statute of limitations. This makes sense as an incumbent could 
lawfully enter office and only thereafter became ineligible due to a felony. 
53 Jaycox v. Varnum, 39 Idaho 78, 226 P. 285 (1924) (Contestant must prove that result of election would have been 
different if illegal votes had not been received.) See Rural Kootenai Org., v. Board ofCom'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 841, 
993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999); Student loan Fund ofldaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 828, 875 P.2d 236, 
238 (Ct. App. 1994); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct 2130, 119 L.Ed2d 351 (1992). 
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 
contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in facf' - an invasion of 
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual and imminenf'; 
not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical;' "Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury 
and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[ able] to the challenged action 
of the defendant, and not ... th[ e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before 
the court." Third, it must be "likely", as opposed to merely "speculative", that the injury will be 
"redressed by a favorable decision." 
54 People ex rel. Neilson v. Wilkins, 101 Idaho 394, 396, 614 P.2d 417, 419 (1980). 
According to Black's, "usurpation of franchise or office" is defined as the ''unjustly intruding upon or exercising any 
office, franchise, or liberty belonging to another." The "usurper of a public office" is [ o ]ne who either intrudes into 
a vacant office or ousts the incumbent without any color title." 
SS Id. 
S6 Jd. 
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Usurpation actions are an extreme remedy, rarely utilized.57 In fact, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has not substantively addressed the usurpation statutes in over thirty years. 58 This, in and 
of itself, ought to raise skepticism concerning the efficacy and sincerity of this action since 
benign procedural errors as described herein are ridiculously common yet the usurpation of an 
incumbent by virtue thereof is non-existent. Where such proceedings have related to an elective 
office, the courts will not inquire into the electoral process itself since the law provides another 
tribunal and an exclusive method for the determination of these matters. 
The Idaho Supreme Court provided an excellent analysis distinguishing between election 
contests and usurpation actions in Tiegs v. Patterson. 59 In Tiegs, the Board of Directors fot the 
Nampa-Meridian Irrigation District canvassed the votes for the 1956 election for sub director #3, 
which resulted in 1,029 votes for Ray Patterson but only 1,027 votes for Elmer Tiegs.60 Tiegs 
requested a recount, which this time resulted in Tiegs receiving 1,030 and Patterson only 1,028 
votes.61 The Board's meeting minutes show that Tiegs was duly declared the winner. However, 
the next day the Board held a meeting and rejected the result of the recount and declared 
Patterson the winner based upon the initial results.62 The Secretary of the Board issued a 
certificate of election to Patterson. Tiegs thereafter brought a usurpation action pursuant to I.C. § 
6-602.63 The district court dismissed the action for failure to timely file an election contest 
pursuant to I.C. § 34-2008. The Idaho Supreme Court stressed that Patterson w~ not 
challenging a procedural error in an election contest.64 Regardless of the process, the election 
57 With the advent of remedies such as recall elections and dissolution, the will of the public can be exercised 
without the prosecutor inserting himself into the electoral process. 
ss Neilson v. Wilkins, 101Idaho394, 396, 614 P.2d417, 419 (1980). 
59 Tiegs v. Patterson, 19 Idaho 365, 368, 318 P.2d 588, 589 (1957)("Tiegs I'') . 
. 
60 Tiegs v. Patterson, 81Idaho46, 48, 336 P.2d 687 (1959)( .. Tiegs II''). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Tiegs, 19 Idaho at 366-367, 318 P.2d at 588-589. 
64 Id, 19 Idaho at 372, 318 P.2d at 592. 
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was over and the votes were in. Rather, as evidenced by the actual ballot boxes, Patterson's 
challenge was substantive; that he won the election having received the majority of the votes. 
"(A]ppellant, alleging ... he had received the rriajo~ty of the votes cast, has brought this action 
under the usurpation statute, and has not in any [way] contested the election.'.65 
The question before the Court ... goes only to the issuance of a certificate of 
election after the votes are counted. It cannot be said that any discretion would be 
left for the issuance of a certificate of election where the votes had been tabulated 
and the only act left to be done was the issuance of a certificate. This would not 
be an act of discretion, but would be a ministerial duty, and could not be 
considered in any way determinative of the election or the conduct thereof. This 
proposition is clearly demonstrated in the case of Sparkman v. Saylor, 180 Ky. 
263, 202 S.W. 649, 651. Saylor had received a majority of votes in an election for 
justice of the peace," but the election commissioners refused to issue him a 
certificate of election because he was late in filing a statement of expense. He 
brought action for a mandatory injunction requiring the board to issue the· 
certificate. After holding the time for filing a statement of expense was directory, 
not mandatory, the Court said: · 
'An election contest is a distinct and peculiar proceeding, required to 
be filed in the time and manner prescribed by law. This action is not 
such a proceeding, as between the plaintiff and the election 
commissioners, and the duties of the election commissioners are 
purely ministerial. '66 
While the election contest statute is the exclusive remedy to challenge a procedural 
irregularity in the election process, the Court noted that the law provides two remedies for a 
substantive challenge to an incumbent's eligibility to hold office: one by contest by an elector 
and the other by usurpation by the State. 67 Any elector, within twenty days, may bring an 
election contest asserting that a candidate is ineligible to hold office, for example, as a convicted 
felon. The State may even do so thereafter in a usurpation action. This does not however permit 
the inverse; i.e. for the VCP A in a usurpation action to stand in the place of an elector to 
6s Id. 
66 Id. at 371-372, 318 P.2d at 592 (emphasis added). 
67 Id. 79 Idaho at 369, 318 P.2d at 590. 
JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 14 
challenge a procedural infirmity during the election process, a right conferred solely upon the 
individual. 
The gravamen of the VCPA's Complaint pertains solely to procedural events that took 
place during the election process as much as five years earlier, but it is an election contest alone 
that focuses on the 
facts and conditions that exist at the time of the election . . . or that transpired at 
the election itself [whereas an action] against usurpers and intruders into office 
have reference to conditions that exist at the time the action is brought. 68 
In Neilson, Wilkins ran for seat (No. 1) on the Gooding County Board of Commissioners.69 To 
be eligible, residency within the district is required. Wilkins was elected by a majority in 
November, 1976 and sworn in the following January.70 In February, 1977 the district boundaries 
were changed such that only then was Wilkin's residence located in District No. 1. In June, 1977 
the attorney general brought a usurpation action asserting that, at the time of the election, he was 
ineligible to run for office.71 The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the usurpation action since, at 
the time the action was brought, Wilkins resided within the district.72 The usurpation action was 
thus not based upon purported procedural errors in the election process, but rather a substantive 
challenge to the Commissioner's eligibility. 
III. "WITH AUTHORITY OF LAW": THE VCPA IS CLOTHING AN ELECTION 
CONTEST AS A USURPATION ACTION. 
An action for usurpation of office focuses on an incumbent's eligibility to lawfully hold 
office measured at the time the action is brought. Unlike Neilson, the VCP A does not 
substantively address the directors' eligibility to hold office including residency, felony 
68 Id. at369,318P.2dat590. 
69 Neilson, 101 Idaho at 395, 614 P.2d at 418. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 395-396, 614 P.2d at 418-419. 
12 Id. 
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convictions, etc. Rather, the VCPA's Complaint focuses solely upon uncontested, de minimus 
procedural errors which transpired during the election process. At the time the action was 
brought, there is no dispute as to the result of a contested election as in Tiegs. 73 Michael Smith 
and Jim Roberts were the sole candidates for their respective districts in.2008. Yvette Davis was 
the sole candidate in the 2007 election process. No declaration of intent has ever been received 
from a qualified write-in candidate. Thus, where only one candidate has been nominated, I.C. § 
31-4306(2) requires, the SVCRD to "declare such candidate elected as director, and the secretary 
... shall immediately make and deliver to such person a certificate of election." 
Thus, all three directors hold office with authority of law either by election or 
appointment. Could a procedural irregularity serve as a valid election contest if timely brought 
by an elector or estranged candidate where the resultant election was materially impacted? 
Perhaps but the simple fact here is that the aforementioned procedural irregularities went 
unchallenged and uncontested. Thus, the VCPA's nexus is entirely speculative; that a lack of 
strict adherence to the notice statutes might have impacted the election process and could have 
prevented a candidate from filing a declaration of candidacy. 
Further, the election process is irrelevant and moot 74 as it pertains to "appointed" 
directors pursuant to I.C. § 31-4305 (i.e. where a vacancy in office occurs, the Board "shall" fill 
such vacancy by appointment). For sub district (2) Mr. Cowles was not a candidate in the 2008 
election, but was rather appointed in May 2010 to fill the vacancy of his predecessor. Thus, a 
procedural error in the election process of Mr. Cowles' predecessor's predecessor is moot. With 
73 I.C. § 31-4306(2). 
74Pursuant to Article m of the United States Constitution, for this Court to have jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the 
burden to satisfy the threshold requirement that a justiciable case or controversy exists. Generally, justiciability 
questions are divisible into several sub-categories including, but not limited to standing, ripeness, and mootness. "A 
case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in 
the outcome." Goodson, 133 Idaho at 853, 993 P.2d at 616. 
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regard to sub district (3), the February, 2007 election process in which Ms. Davis was the sole 
applicant cured the SVCRD's failure to publish a November, 2006 notice of election. Four years 
later, the legislature vacated the February, 2011 election leaving May 2011 as the earliest 
available election date. Is Ms. Davis a usurper due to the SVCRD's failure to publish a notice of 
election in November, 2010?75 The question is moot as the sub district (3) director is an 
appointed position until the May 2011 election. At the time this action was brought, the 2007-
2011 term had expired leaving a vacancy in office. In consultation and cooperation with the 
Idaho Attorney General's Office (the jurisdictional authority) and the Idaho Secretary of State, 
the SVCRD, on January 11, 2011, appointed an interim director to serve until the May 2011 
election.76 Thus, as in Neilson,77 any purported procedural errors in the election process in 2006 
and 2010 are moot. 
In addition to standing, mootness, and causation, a justiciable case or controversy 
requires the VCPA to demonstrate "redressability"; i.e. that it be "likely", as opposed to merely 
"speculative", that the impact of such a procedural error can be "redressed by a favorable 
decision."78 If the SVCRD, the Idaho Attorney General's Office, and the Idaho Secretary of 
State are all incorrect in its statutory cure, how can this action legally arrive at a different result 
than the remedial actions already undertaken? Whether labeled as expiration, usurpation, or 
otherwise, the end result is unavoidable in that a vacancy in office will exist until the May, 2011 
15 Pursuant to LC. § 31-4305 the sub district (3) director position is an elected position; a four (4) year term which 
began in February, 2007 and "shall continue until a successor is elected and has qualified." Four years later, the 
legislature vacated the February, 2011 election date. As no successor was elected, does the position simply continue 
until the May, 2011 election date? While this tracks the plain text of the stafute, the consensus was that this did not 
track the spirit of the provision, and thus it was rejected. Does the term simply expire early on January 151 leaving 
only two directors until May, 2011? This solution was rejected as well. With the goal to avoid the 
disenfranchisement of an entire sub district, Idaho Code § 31-4305 requires that "each district shall be governed by a 
board of three (3) directors". This leaves appointment as the sole remedy. 
76 Complaint, 1[ XIII. Exlubit B. 
77 Neilson, 101 Idaho at395-396, 614 P.2d at418-419. 
78 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
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election. Pursuant to LC. § 31-4305, if this Court ousts the sub district (3) position as a usurper, 
a vacancy in office has still occurred, which the Board "shall'' fill by appointment. 
In any event, this action is precluded. By focusing only upon procedural events that 
transpired at the time of the election, the VCPA's Complaint, while clothed as a usurpation 
action, is nothing but an untimely election contest. 
IV.. THE DEFACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE 
The VCP A asserts that the SVCRD is ''void of leadership" in that all three directors are 
usurpers and thus any appointment was undertaken without authority of law. "[T]here are no 
viable and legally established directors remaining with the SVCRD to fill positions or to hold 
office ... "79 As stated herein, while Pat Cowles, who was appointed in May 2010, obviously 
could not have participated in any of the SVCRD's purported procedural errors asserted herein, 
the VCP A nonetheless asserts that he is a usurper in that: 
The other two board members who appointed Patrick Cowles were not valid 
board members at the time of the appointment (holding and exercising the office 
without authorit~ of law) and therefore said appointment was made without 
authority oflaw. 0 
So, an unchallenged procedural error may serve as a basis to void every action, policy, or 
decision taken by a director, councilman, mayor, or even the President, including appointments, 
as exercised by one without authority of law? Moreover, a complainant may simply lie in wait 
and spring such an action at the end of the usurper's term thereby reversing four years of policy? 
The VCPA's position is absurd. Even assuming arguendo that the SVCRD directors do not 
lawfully hold office as de jure directors, the VCPA patently ignores the de facto officer doctrine. 
Idaho has long recognized that a legal defect in a person's holding of a particular office 
does not necessarily invalidate that person's official acts: 
79 Complaint, , XIX. 
8° Complaint,, IX. 
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A de facto officer is "one who actually assumes and exercises the duties of a 
public office under color of a known and authorized appointment or election, but 
who has failed to comply with all the requirements of the law prescribed as a 
precedent to the perfonnance of the duties of the office. 1181 
A de facto officer perfonns his duties under color of right of an actual officer 
qualified in law so to act, both being distinguished from the mere usurper who has 
neither lawful title nor color of right.82 
... Generally, the de facto officer doctrine has been applied in the situation where 
an individual's authority to act has been challenged due to some defect, error, or 
irregularity in the individual's appointment to the position. 83 
Broadly speaking, an officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the 
officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. More 
particularly, a de facto officer is a person who is surrounded by the insignia of 
office and seems to act with authority or one who is exercising the duties of an 
officer under a color of title, right, or authority, or under color of an appointment 
or election. As otherwise defined; a de facto officer is one whose title is not good 
in law but who is in fact in unobstructed possession of an office and who is 
discharging the duties thereof in such a manner as not to present the appearance of 
an intruder or a usurper.84 
The acts of a de facto officer are as valid as those of an office de jure; this rule is based on 
considerations of"public policy, necessity, justice, or convenience."85 
Where a person is appointed as a member of the board of highway 
commissioners... and such person is ineligible to hold such office, and such 
person accepts such office and acts in that capacity, until such eligibility of such 
officer is called in question, he acts as a de facto officer, and the actfon of the 
board is not illegal or void by reason of the fact that such de facto officers as a 
member of such board. 86 . 
"As an officer de facto, he must be submitted to as such until displaced by a regular direct 
proceeding for that purpose. "87 Until then, to hold as the VCP A argues that an irregular 
appointment of a director "renders his subsequent official actions null and void", would unduly 
81 State v. Dailing, 128 Idaho 203, 205-206, 911 P.2d 1115, 1117-1118 (1996) citing State v. Whelan, 103 Idaho 
651, 655, 651P.2d916, 920 (1982). 
82 Whelan, 103 Idaho at 655, 651 P.2d at 920. 
83 Dailing, 128 Idaho at 205-206, 911 P.2d at 1117-1118 (1996). 
84 67 C.J.S. Officers§ 266, pp.801-02 (1978). 
SS Id.,§ 276, pp.812-13. 
86 Shoshone Highway District v. Anderson, 22 Idaho 109, _,125 P. 219, 220 (1912). 
87 Barrett-Smith v. Barrett-Smith, llO Wash.App. 87, 91, 38 P.3d 1030, 1033 (2009). 
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disrupt the orderly function of govemment.88 "Necessity and public policy compels us to declare 
otherwise. "89 
By reputation and indicia of office, the directors, the sole applicants duly declared as the 
elected directors pursuant to I.C. § 31-4306, have discharged their duties faithfully under color of 
title, right, or authority and under color of an appointment or election in such a manner as not to 
present the appearance of an intruder or a usurper. From a public policy standpoint, the actions 
of a de facto officer are valid, including appointments upon a vacancy. In such a landscape, 
mere de minimus irregularities in the election process cannot void the actions of de facto officers 
in the discharge of their duties years after the fact.90 To suggest otherwise would unravel legal 
precedent, the vested rights of applicants, and all but preclude governmental stability. 
V. SCIENTER: THE DIRECTORS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH 
As a quasi-criminal proceeding, legal scienter is at issue in usurpation actions. While 
generally malfeasance is palpably evident in usurpation cases, a 2008 Ohio Supreme Court 
decision noted the impact of its absence: 
88 ld. 
89 Id. See also Gorman v. Commissioners of Boise County, 1 Idaho 655, 658-659 (1877). The county commissioners 
removed the incumbent assessor, Gorman, and appointed Davis. Gorman sought payment of the compensation that 
had been paid to Davis during the time he exercised the duties of the office. In rejecting Gorman, the court noted: 
[Davis'] official acts, while acting as an officer de facto, under color of an appointment by the 
board, were binding upon third persons, and upon the people, and no inquiry could be had as to his 
right to compensation for his services so long as he was the acting officer ... Davis was not a mere 
intruder, without any claim or color of title. He received his appointment from a body authorized 
by law to make it, and was clothed with all the indicia of office. He made the collection in a legal 
manner, and in doing so, his acts were as binding upon the public as they would have been had he 
been acting as an officer de jure. 
90 Ironically, a perusal of the case law reveals that the de facto officer doctrine is most often cited by convicted 
felons challenging the authority of the special prosecutor. Mr. Williams' contract with the City of Cascade expired 
on September 30, 2010. The agreement unequivocally provides that "[t]he City of Cascade must appoint legal 
counsel each October." They didn't. As the prosecutor bears the burden of proof in all cases and Mr. Williams, sans 
a contract, is "without authority of law", is Mr. Williams prepared to disavow the de facto officer doctrine and 
dismiss the cases between October 1, 2010 and when bis contract is renewed? Would he not be a usurper under his 
theory under the law? 
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[F]irefighter was not entitled to a writ of quo warranto to remove fire chief from 
office, even if alleged irregularities in fire chiefs appointment involved 
noncompliance with the Open Meetings Act, where fire chief was a good-faith 
appointee who was not aware of and did not participate in any irregularities in the 
... proceedings appointing him, and [the plaintiff] failed to [timely] take 
affirmative action to challenge fire chiefs appointment until after expiration of 
fire chiefs six-month probationary period. 91 
The VCPA, Matt Williams, freely admits in two separate emails to SVCRD's legal counsel that 
I believe the Directors are good people and are in the positions they are in because 
they want to serve the people of the District and not because they have personal 
agendas to push. I believe their errors and omissions were unintentional and were 
the product of not fully understanding what was required ofthem.92 
If usurpation actions focus on the conditions at the time of the action, the VCPA's relief to oust 
the directors for procedural irregularities that predate their terms illustrates that this is not a valid 
usurpation claim. In good faith, the directors submitted their declarations of candidacy thereafter 
duly exercised their duties of office. The absence of legal scienter precludes the efficacy of this 
usurpation action as an untimely, improperly clothed election contest. 
VI. THE VCPA HAS ACTED WITH AN IMPROPER PURPOSE 
As stated, usurpation is an extreme remedy, rarely utilized, and susceptible to abuse. The 
policy behind this is obvious. 
Public officers should be free to perform their duties without having their 
authority questioned incidentally in litigation between other parties. They should 
not be called on to defend their authority unless a proper officer of the state has 
determined that the question raised is serious and deserves judicial 
consideration. 93 
A county prosecutor is vested with considerable power and discretion, but with such power 
comes the responsibility that he exercise sound judgment, impartiality, objectivity, and avoid 
conflicts of interest. Where a prosecutor brings a usurpation action for an improper purpose, it is 
91 State ex. Rel. Newell v. City of Jackson, 118 Ohio St.3d 138, 140-141, 886 N.E.2d 846, 848 (2008) (quoting taken 
from Headnote 4). 
92 Exlnbit G. 
93 Heller v. State of Nevada, 120 Nev. 456, 463, 93 P .3d 746, 751 (2004). 
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that much more of an affront to justice. Illustrative to this action, the law of usurpation has less 
than laudable origins: 
Quo warranto is an ancient, ''prerogative" writ, frequently used at the whim of 
feudal English kings to force a claimant of franchise, office, or liberty supposedly 
conferred by the crown to show by what right the claimant currently held the 
privilege. The writ was a favorite of Edward 194, who needed money, and 
shrewdly understood that few of the nobility, clergy, or commoners who held 
franchises granted long ago by the crown could present any contemporary proof 
of such a grant. The king's attorney general would apply for the quo warranto 
writ on behalf of the crown . .. If the attorney general prevailed, the king would 
seize the franchise or oust the usurper. 95 
Here, the catalyst in this action is political control over the SVCRD's funds to construct a 
community swimming pool. The SVCRD wishes to partner with the YMCA and enter into a 
long-term lease with the City of Cascade to locate the swimming pool in the southern part of the 
City. Dick Carter, the mayor of Cascade, is opposed to the SVCRD's preferred facility plan and 
location. As the president of the private corporation that owns Kelly's Whitewater Park facility, 
he has unequivocally expressed his desire to have the pool located at the private waterpark.96 
Dick Carter is also one of the most outspoken complainants in this usurpation action, 
which has jeopardized the SVCRD's contractual relationship with both the City and the YMCA. 
The VCPA, Matt Williams, auspiciously brings this action on behalf of the State, but has a 
pecuniary interest with the City of Cascade having contracted in his individual capacity to 
94 Also known as ''Edward Longshanks" and the "Hammer of the Scots", Edward I was the King of England from 
from 1272 to 1307. A rather brutal man he was often criticized for his brutaJ conduct towards the Scots (also 
depicted in the movie "Braveheart"), and issuing the Edict of Expulsion in 1290, by which the Jews were expelled 
from England. The Edict remained in effect for the rest of the Middle Ages, and it would be over 350 years until it 
was formally overturned in 1656. 
95 McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 50.2 (3d ed rev. vol 1970). 
96 The SVCRD disagrees due to a high water table and other cost-prohibitive considerations including land 
acquisition, building design, etc. At a minimum, the SVCRD would have to purchase some of the land from Hans 
Borbonus for approximately $57,000 per acre. 
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perform the City's prosecutorial services in his individual capacity. As its chief executive 
officer, Dick Carter is the signatory on that contract. 97 
Thus, although the catalysts are a select few individuals, this usurpation action represents 
a coordinated attack by the VCPA, the City of Cascade, and Kelly's Whitewater Park to 
effectuate political influence and control over a public works project. This case screams of self-
dealing, intimidation, and abuse of process. It is patently clear that, years after the fact, this case 
was never about the publication of notices for a position that no one ever gave a second thought 
about much less volunteered for, but rather a political agenda. Mr. Williams has all but admitted 
this. In the Complaint Mr. Williams asserts that "political interest and public debate has 
dramatically increased with regard to the scope of the SVCRD's mission to its constituents and 
the continued lack of swimming pool facilities." In an email to SVCRD's legal counsel, the 
VCPA further asserts that legal counsel is 
at a bit of a disadvantage because you are not a member of the community and do 
not fully understand the dynamics currently at play here. There are enough 
·people upset with the Rec District that there is the beginning of a movement in 
favor of dissolution.98 
What is the relevancy ofhoi polloi politics to a prosecutor's discharge.ofhis duties? By 
publishing its case in the media on several occasions99 and threatening ancillary open meetings 
act violations, the VCP A is clearly orchestrating a political attack amidst these negotiations 
against the SVCRD on behalf of a select few with personal, contractual, and financial interests; 
97 Pursuant to IRPC l. 7 and 1.11 Mr. Williams appears to have a conflict of interest in that: 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by the 
personal interests of the lawyer, including family and domestic relationships. 
98 Exhibit G. 
99 See IRPC 3.8(f) "[E]xcept for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the 
prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, [the prosecutor shall] refrain from making 
extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused .... 
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interests which indirectly impact the VCPA in his individual capacity. The VCPA has 
manipulated the usurpation statute in violation of public policy. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The SVCRD may recover its reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117 
where it can show that the non-prevailing party acted ''without a reasonable basis in fact or law". 
In 2004, the Idaho Supreme Court summed up the operation of the statute: 
The purpose of l.C. § 12-117 is two-fold: First, it serves "as a deterrent to 
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy for 
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending 
against groundless charges .... " An award of attorney fees under J.C.§ 12-117 has 
been distilled into a two-part test. Attorney fees must be awarded if (1) the Court 
finds in favor of the person, and (2) the [non-prevailing party] ... acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law.100 
This Court may decide that attorney fees are also warranted pursuant to I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l). A 
party may be subject to sanctions if its signed legal document (1) is not well grounded in fact; (2) 
is not warranted by existing law or a good-faith extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; and (3) was interposed for an improper purpose. 101 For the reasons stated herein, the 
VCP A has brought this action without a reasonable basis in fact or law nor reasonable extension 
thereof, but is rather misusing the power of the State to effectuate political influence over a 
public works project. King Edward I could not have done better. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court dismiss this 
action and award attorney fees against the County. 
100 Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004). 
101 Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 504, 236 P.3d 1257, 1264 (2010) citing Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 
371, 209 P.3d 661, 668 (2009) 
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DATED this J(; day of March, 2011. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRCKE, CHARTERED 
Paul J itzer 
Atto ey for Defendant 
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STATE OF IDAHO, ) C~e No. CV201 l-48C 
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) AFFIDAVIT OF LORENA BEHNKE IN 
v. ) SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO 
) DISMISS 
MICHAEL SMITH, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF LORENA BEHNKE IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Valley ) 
LORENA BEHNKE, being first duly sworn, sayeth as follows: 
1. My name is Lorena Behnke. I am an adult human being over the age of 18 years, 
and I am of sound mind. The statements made in this affidavit are made upon my own personal 
knowledge and are true to the best of my knowledge. 
2. I am the duly appointed Secretary and election officer for the Southern Valley 
County Recreation District ("SVCRD"). As the Secretary I am the custodian of all records of the 
SVCRD that are regularly maintained in the course and scope of the SVCRD's regularly 
conducted district activity made at or near the time of the underlying district activity that the 
record pertains thereto. 
3; By virtue of working as the Secretary, I am familiar with the factual issues and 
events pertaining to the current legal action against the SVCRD by the Vcilley County 
Prosecuting Attorney ("VCP A''). I have reviewed the Complaint and familiar with records and 
the factual events alleged therein. 
4. In Paragraph VI of the Valley County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (''VCPA") 
Complaint for Usurpation of Office and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Complaint''), the 
VCPA asserts that since its inception in 1998, the SVCRD has not conducted a public election 
for its directors although general elections are required pursuant to LC. § 31-4306 to be held in 
substantial confonnity with Title 34, Chapter 14, Idaho Code. This is partially correct although 
notably misleading; Pursuant to J.C. § 31-4306(2), if only one candidate has been nominated for 
AFFIDAVIT OF LORENA BEHNKE IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
each director position to be filled and no declaration of intent is filed for a write-in candidate, the 
election shall be cancelled. In such instances, the Board "shall ... declare such candidate elected 
as director, and the secretary ... shall immediately make and deliver to such person a certificate 
of election." 
5. The SVCRD Directors are unpaid positions filled typically by retirees who have 
volunteered their time to provide recreational opportunities for the citizens of the district. Since 
the SVRCD's inception, there has never been an election as there has never been more than one 
candidate pursuant to I.C. § 31-4306(2). Unfortunately, since 1998, other than the directors, no 
one-else has ever expressed a willingness to volunteer their time by becoming a director. 
6. Yvette Davis is the Director for sub district (3) and has been since the SVRCD's 
inception having been appointed by the Governor, the Honorable Phil Batt. No one has ever run 
against her. In Paragraph VIII of the Complaint, the VCP A asserts that the SVCRD failed to 
publish a notice of election filing deadline for the sub district (3) position in 2006 for the 2007..:. 
2011 term and in 2010 for the 2011-2015 term. Again, this is misleading. 
7. The SVRCD failed to publish a Notice of Election Filing Deadline pursuant to 
I.C. § 34-1405 for the November, 2006 election for the 2007-2011 term of the sub district (3) 
director position.1 While no one contested this procedural error, the SVRCD cured this defect 
by immediately rescheduling the election for February 6, 2007. The SVRCD duly published the 
notice of election filing deadline for this election in the Long Valley Advocate on December 20 
and December 27, 2006. The Long Valley Advocate is a weekly paper and the official 
newspaper of the political subdivision. Only one declaration of candidacy was filed by Ms. 
Davis and no declaration of intent was received from a qualified write-in candidate. Thus, 
pursuant to LC. § 31-4306(2), the election was cancelled and Ms. Davis was "declared elected as 
1 In 2006, Archie Banbury was the SVCRD Secretary. Mr. Banbury is now the Valley County Clerk. 
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director" in February, 2007. Attached hereto and incorporated herein as if stated in full is 
Exhibit (A) representing the sub district (3) 2007-2011 Election Process. 
8. Pursuant to I.C. § 31-4305, the director position is a four year tenn and "shall 
continue until a successor is elected and has qualified." As the 2007-2011 tenn began in 
February 2007, there was some confusion as to when this term would end. Following the 
September 14, 2010 SVCRD meeting in which, by petition, various members of the public 
addressed the November election for sub district (3), I consulted with the County's Election 
Officer, Jo Ann Fly, and, as in 2007, SVCRD agreed that it would schedule the election for 
February 2011 unaware that the newly revised election laws had va.Cated the February election 
date. On the regularly scheduled meeting of November 18, 2010 the -SVCRD's legal counsel, 
Stephanie Bonney addressed the Board and the general public. In coordination and cooperation 
with the Idaho Attorney General's Office (Brian Kane, Assistant Chief Deputy) and the: Idaho 
Secretary of State's office (Tim Hurst, Chief Deputy), the SVCRD declared that the sub district 
(3) director position would expire at the end of the tenn, which, erring on the side of caution, 
would be deemed to be January 1, 2011. In the interim, whether labeled as usurpation, 
expiration, or otherwise, a vacancy in office existed. Pursuant to LC. § 31-4305, the board is 
required to appoint a replacement for a vacancy. · On January 11, 2011, the Board filled· the 
vacancy by interim appointment to serve until the May, 2011 election. Attached· hereto· and 
incorporated herein as if stated in full is Exhibit (B) representing the meeting minutes for the 
above-mentioned meetings. 
9. For the 2009-2013 term for sub district (1) and (2), the SVCRD published its 
Notice of Election Filing Deadline for the November 4, 2008 election in the August 13, 2008 
edition of the Long Valley Advocate. In Paragraph IX of the Complaint, the VCPA asserts that 
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this was five days early. Yet, it was the County's Election Officer, Jo Ann Fly that specified that 
the SVCRD's notice must be filed in the August 13th, 2008 edition of the Advocate. In 2008, 
I.C. § 34-1405 required that "the county clerk shall cause to be published the election calendar 
for the county for the following calendar year." Thus, the SVCRD consulted with and provided 
a copy of all its election documents to JoAnn Fly, Valley County's election official. Ms. Fly 
provided the SVCRD the 2008 Local Election Calendar and specified to me that the SVCRD 
must publish its Notice of Election Filing Deadline at least seven days prior to the deadline 
specified in her Local Election Calendar, which was August 25. As the Long Valley Advocate is 
a weekly paper, the only edition that was at least seven days prior to the August 25th deadline 
was the August 13th edition. 
10. Ms. Fly also specifically approved the text of the Notice of Filing Deadline. 
Pursuant to l.C. § 34:..1405, the notice of filing deadline "shall not include not less than the name 
of the political subdivision, the place where filing for each office takes place, and a notice of the 
availability of declarations of candidacy." Thus the notice, as approved, provided: 
That declarations of candidacy for the office of Board of Directors of the 
Southern Valley County Recreation District must be filed with the district 
clerk/secretary whose address is . . . no later than 5 :00 p.m. the 1st day of 
September, 2008. 
The VCP A contends that the entire election process is void and that the directors are usurpers 
because the notice did not specify "sub district (1) and (2)". Regardless, only one declaration of 
candidacy was filed for each sub district, Michael Smith for district (1) and Jim Roberts for 
district (2). No declaration of intent was received from a qualified write-in candidate. Thus, 
pursuant to I.C. § 31-4306(2), the SVRCD subsequently published a notice of cancellation of the 
election on October 22, 2008 in the weekly paper and Mr. Smith and Mr. Roberts were "declared 
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elected as director". Attached hereto and incorporated herein as if stated in full is Exhibit (C) 
representing the sub district (1) and (2) 2009-2013 Election Process. 
· 11. Since the inception of the SVCRD, no one has ever contested the SVCRD's 
election process. No one bas ever asserted that they were denied of due process either as an 
elector or a potential candidate. 
Further this affiant sayeth naught. 
· Dated this /{p day of March, 2011. 
orena Belmke 
. ~ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this (~ day of March, 2011 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Iii day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAvIT OF LORENA BEHNKE IN SUPPORT OF 
JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
_<--tr.f. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile: (208)382-7124 




__ Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile: (208)287-7529 
E-mail: dcmclaum@adaweb.net 
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This p.etitlo11 111un be flied in the urficc· of _the '.approprlat_e political sub-dlv!aion fili113 offic;cr on or br.fore S p.111. 
________ ..;.,_priO,- IO the 81ection. The $Ubmilttid petidOfl ivust have affixed tllcrcto the names of ;it \cast five CS) quillti~ · 
elc®rS which r~lde _within llle apptopdatc zone ()I' dislrict. 
I. Ille Qlldenigncd. bdng a q11111iliecl dcct0r of the toneldiscrict, In 11\e Siate orldabo, do 
hetc by ccttlfy and . declare :that J re11idc ~11d that I join in rile peU1lo11 or 
10 be voted for at the election lo be held on the 
. II . 
Affidavit of Publication 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF VALLEY 
I, Janet L. Shaw, being duly SW(lrn deposes, and says~ I am authorized by the 
Publisher of The_ Long Valley Advucate, a weekly newspaper published at 
Cascade, in Valley County, Idaho, and having a general circulation therein 
and of legal status in :said county. 
l:he • - . , a copy or 
which IS attached ereto, was. pu lis e in sw newspa r once 11 week for 
_)..,,_consecutive w~ks in the regular and entire issue of every number 
thereof during (he period and ti me of publication, an.d was published in the 
newspaper proper and ~n l in a supplement, and that publication of such 
notice bes.an l!!:-14' · 20 0'6 . and ended · 
{k,f 2.7 I A• • r. 
Janet L. Shaw 
. h" o~ . f . L ,., -, 
Signed I 1s the ~..c..~--- day o --~.::!ll!o::.::;.:.::....:•:..---· 20~ 
STATE OF IDAHO 




c:z.11. k . On this the -- day of , 20 g 1 , before me, 
l!. Notary Public m and for said Statpers11naUy appeared Janot L. Shaw, 
known or identified to me 10 be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within Instrument, and being by me fi~t duly sworn, dedarcd thal the 
statements therein are true, and acknowledge9 \o,me ~ha~ ~~~~ec:uted the 
u~. ~ 1·"· .,. ..... :~ .. ;;. !: . ' ~"'J- .... \ 
 ~·... """' ~~·. -" '" \ r" ~. . . ~ l~- +c·~~~: ,.~, 
. . g -('""" ~ ./J ~ N<:,,~"~ \J "I ' Residing at:• · ~ \ ilu-o \.. \. l · :! 
Commission E_ x~/ f O\ ,_,. "·• .• •• ~~J 
" l• ............ : to-· .. ... 
"" 1 t-~ 0 f' :'i> ... '!; 
•P-tft: • <, I '·"" 
. • .. ~,~0ras'' 
'"·--... -- ... 
·Affidavit of Publication 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF VALLEY 
1, Dani~I J. Oallaghcr, being duly sworn deposes, and says, I am authorized 
by the Publisher of The Long Valley Advocate, a weekly newspaper 
published at Cascade, in Valley County, ldaho, and having a general 
circulation therein and of legal status in said county. 
T~e 1z.e.~~d1 cc£~91.f.l&wk,,. , a copy of 
which is attaeh-;re101 wa."' p\lbilSln said newspaper once a week for 
___}___consecutive weeks in the regular and entire issue of every number 
~during the pctiod and time of publication, and was published in the 
newspaper proper an not in a supplement,. and that publication of such 
notice~: · , 20.LL and ended 
{ tJ:. • '.B-· 
"' Daniel J. Gallagher 
STATE OF IDAHO 




On this the t. ~ day of ?ft. , 20 u_, before m1 
a Notary Public in and lor said State, personally appeared Daniel J. Gallagher 
known or identified to roe to be the person whose name is sut>scribed lo lhe 
withio Instrument, and being by me first duly sworn, declar~d that the 
statements therc~n are true. and acknowledged to ~e th~t 'li~:·~~ted the 
same. ... . . .- .•. ..., 
·~~~ 
Not~ Public Stale of Idaho 
Residing at: C~~~~ 
Commission Exp1re;Ck=!J;;;,D 
·: ....... .,). ••• * ~ .• ~ ~ 
.J' ..... •' · .... : ~ ~ ./':_•/ .,. . .... .. 
I. J1 .-:_;...::-- \ ll: \ 
! ~ \' 0 '€.<.. (., ~ • ti : ,.... . . ; . .., 1 ... i ,, .. ,.. '.\-' ,·~:· 
\ . p'\) "O ) ~""" :: 
.. ,,,,_......... ,q-.9/ 
' -....,..t>utl<' ~ "~· 
.. # •• 3 rA - \! ;::; · ....... . · 





/..-J.J.I.. t)i / ltful$f;ic·~·~ . 
u 1 / ("f iJ'"{ 
-1-o t..vl-t\.. t -~-& iJJ~: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: That the Southern Valley County Recreation 
District is cancelling the election scheduled for February 6. 2007 for: 
President 
Whereas, Yvette Davis was the only qualified candidate filing for such 
office prior U> the expiration of the date for filing nominations, namely, prior 
to December)8, 2007 and · 
Whereas, no declaration of intent was received from a qualified write-
in candidate prior to the expiration of the date.for filing declaration of intent, 
namely, prior to January 12, 2007 and 
Und~Qre~w.~e::d=:~ 
Election ffiCial 
Southern Valley County Recreation District 
Minutes of Regular Meeting 
January 11, 2011 
Cascade County Courthouse-Commissioners Meeting Room 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
The meeting was called to order by President, Mike Smith at 6:01 pm. 
Present were: Mike Smith - Board President 
Pat Cowles - Board Member 
Lorena Behnke, Secretary 
Yvette Davis was out of town. 
Election of Officers: Motion by Mike Smith, seconded by Pat Cowles, to elect Pat 
Cowles as President of SVCRD effective this meeting, January 11, 2011. 
Mike Smith read a letter from Yvette Davis expressing interest in being appointed to the 
Board seat that was vacated January 1, 2011. 
Motion by Mike Smith, seconded by Pat Cowles to accept letter of intent from Yvette 
Davis until May election. No further discussion. Passed unanimously. 
On motion of Pat Cowles, seconded Mike Smith, Dec 14 and Dec 28, 2010 minutes 
were approved. No further discussion. Passed unanimously. 
Financial reports for the month were also approved. Motion by Mike Smith, seconded 
Pat Cowles. No further discussion. Passed unanimously. 
Approval of Bills motioned by Mike Smith and seconded by Pat Cowles. No further 
discussion. Passed unanimously. 
Pat Cowles discussed "Free Ski Day" at Van Wick Park on held January 8, 2011, good 
turnout. 
Lorena asked for an amendment for December 14, 2010 minutes regarding x-mas 
employee gift certificates. Certificates were purchased at Subway for $25.00 and not 
Route 55 as stated. Lorena had gone by Route 55 and tried to purchase certificates but 
owner not in on 2 occasions. 
Motion by Mike Smith, seconded by Pat Cowles to accept amendment in regards to 
December 14, 2011 minutes, Christmas certificates. No further discussion. Passed 
unanimously. 
Correspondences: 
SVCRD received a donation request from Cascade Chamber of Commerce for $300.00 to 
be applied toward inter Jamboree 2011. 
ICRMP said SVCRD could put signs out at X-country ski trails if we wish, but was not 
mandatory. 
ICRMP also stated that as long as the 4 Summit Challenge Bike Ride, held in July 2011, 
was monitored by the Police/Sheriff's Department, signs were visible to 
spectators/pedestrians/riders, no additional coverage was needed. 
Pat Cowles discussed his conversation with Boise newspaper and Pete Zimowsky. 
Motion by Mike Smith, seconded Pat Cowles to donate $300.00 towards Winter 
Jamboree. Money was allocated in 2010/2011 budget. 
Theresa Perry spoke on behalf of the Idaho Parks and Recreation in regards to the MOU 
between Parks and SVCRD. She was in the process of getting approval from her home 
office and will forward new MOU to SVCRD once completed. The MOU will delegate 
each parties responsibility for X-country Ski Trails, grooming and maintenance. Theresa 
Perry also mentioned that she was starting a "Nordic Team", which volunteers will meet 
to discuss different ideas for all ski trails in Cascade. The first meeting is planned for 
Thursday, January 20,2011 at 4:00-Idaho State Park offices. If this changes, she will let 
us know. 
Public comment: Dennis Marguet and Aaron Guest inquired about land options, voiced 
opinion on options. 
The meeting was adjourned at approximately 7:03 pm, motioned by Pat Cowles and 
seconded by Mike Smith. 
Respectively submitted:-----------------
Lorena A. Behnke, Board Secretary 
Approved: 
Mike Smith - President 
Southern Valley County Recreation District 
Minutes of Regular Meeting 
November 18, 2010 
County Commissioner Meeting Room 
Cascade Courthouse 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
The meeting was called to order by President, Mike Smith at 6:01 pm. 
Present were: Mike Smith - President 
Yvette Davis - Vice-President 
Pat Cowles - Board Member 
Lorena Behnke, Secretary 
Amendment Noted: On the Oct 14, Aaron Guest brought a petition to the BOD 
questioning the legality of SVCRD's BOD. Mike Smith instructed Mr. Guest to forward 
all concerns to the Secretary of State. 
On motion of Pat Cowles, seconded by Yvette Davis, October 14 and October 26, 2010 
minutes were approved, with amendments. 
Financial reports for the month were also approved. Motion by Pat Cowles, seconded 
by Yvette Davis. 
Approval of Bills( and any additional invoices received by SVCRD after BOD 
packets went out) Motioned by Yvette Davis, seconded Pat Cowles. 
Motion by Yvette Davis, seconded by Pat Cowles, to add additional agenda items 
There was public comment regarding some of options for Rec. facility and pool. Ron 
Wise commented how pleased he was with the options for pool/rec. facility, especially 
option# 6. 
General Discussion: Attorney, Stephanie Bonney addressed various Idaho codes and 
statutes. Explained compliance issues and as of Jan 2011, the local counties will be 
responsible for all election filings and posting. This was approved by State of Idaho. Ms. 
Bonney also discussed the petition that was brought up by citizens on Oct 14, 2010 
meeting for SVCRD. 
Motion by Yvette Davis, seconded by Pat Cowles to table the BLM/RPP discussion until 
BOD talk further with Effie @ Bureau of Land Management in Boise. Yvette will set up 
a conference call. 
Yvette Davis discussed overview of Steering Committee Meeting that was held on 
November 10, 2010. Different options and locations were also discussed. Yvette also 
discussed Fit Express's open house that was held on Nov 13. Good turnout, Gym 
outfitters on hand to answer any questions regarding new equipment. 
BOD requested Lorena set up a conference call on Monday, Nov 22, 2010 to discuss 
Pool/Hot pool for sites #6 and #7. 
BOD requested Lorena contact Kate Farmer @ Cascade Medical to see if senior citizens 
might be interested coming to Fit Express on certain days for exercise that will help their 
upper and lower body strength. 
BOD requested Lorena call all current Steering Committee members to see if they would 
still like to participant in future meetings. 
BOD requested bids, for snowplowing at Hasbrouck/x-country ski area, to be sent out for 
snow removal for the 2010/2011 season. 
Pat Cowles discussed meeting for the Horizon Lifestyle and Education meeting. Their 
focus is still getting info. out to public about risks of smoking 
Motion by Yvette Davis, seconded by Pat Cowles, to deny additional contribution for the 
Hiking Club event that was held in October. SVCRD contributed $200.00 to event and 
requested they use money at their discrepancy for supplies, t-shirts, etc. 
The meeting was adjourned at approximately 9:07 pm, motioned by Pat Cowles, and 
seconded by Yvette Davis. 
Respectively submitted:------------------
Lorena A. Behnke, Board Secretary 
Approved: 
Mike Smith - President 
Process of 2008 Election per instructions from Joann Fly at 
Valley County Courthouse 
1. The attached 9 pages is the sequence of filing per instructions of Joann Fly. 
~00~ ~QY\J 
. frottSS 
ELECTION PROCESS FOR 
BOARD MEMBERS 
1. Each year, get a current "Election Consolidation Manual" for that 
Current year from Joann Fly at the Court House. On page #15, "Local 
Election Caleitdar" it will say what dates are necessary to file all 
Paperwork (Local Goveming·Bodies·Publish Notice of Filing Dates") 
2. The BOD member that needs to be re-elected must fill out a 
"DeclaratJon of Candidacy" and get 5 signatures. Once completed, 
Document must go to Joann Fly at courthouse. 
3. Then, the "Notice of Filing Deadline" needs to be filled out and given 
To the newspaper to publish 1 time.· The notice needs to be published. 
At least 7 days prior to the date listed on # 1 (local governing bodies publish 
notice of filing dates)- Example~ on page#15, it shows August 18-25 so 
the newspaper would have to run it by August 13. 
3+ (- Ask Joann is we need to fill out ''NOTICE OF District Election", do 
. We need to publish this notice eng if so, on which dates)· · 
Then, once it has been given to the newspaper, we wait until October 10 
(Ask Joann for exact dates), to see if anyone is going to be running against 
Board member. On or around the 14th of October, let Joann know that 
Yes, someone is running against or no, no one has come fo..Ward. 
4. Confirmed with Joann that no one ran against our BOD (Oct 15, 2008) 
I then faxd newspaper a legal publication for "Notice of Cancellation 
Of District Electjon" to run in next weeks paper. (notice is not in 
Packet-need to pull up in computer listed in "My Documants" under 
Same title "notice of cancellation ...... '' 




LOCAL ELECTION C"'-LENDAR 
POLmCAL SUBDIVISION ELECTION OFFICIAL: Not later than the last day of 
November 2007 notify the County Clerk or any election for your political subdivision 
to occur in calendar year 2008. 
ELECTION HELD: E@rp.ary 5 M•X iJ hYIUIS ~ ~oyember 4 
LocaJ Governing Bodies Dec. 14-21 March 7-14 June 13-20 Aug. 18-25 
Publish Notice of Filing Pates 
Last day District Candidates Dec. 28 March 21 June 27 Sepl I 
file Declaration/Petition. 
with local Se"1"ctary or 
Clerk of Taxing District 
Last Day to Pre-Register Jan. 1 J May 2 July 11 Oct. I 0 
to vote whh County Clerk 
Candldato not placed Jan. 11 May 2 July J I Oct l 0 
on ballot but files as a 
declared write·in with the 
local County Clerk or 
Secretary of T&Xlng District 
first Notice of Election Jan. 24 May 15 July 24 Oct. 23 
Published 
Second Notice of Election Jan. 31 May 22 July 31 Oct 30 
Published 
Following Districts have provbions which allow them not to conduct a11 dccdon if only one can-
didate bas filed for any posltioo. Pursuant to Section 34-1407. Idaho Code, tbls delermination 












Regional Airport Board 
Soll Conservation 
Water & Sewer 
Watershed improvement 
\'N}J.~~ 
~~ ""'* 'W\ 
¢f~s~ ·'/j\-V\ 
~A~. 
~~ FOR THE OFFJCE OF ---------
'· 0111 undmicncd. boillJ a !:C$idcnl or District, S1a1e ofldalJo. do hereby dcdmc ........ myJ&lflo beai:andldalO forth• omco or _______________________ _, ror a lemlof _ 
ycana, to be voted for at the Blettion to be held on me _____ _ 
day of and lhet my rcsideMc addreu is __________ _ 
J f\inhor certif)' thtt I JIOSICSS the !cpl qualifications to hold 1aid offioo. 
Dalt: __________ __,_ 
Sipied: ----------------
Subacribcd lllld SWOfn IO befo111 mt tbll _ dly or _____ _, (Corldl"'*l 
Signed:---------------
(Notary S.al) NOW)' Public. 
R•~iDgAt~~--------~---
PETITION OF CANDIDACY 
OF_...._~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
(1'1-Prilll H-ofCrnfldllt) 
FOR. OFFICE OF _____________ _ 
Thill pctilia11 must bo filed in the omce oflbt appropriate political 1ub-div1Jion filing officer 011 or before j p.m. -------
----prior 10 tile Eleetkm. The Sllbmlned petition must have affixed thcn110 the names or ot lellS\ five (SI qualified electors wllleli m1de 
within tile approprme a:one or district 
I, the UJ!tkniped, bei111 • q11111ilied elcttor of tho zone/district.. in dac Stale of Idaho. 
do hemby .ccnil)' ~ de1:lare lbllt I reside M \he plaor set opJJOllilet my name and lbllt I join in the petition of -----------









Sipatruv of P61lttaner Prin1,J Name OattS1gntd 
10 ______ ~-~-------~----------~~---------~ 
STATE OP IDAHO 
n. 
Coun~ of ______ _ 
I. • being ftrgt duly sworn. say: That I am a resident ortbo S1ateofldaho and atleast 111 years of age: that 
every person who Jiped lhl; thoet of llw foregoing petition si,enDd his or her nan\o 1hera10 in Ill}' presence; I believe that eacb )lu stated his or lter 
narne. posi.office 11ddrcss and residence correctly, lhal. each riplcr iJ a quell&ed eloi::tor of lhe Slate ofldaho, and the <01lfl!1 of ____ _ 
Signed--------------
Post OfllceAddreH __________ _ 
S11bscribcd and !IWO!ll to before mo this - day or_.;.....~----'.--· 
Siened _____________ _ 
DECLARATION OF CANDIDACY 
&e1'...ts 
0 ...... ./ 1- ~· 
In'\ 
~ 
PETITION OF CANDIDACY 
OF l't\\U 5Hnr\1o 
FOR OFFICE o~N-.~eo.-b~ IA'Sk. ~ 
,...~_Jllis petition 1n1at be tiled in Ille office orlhe •pproptlate polllical Jul:Hlivision filing ofl'lccr on or before 5 p.m. ~ / 
OIU1) prior to the Elec1ion. Tiie iubmluod pclition rn~n have .11ftiicGlf lhcreto lhe IWru::'l of al fC!iu;1 nve (SJ qualified elmors which reside 
witlJin the appropriate tone or dutric:t. 
I, 1hc U11der1igned, being a qualitled elector of the _...,....M<..>......,..._.IL!..?: ....... .._11:.1..!:_.... _____ _,,:n,diJtr~~he!~ of Idaho, 
do b~l>y oc:mfy llJld declare lh•t I reside lll lh~ . lac " Kion or U.\\Kt ~~ 
.._...l.Q.l~~=j...l.«..::.!.:'!~CJL...h!.!.-IOCll::=:;.J.!.l&:I~ l!.JO:l.10 be voted for a1 tbe e1cc11on io be held 
9 
._:_:10~ __ ..._.._~~~~~~~~._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
STATE O): IDAHO 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: T11at decJaratlons of candidacy for the office 
of_ f21Xlftl .of' .~e.a.q,furs 
· . (nameo 1a:) · 
ofth~O lf&J~Ctw~J~ Dr;C, 
(name of d11~ 1 
must be filed with district'clerk/secretary whose address is am N. [U4'L, 
C_fl5t...._11l.....,J-.1_...:L=.-.:o.D_~~=-=--'-\ ----no Jater than 5:00 p.m. on the \ ~ 
day of s:ipoJ~ . ' d.DQ~ . 
Such declarations are available at th• dg•ft!~ . 
f1oZ J\\. J1\uAv . I ~ ;:tD 
or at the office of the County Clerk. 
Individuals who run as write·in candidates must file a declaration of intent no later 
than 5:00 p.m. on tbe 2Stb· day 
F.C·3AApprovcd Sec. St.ate 1997 
• 12-
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION 
OF DISTRICT ELECTION 
(\Q.(&.s -fD ~ poskal. , f\., 
t'\tUVSp~ du'VV] 
w .ttA. t~ Cf!.;f :iJ - :.< 'f 
C.«l~NIL P~'\. OfJWiS ~ 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: That The Southern Valley County Recreation District is l.f11M ,, fl. 




-~.' IJ\IM '1 
W' I t.M-1\. '-f1.-< loll t 
Board Member - District 1 
Board Member - District 2 
Whereas, :tvfik_e Smith· District 1, and Jim Roberts-Dis4'ict 2, were the only 
qualified candidates filing for such offices prior to the ewiraffon of the date for filing 
nominations, namely, p1ior to October 21, 2008 and/···~ 
u..pt,t·1~ C/oSIN1 ,W 
~~~~ 
Whereas, no declaration of intent was received from a qualified write-in candidate 
prior to the expiration of the date for filing declaration of intent, namely, prior to October 
21, 2008 and 
Under state law. the elec ·on may be cancelled. 
. -
_. -... 
""!. • ,. ';"~ 
AffidaVit of Publicatio~ 
STATE OF IDAHO ·~ 
COUNTY OF VALLEY 
I. Daniel J. Gallagher, being duly swom depos~s. and ~ays, 1 am authwiI.1..\1 
bY. the Publisher of The Long Vfllle,> Advocate. a wecklr newspaper 
published at Cascade. in Valley County, Idaho. and ha,· in~" gen<.:ral 
circulation therein and of legal status in said county. 
The Ct.Met. '&\.I CJ e.i!..t\ ~ • a copy or 
which is attached beret , was published in said newspaper once a week ror 
_l_ consecuti vc weeks In the lllgul~r and entire issue of ev1:.-ry number 
thereof during the period and lime of publication, and was published in the 
newspaper propeJ and not in a supplement, aod that publication of such 
notic~ began _ OC..t<tx;r 22.. , 20...Q'Q... and i:nded 
22 I 20..Qfi. 
Dani~ l O~z~ /e>Ji--= 
Sig"•" thb <he I ~ day of iJ.J. ,,.,..._ l ..-
STATE OF IDA.HO ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF VAI.JLEY. ) 
NOTICE OF F.IUNG 
DEADLINE 
NOTIC.B IS HEREBY GIVJ!N: That 
. ~ ofCllDdidacy forbollklo 
of Board of~ oftbo Sou.diem 
Valley Cowity RCC(Cat{oJl Di•triet 
must be ~ with dfatrial clcddllelk. 
l\:&a.l'1 ~ •dclleff is~ N;·Maln · 
St., Cucade, Idaho 836 I t. no latet 
lban S:OO p.m. on 'the ht dll)' of 
. 5eptemba',l008. ' . 
Sucb ~are avallabki at'lhe 
district office at 208 N. Maio ~1.;. 
cascade, Idaho B31Sll, ot at 1be ~ 
o{lbl! Valley~ Cltd:. bldividiDl.a 
wbo Tut\ » wrlti:-lu.cmdid.atoa mmt 
. file a declaration of in&altDO·J$r than· . 
5:00 p.m. on Ille 2'th.dny·pdorto the 
elecllon. 
Isl Loteiia .Behnke 
·llontd Secrcta!')' . 
Soumem V3Jlfey County Reau\Wn 
District " 
Publisb 8113/08 
Affi.davit of Publication 
STATE OF IDAHO 6) 
COUNTY OF VALLEY 
l, Daniel J. Gallagher, being duly sworn deposes, and says, I am authoriz:ed 
by the Publisher of The Long Valley Advocate, a weekl>' newspaper 
published at Cascade, in Valley Coul)ty, ldaho, and having a general 
circular.ion therein and of legal status in said county . 
"' \: ' ' 
The , a copy of 
which is attached , was I> lished in said newspa.per once a week for 
_I_ t."<Jnsecutive weeks in tlle regular aod eotlre issue of e~eiy number 
thereof during the period and time of publication, and was published ln the 
newspaper proper and no~ln a supplement, and that publ1cation of such 
notice be~ 226.r j , 20.d_, and ended 
. ~~ ' Alf_. 
Daniel J. Gallagher 
Signed this the _..."'---__.__,__,day of _..,.A_....,1.:,"'"J"'"·_,.v.""'c_."Y..__ _ , 20;;_!_ 
STATE OF IDAHO 





Paul J. Fitzer, ISB #5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRCK.E, CHARTERED 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
ISB Nos.: 5675 
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
~RCHfE N. BANBURY, CLERK 
------Deputy 
HAR 1 5 2011 
Case No Inst. No 
Fifed ·-----A.M ..__ _,P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 



















STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CV2011-48C 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK COWLES IN 
V. ) SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO 
) DISMISS 
MICHAEL SMITH, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK COWLES JN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DIS<«::» [p )f 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Valley ) 
PA TRICK COWLES, being first duly sworn, sayeth as follows: 
1. My name is Patrick Cowles. I am an adult human being over the age of 18 years, 
and I am of sound mind. The statements made in this affidavit are made upon my own personal 
knowledge and are true to the best of my knowledge. 
2. I am the Chairman of the Board of the Southern Valley County Recreation 
District ("SVCRD") and its Sub District (2) Director. As a Director I am familiar with the factual 
issues and events pertaining to the current legal action against the SVCRD by the Valley County 
Prosecuting Attorney ("VCP A"). I have reviewed the Complaint and familiar with records and 
the factual events alleged therein. 
3. In Paragraph N of the Valley County Prosecuting Attorney's Office ("VCPA") 
Complaint for Usurpation of Office and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Complaint''), the 
VCPA seeks to declare me as a usurper of office due solely to the SVCRD's publication of its 
2008 Notice of Election Filing Deadline in the Long Valley Advocate, which evidently was 
published five days eariy. I was unaware and took no part in the 2008 election process. In fact, 
I was not even the candidate in this election. I only became the sub district (2) Director in May 
2010 by appointment following the resignation of my predecessor, Sue Patterson. Ms. Patterson, 
however, also was not the candidate. Rather, the VCP A seeks to impose a $5,000 fine against 
me in my individual capacity for a procedural error in which Ms. Patterson's predecessor, Jim 
Roberts, was the candidate. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK COWLES IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
4. This action stems from a public debate over whether the SVCRD should construct 
a covered swimming pool or seasonal swimming pool facility. In the Complaint the VCP A 
states that "political interest and public debate has dramatically increased with regard to the 
scope of the SVCRD's mission to its constituents and the continued lack of swimming pool 
facilities." 
5. There are a distinct few constituents who wish to utilize all of the District's 
funding for a covered swimming pool leaving no funds for other recreational programs. I believe 
that this is contradictory to our mission. The SVCRD's mission statement is to "provide quality, 
diverse, affordable recreation opportunities which enhance the quality of life for all residents and 
visitors of Southern Valley County." We provide a variety of affordable recreational programs 
to the citizens of the district including cross-country skiing, golf, an exercise facility, yoga, youth 
sports, adult softball, sponsorships of youth fishing and ski-free days and other such programs 
and partnerships. These programs would be lost to appease but a few individuals who wish for 
an indoor swimming facility. 
6. The Board disagrees and we had hoped that the project would already have been 
underway. The SVCRD has already advertised for RFQ's (Requests for Qualifications) for 
architectural services to design the SVCRD's preferred seasonal swimming pool facility. The 
SVCRD has also begun negotiations regarding a partnership with the YMCA. 
7. One of the biggest issues is the location of the facility. The SV CRD was to be 
negotiating with the City of Cascade to enter into a long-tenn lease of municipal real property to 
locate the facility. Then this action was filed which has jeopardized the relationship with the 
City and the YMCA. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PA TRICK COWLES IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
8. One of the main complainants in this action and outspoken citizens against the 
SVRCD's preferred facility plan is Dick Carter. Dick Carter is the mayor of Cascade. Mr. 
Carter wishes to force the SVRCD to change its preferred option and locate the swimming pool 
facility to the Kelly's Whitewater Park facility. Because of the high water table, the concomitant 
increased infrastructure and land acquisition costs, the water park facility was rejected. In 
addition to being the Mayor of Cascade, Mr. Carter is the President of the private corporation 
that owns the park, (Friends of Kelly's Whitewater Park, Inc.). See Exhibit (D) attached herein. 
9. This conflict is compounded by the VCPA's participation. The VCPA, Matt 
Williams, contracts in his individual capacity with the City of Cascade for their prosecutorial 
services. See Exhibit (E) attached hereto and incorporated as if stated in full. Mr. Carter is the 
signatory on that contract. By using the power of the State to bring an action on behalf of a 
complainant who has a personal business interest in influencing the location of a public works 
project and who is also the chief executive of a municipality to which Mr. Williams receives a 
pecuniary benefit, we believe that Mr. Williams is bringing this action for an improper purpose. 1 
Further this affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this J.f.ti_ day of March, 2011. --'? 




Subscribed and sworn to before me this /(; day of March, 2011 
Al'FlDA VlT OF PATRICK COWLJ!S JN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DJSMISS - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK COWLES IN SUPPORT OF 
JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
__ -t:T."S: Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile: (208)382-7124 




__ . Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile: (208)287-7529 
E-mail: dcmclaum@adaweb.net 
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK COWLES IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS - 5 
·. Feb 27 08 09:468 Rlffie .382·1285 p.3 
~-'~ ··.FILED EFFECTIVE 
~ ~'<.-
,.~ '":>"~-~ ~y_ ~ARTICLES OF INCO.RPORATJON OF 
\,~~ ~S OF THE CASCADE WBIIEWATER PARK. INC. 
~~f ~~ . . . 
~Undersigned, acting as the incorpondor' of a nonprofit cmporation . 
("COl'pOtaDOD") organized uoder' and pursuant to :the Idaho Non-profit Corporation Act, 
Chapter 3, Title lO, Idaho Code (" ~. adopt tbC follOwiog Articles oflncoiponmon fot 
thcCorpo.ratioJi: · 
Inc. 
ARTICLE O~ NAME · 
The name of the corporation ihaU be Fdcnds ~ibc Cascade Whitewater Puk, 
ARTICLE TWO. NON-PROFIT STATUS 
The Corporation is a DOnprofit CO?pora1ion '• 
ARTICLE THREE. PERIOD OF DURATION 
The period of duration o(tbc 'Corporation is perpetual. 
ARnCLE FOUR. . INITIAL REGISTERED :OFFICE AND AGENT 
The location of this Corporation is in the City of Cacadc, County of 
Valley, State ofldaho. The phys1cal addresS oftbC initial rcgistcrcd office is 609 W. 
Spring Street, Casc8de,. Idaho ~11.· The Dame: of die iDitial .rcgisten:d agent is K8tbJeen 
Riffie whose mamag address is ~.O. ·Box 758, ~~. Idaho ~3611. 
ARTICLE FIVE. .PURPOSES 
Said COlpOl'Btion is organiztd exclusively for charitable, educadonal. and 
scientific pus:posCs, including, for such purposes. the making of distributions to . 
organi2'Ations that qualify as exempt orpnizations under'.aeetion S01(c)(3) of the Jntemal 
Revenue Code, or the corresponding section of my mturo .. s=ctend tmc code. 
The purposes for which this coiporillion is orpnr,M 8l'CI as follows: 
(A) To create a Whitewater Park on the North Fm:k Payette River in Cucade1 
Idaho with whitewater wave or hole features for boaters .(kayab, ~etc.) to use free of 
charge; . . . 
(B) To impmve access poDlts on the North Fodt Payette River for boaters in 
the vicinity oftbe City of Cascade and at the immediate location oftbe WhitcWater Park 
features themselves close tO tbC old Boise Cascade mill site; 
(C) To. provide riverbank rcstrocturc and ltlbili7.ation along the North Fork 
Payette River in the vicinity of the City of Cascade; : · 
(D) To boost.the local ~nomy; 
FRIENDS OF THE CASCADE WHITEWATBR PARK.-JNC. 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION - 1 
IM!ll SECAE'rARY IF STATE 82/27/2B88 · 85aee 
Cits 147628:1 .CT1 172199 IH1 Ut!:S95 
1 I JI.a • .... Ill: - I e 
' • a.a • . 21. • .., mer • .J 
Feb 27 08 09:46a · Riffle 382-1285 . 'p.4 
(B) To promote, encourage, foster and provide opportunities for people to 
improve education. physice.1 fitness and healthy lifestyles;· 
(F) To enhrmce our eommun:ity•s quality of life; 
(0) To mafotain and pre~ the North Fode. Payette River wuterway in the 
vicinity of the City of Cascade; . · 
(H) To promote, encourage, foster and raise Nnds for tho creation aD.d 
main1cJ:Jance of tho Cascade Whitewater Pmk: BDd North Fork Payette River access points 
:in the vicinity of the City of c.cade. 8nd · 
(1) To participate in the p]anning and development of recrc:atiooal 
opportunities in the vicinity of the City of Cascade. · · 
ARTICLE SIX. NON-8TOCK CORPORATJON· 
~ corporation shall be nCm-stock.. · · 
ARTICLE SEVEN. ·MEMBERS 
The Corporation shall haw no Members~ 
. .ARTICLE EIGHT. BOARD OFDJR.EcrORS 
The affairs of 1be Corporation shall be managed by _its Board ofDUccton;. The 
Board of Directors shall consist of not less than three (.3) or more tharl nine (9) 
individuals. '!he aCtual number of Dilectora shall be fixed in. accordance with the 
Corporation•s Bylaws.· The twmber, queH&ation, 1mms of. offic~ manner cit oleotion, 
powers mad duties of such Directors sball be .sUch ~may be~ by ~w. by these 
ArticJes,'by such Bylaws as ma>' .&o.tp time to time h enfOTCOd. · 
are: 








P.O. Box 1067. Cuai.de. ID 83611 
. P.O. Box 758, Cascade, ID 83611 
P.O. Box 210, Cascade. ID 83611 
413 Cabarton Rd. Cascade, ID 83611 
P.O. Box 617, Cascade, ID 83611 
FRIENDS OF TIIB CASCADE WHITEWATER PARK, JNC. 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION;. 2 . . 
Feb 27 08 09:47a . Riffle .:382-1285. 
ARTICLE.NINE. INCORPORATOR 
The name and street address of the incorpOmtor is Kathleen Riffie of 609 w. 
Spring S~ Cascade, Idaho 83611. . . . 
ARDCLE 'J'EN.· BYLAWS 
Provisions for the regulation of the in1emal iffidis of the Corpomdon $hall be set 
forth in the Bylaws. The Board of DireCtors of the ,Corporation shall be authorized to 
amend the C'mporation's bylaws st a pmperly J')Oticed Special 0r regular meeting of the 
Boan! of Directors.. . . 
·ARTICLE ELEVEN. 
No part of the net earnings of the corp0ration shall inure to the benefit at or be 
distn'butable to its members~ trust~. ·officers. or other private penons,·except that the 
coiporatio11 shall be autboriZed and empOwered to pay reasonable compensation for 
services ~ and to mate payments and distn"butions in 1Urther8nce of the pmi)oses 
set forth in Article ·Five hereof. No 'substantial part of the activities of the corporation 
shall be the cmying on of propaganda,. p.r otherwise attempting to lldluence le8islation, 
and the cotp0mtion shall~ participate in, or fDterveno in (iiicluding the publishing ot 
distribution of statements) any political campaign OD beli81f of or in Opposition to any 
candidate forpnblic office. ~any o1her Jii'ovision of these artiCles.1bis 
corporation shall not. except. tO mi ~ dCgrec,· Cngage in any activities or 
exercise any powers tba.t me ;nr,x in furtheraDce of the ~'ofthfs corporation. 
ARDCLE TWELVE. DIST.RIBUrION ON DISSOLUTION 
Upon the dissolutimi of the cmPorati~ assets shall be distril>ub=d for one or more 
exempt purposes within the lneanlng of section 501(0)(3) of die Internal RDvmue Code, 
or the coJiesponding section of any 1bture federal tax code, or. shall be distri.ba:ted to the · 
federal govemment,. or to a state or local govemmcDt, for a public purpose. Ally such 
assets not so disposed of sball be.disposed of by a Court of~ Judsdiction of the 
county hi which the principai oftice Oftbe corporation is d:ien loeabxt;exclwiively for 
such purposes or to such org8niz8tion or organimons., as said C.ourt shall determine. 
which me organi7.ed and o~ exclusively for such ~ses. · · · 
11\ . . 
DATED this ~ =/ . day of £.b t'y.°12008. · . . 
. ~~ 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF VAYZf. ~ 
ON THIS :I).. J . DAY OF. ~._.,, 
20 V'if:BBFORB .MEj A NO!ilY PUBLIC IN & ff01. 
SAIUSTATE ~OWLY ~l'BAltED. 
I{ o:;.U.u...,_} t<~· . 
FRIENDS OF nm CASCADE WHITBWATBR P~ JNC. 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION - 3 
~~·-r:-)~ . -.. )!(_~_ 
11· ,,._.n r 
~r1.t. ,...Ar(_ 
12/3/2009 4:45 PM J'l\OM: fax HPMP taw TO: +1 {208) 334-2080 Pl\GE: 002 OF 002 
FILED EFFECTIVE. 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT 2flf8EC ~-. . AJffO: fl 
. (~on-profit) SE.CRf TARY oi -~·rAr 
Tothe.SecretaryofStateoflhe.State·ofl.daho· STATE Of IOAHO E 
Pursuant to Tltle;JO. OhaPtef~. IClahO CQ<t~. ~ 1.1r:ictt!f'tlgn$d · 
IWO-PfOflt corp.ota.\iQll ~nds ~ ariiCle& ofin<:al'poratiort:a. 
~ . 
1. The t.1ame of the "natlratlon Is: · 
t:ri1Jn~ Or\he Cascade l/Vhltewater Part<, Inc. 
It tbll ~on bla lhA adfllillWtnstfwt lfltfflYOlf and th• CIJfstOt• IRlflll It # I~ 
... !hi .. ,.,, '*• the ~·) ~ktW ni•t 111ctudf1 .. ·Ofl.•llllt of ~,.. llllllllt. 
2-. The textd each amendrneot:lt aa ft:I~: 
ARTICLC ONE. NAMe 
The name of the.c;o~n thal be Frienda i>f Kelly's. Whitewater Park.- tr¥:., as Sll<lCMSQr to 1frie.n~ r,( t"-: 
cascade Whhwater ~ 1no. 
3. The date of adoption of tne amem:Jment(s) was: November 22, 2009 
--....--.--..-...--~--....... --------..-~~--''--
4. Mani\er Of adQ(lUOn (Chti on•): 
[Z} Ealll'> am.,,dment conststs exciuelvely of ma&ters :wt;m:ti :do not require member. •pt»'oval P\ftU9rt..f42 
sectk>n '30-3-90. l<laho Oode~ and was. ther.el'or8, adopted ·by tha board of directors. (Please 111 ~ bllJowl 
a .. The mlmbet ot director.t entl~ io vote was: 4 
b. Thit nuMt>er of dlreotON 1hat voteCJ foreach amend_.__m_en_t wa-s-: ~_. ..... ,.......----------
c. The rmmb9r of dlreetor"e that voted against eadl ai:nendrnont was: :o __ _,,, __ _,_........,.._...,:.r.......__,__ __ ._. 
O ™ antetfdmfint ~OllUta of matters other then ttiose describsd Jn.secllon 30.-3-90 .. Idaho Code. ttncl was. 
tb~~Me adopted b.y the members. (Fllefte llll •'*'8' IHllOWt . 
a. The number Gf rnembtr-$ l!lnlftied to.-vate w.n:. ---- ________ ........._ __ 
b. The number of meimbert .,,_. wteo for-&ach 
aJneodtneritwas: _______ _._..._ 
e. The ntmbet el membeRf th.at wted -against 
Hth amenOO!ent·wa~_,...-------
Dated: ~"!1'·:9 ~" 
619~ ?'?. !Q : ~~;~f 
7 
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Annual Report for C 17734 Page 1 of 1 
No. C 177348 Due no later than Feb 28, 2011 
2. Registered Agent and Address 
(NO PO SOX) 
Return to: 
Annual Report Form 
W RICHARD LAMM 
SECRETARY OF STATE 1. Mailing Address: Correct in this box if needed. 315 DEINHARD LN 
700 WEST JEFFERSON MCCALL ID 83638 
PO BOX83720 
FRIENDS OF KELLY'S WHITEWATER PARK, INC. USA 
W. RICHARD LAMM 
BOISE, ID 83720-0080 PO BOX 2069 
MCCALL ID 83638 3. ~ Registered Agent Signature:* 
NO FILING FEE IF 
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE 
4. Corporations: Enter Names and Business Addresses of President, secretary, and Directors. Treasurer (optional). 
Office Held Name Street or PO Address .............. ~ .. --··· State . C:OIJ.ntry Postal Code ···········-······· ....... . -· ........... ·- ........ ··~ ....... ······-···· ·-················· . . . . . . . . . . . .... _. .. _ ... ······· ... 
SECRETARY KRISTINA PICKARD POBOX69 DONNELLY ID USA 83615 
TREASURER MARK PICKARD POBOX69 DONNELLY ID USA 83615 
DIRECTOR R. CAMERON CORDOVA POBOX746 DONNELLY ID USA 83615 
PRESIDENT RW CARTER PO BOX617 CASCADE ID USA 83611 
5. Organized Under the Law5 of: 6. Amu~I Report must be signed.* 
ID Signature: W. Richard Lamm Date: 12/15/2010 
c 177348 Name (type or print): W. Richard Lamm 11tle: Cpa 
Processed 12/15/2010 * Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures. 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/servletffransfonnXMLDoc?URL=%5C20101215%SCXMLPO... 3/1112011 
Annual Report for C 1773 Page 1 of 1 
No. C 177348 Due no later than Feb 28, 2011 2. Registered Agent and Address (NO PO BOX) 
Return to: 
Annual Report Form 
W RICHARD LAMM 
SECRETARY OF STATE 1. Mailing Address: CotTeCt in this box if needed. 315 DEINHARD LN 
700 WEST JEFFERSON FRIENDS OF KELLY'S WHITEWATER PARK, INC. 
MCCALL ID 83638 
PO BOX83720 USA W. RICHARD LAMM 
BOISE, ID 83720-0080 PO BOX 2069 
MCCALL ID 83638 3. New Registered Agent Signature:* 
NO FIUNG FEE IF 
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE 
4. Corporations: Enter Names and Business Addresses of President, Secretary, and Directors. Treasurer (optional). 
Office Held Name Street or PO Address qty_ S~e_ ... C:OIJntry. PostalCOde ,,,,,.,, .......... ............ ................ -... .......... · roeox69· ······ ...... ···-···•>< ''""'''••• ... ~ ........ ' ..... ., .. ' SECRETARY KRISTINA PICKARD DONNELLY ID USA 83615 
TREASURER MARK PICKARD POBOX69 DONNELLY ID USA 83615 
DIRECTOR R. CAMERON CORDOVA POBOX746 DONNELLY ID USA 83615 
PRESIDENT RW CARTER POBOX617 CASCADE ID USA 83611 
5. Organized Under the Laws of: 6. Annual Report must be signed.* 
ID Signature: W. Richard Lamm Date: 12/15/2010 
c 177348 Name (type or print): W. Richard Lamm Title: Cpa 
Processed 12/15/2010 * Electronically provided Signatures are accepted as original Signatures. 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/servletff ransformXMLDoc?URL=%5C201012 l 5%5CXMLPO... 3/1112011 
CITY PROSECUTING AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, dated this day of February, 201 O, is made between the 
City of Cascade ("City") and Williams law, PLLC ("Firm"). 
WHEREAS, the City is a municipal corporation duly organized and existing under the 
general .laws of the State of Idaho, and; 
WHEREAS, Williams Law, PLLC is a law firm located in Cascade, Idaho, with attomey 
or attomeys licensed lo the State of Idaho with experience in the prosecution of crimes 
under the laws of the State of Idaho· and the City of Cascade, and 
WHEREAS, .the City h.as created the Cascade Police Department employing city 
employees and the Valley ·county Prosecuting Attomey has no statutory duties to 
prosecute infractions or misdemeanors when the arresting officer is a Cascade Police 
Officer. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of.the mutual promises contained herein, the 
parties agree as folloVV.s: 
LEGAL SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED. The City agrees that Williams Law, PLLC, with 
the primary service provider being Matthew C. Williams, will represent the City as 
described herein, and Matthew C. Williams agrees to serve under the title of "City 
Prosecutor" as criminal prosecutor for the City of Cascade and to provide the following 
services: 
1. Legal representatio,n of the City on all City of Cascade misdemeanor criminal matters 
and infractions includlf)g, but not limited to, preparing for and appearing In court at 
arraignments; pretrial ·and motion hearings; assisting Cascade Police Officers with 
search warrants; responding to crime scenes when necessary; prosecuting court and 
jury trials and appeals to the District Court; processing discovery to defense attorneys 
and pro se defendants, and giving criminal legal advice to the Cascade Police 
Department. 
2. Legal research and ·legal consultations with the City of Cascade Police Department; 
specifically, City Prosecutor shafl provide training on topical statutory and· case law to 
the Cascade Police Department at a mutually agreeable time and place as requested by 
the City of Cascade Chief of Police. 
3. Review of, and consultation with, the City of Cascade Police Department regarding 
all public records requests submitted to the City involving the City of Cascade Pollce 
Department. 
4. Providing on call access 24 hours a day via telephone to answer legal questions 
posed by the City of Cascade Police Department, and when not available for a period of 
more than 24 hours will arrange a substitute on call person. 
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5. Notification of the Chief of Police and the Mayor of any recurring concems relating to 
the performance of members of the City of Cascade Police Department which 
negatively Impacts CiW Prosecutors abUity to successfully prosecute cases presented. 
COMPENSATION. In exchange for performing the services described herein, Williams 
Law, PLLC shall receive the sum of $1,350 per month. Said sum shall be paid to City 
Prosecutor following the next Cascade City Council meeting after receipt of a statement 
tor services rendered, provided the statement is received prior to the City of Cascade's 
cutoff date for processing bills ahead of the City Council meeting. Williams Law, PLLC 
shall not receive additional compensation for customary expenses associated with the 
provision of services hereunder, such as travel mileage, supplies, long distance phone 
calls, support staff, legal research materials or electronic legal research, or other 
general expenses Incurred by Williams Law, PLLC, in the representation of the City of 
Cascade as provided;above. Williams Law, P.LLC may submit additional extraordinary 
expenses af3sociated ;with the fulfillment of the duties as the City of Cascade 
Prosecutor, provided #le City Covncil pre-authorizes such expenses. Examples of 
extraordinary expenses are the costs associated with obtaining copies of criminal 
convictions, out of st~te drivers packets, expenses for .bringing witnesses to court for 
trial, and $xpert witne$s expenses. Nothing in this agreement authorizes the City 
Prosecutor to obligate the City. of Cascade to pay any fees associated with the 
fuffillmem of the duties of the City of Cascade Prosecutor without the prior approval of 
the City Council. · 
TERM. The term of this Agreement shall commence upon signing and shall expire on 
September 30, 2010. The City of Cascade must appoint legal counsel each October. 
TERMINATION. This Agreement rnay be terminated by either party upon providing 
written notice of at least thirty (30) days to the other party. Notice under this Agreement 
shall be effective when actually delivered. If mailed, notice shall be deemed effective 
forty-eight (48) hours after mailing registered or certified mail, postage paid. 
NO EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP. The parties to this agreement agree 
the City Prosecutor shall be cons/dered·an independent contractor and not an employee 
of the City of Cascade. Williams Law, PLLC, is a contractor and is not entitled to the 
protections provided City of Cascade employees as set out in the City of Cascade 
Personnel Manual. 
ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Agreement contains the entire understanding between 
and among the parties and supersedes any prior understandings and agreements 
among them respecting the subject matter of this Agreement. 
COVENANTS AND NOTICES. The parties hereto covenant, warrant, and represent to 
each other in good faith, complete cooperation, due diligence and honesty in fact in the 
performance of all obligations of the parties pursuant to this Agreement. All promises 
and covenants are. mutual and dependent. 
CITY PROSECUTING AGREEMENT· PAGE 2 
SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Agreement or the application of such provision 
to any person or circu,mstance is held irwalid, the remainder of this Agreement or the 
application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it 
is held invalid shall nqt be affected thereby. 
APPLICABLE LAW. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hands the date and year above first 
written. 
DATED this ___ day of January, 2010. 
CITY OF CASCADE, yalley County, Idaho 
:: By: _____ _..._ ______ _ 
Rtchard Carter, Mayor 
ATIEST: 
Wes Hardin, City Clerk 
DATED this ___ day of January, 201 O. 
Williams Law, PLLC 
Matthew C. Williams, Managing member 
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A letter from Ron Harper was submitted to the Council for revJ.ew prio:r to the 
deliberation phase of the public hearing. 
Public Hearing closed at 8:52 PM 
Discussion between Council, Mayor, and Clerk ensued. Changes to tlle 
Planning & ZonJng Commission's version of Ordinance 620 were implemented 
by the Council as part of the final draft set for adoption by the Cotmcil on 
March 8, 2010 at regularly scheduled City· Council Meeting. 
Motion by Haski.nS, 2"d. by Term to approve Ordinance 620 as changed bJI 
Council and subi!ct ftnal appr0ual by City Attorney. Motion carried 
unanimou.slu by roll call· vote. 
OLD BUSINESS 
No Old Busi.D.ess for this meeting. Council Member Huckaby inquired about 
. the potential interest rates for transfeni.ng LGIP Funds following up from the 
previous Council meeting. Mayor Carter informed him that the matter was still 
being investigated. ••City Clerk gave. a biief synopsis of the findings discovered 
thus far and pointed out that there were currently no competitive interest rates 
available to the City without restr1cting the use of funds for a period of greater 
than one year. City: Clerk also stated that he and the. Mayor were continuing to 
seek out other potential opportunities and would report back at a later date. 
Mayor Carter stated that he would hesitate tying up any funds for a period of 
greater than ninety days because the penalties incurred if the funds had to be 
utilized would be substantial. · 
NEW BUSINESS-----------·----------------- - -- ---- -----
Revtew & Discuss contract from Matt Williams for criminal legal services 
Motion bu Smith, ,2nd by Buckaby to authorize Mqyor to sign and ~ecute 
provosed legal services contract ·with Williams Law Qtlices. Motion 
carri.ed with thre~ yes votes ·an.d Haskins abstainina. 
Mike Smith - 3 Summit Bicycle Challenge - Requesting use of Annstrong Park 
and camping on the ball fields. 
Mike stated that he did not need to request park use from the Council because 
he was proVlded with a reseivatlon form from the City employees. He also 
stated that he wanted to table the camping Issue until a later date when he 
knew how many riders had signed up. Council Member Haskins stated that 
she was not in favor of camping at the ball fields and that she believes that 
there are adequate camping facilities located· in and around the City to 
accommodate events like the upcoming Bicycle Challenge. 
':11:1c:atfa CiQ! Council R1m:ilar .'rler&tiny .'vlinutrts 
F,,h1·11.u·y ~2. :!.tJ/I/ 
-~" ·~ ~,. ......... g -~ n•oy 11 ' I ,~ ,_, .. 
.. '. -·· · ·- -·- ·--
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sues recreation board m.embers 
for ''usurpation of office'' 
Board members served ,with papers at conclusion-of 
public board meeting last Tuesday night 
By Mike Ste.wart . Phil Batt. fered by the recreation district. 
).ong Valley Advocate "For · Subdistrict (3), the Cowles was appointed by Smith 
_ SVCRD faileli to publish no- . and Davis to fill Patterson's seat 
CASC:Ablf'' ';:;: ·' :Fo11o\virig · · tice' 6f ~trot(iiimg''deadl"me· · laSt summer. 
through on. a threat made pub- . in 2010 (for 2011-15 term) !ind · Board members were asked 
lie in a ~est opiniQn SJ;lbmitte(i . in 2006 (for 2001-11 tet;m)."' ac.. abopt the.· pi:ospect of lawsuits 
to The Long Valiey Advocate ' wtding t9 the co~plairtt. "No against. them at last Tuesday's 
three weeks agq,yalley County electioBS were.held ~ose years, meeting prior to the arrival of 
Prosecuting · Attorney Mau no n~tices qf ex~ptions to the deputies who ·served them with 
Williams· last. week had Valley elections wete filed at •least 7 the-documents. 
·County Sh~s DeptJ,ties serve 'day!! before the actuaj election~ "W¢. can't discuss that. Our 
member$ oftbe Southern Vailey .!ls requited by (Idaho CQde) and attorney, has said we cim't dis-
Col.lllty Recre~tion . District it is believ.ed .the ele¢tions were ·cuss it/• Cowles said in response 
(SVCRD) board · of directors not plac.ed on tile eleetion c;ilen- to a question abour the threat-
with lawsuits following the dar ,by SVCRD," the ,complaint · ened suitS l'rom Olin Balch, who 
conclusion of their meeting last states. · . · was among a dozen or so citizens 
Tuesday night. The Complaint contin:ues, say- attending the meeting. 
Each of the three board mem-- · iag that· elections for subdistricts Balch said there seems to be 
'bers, Y:vette Davis, Mic~1el . l and 2 were "arguably sched- a cloud over the board's legal 
Smith and Patrick C~wles, . was uled for vote" in 2008. The com- standing and he asked why all 
serv¢d with a "Complaint for plaint notes that theSVCRD had three board members don't just 
Usurpation of Office .. .'' after an entry on the eolinty's election resign, and then run for the seats 
the board's regular meeting w.as calendar "for unspecified of- in May's election. 
ended. fice or offices" in 2008. But, the "We can·'t discuss this," 
Containing substantially the complaint states. that th.e notice Cowles repeated. 
same \".\'Ording, . the · th):ee suits, of election · fi,ling dead.line . was . The board was also brought 
which Williams has em'Elhasized not published withinthe 7-14 day to b\Sk by Dennis Marguet, an-
are against the board members as time wind.ow ptior to the dead- other citizen iii attendance. who 
_individ1,1als and not against the lin~;as required by state statµte. said he thought it was a mistake 
recreatiori 'district nor the n<cre~ It does 8*1Y that notice was pub- ~y the board to not solicit names 
ation board, allege. thatthe board lished ·once, J 9 days prior to the from . mernbers c;>f the district 
has no legal standing. . · deadline, but.that that notice was who nrightbe interested in filling 
·. Amorig other things, the com- also·'1defective" in that it didn't Davis'seat. 
plaint alleges that elections for list how many offi~s were :open . He said that he was .sure that 
positions on the board were .not and it didn't intlude information . both Cowles and Smith ~ould 
legally . advertised ·as requited about which b6ard positions for have voted to appoint Davis back 
under Idaho law; that as a result, which subdistricts were open for to the seat she's held since the 
appointments made to the board election. recreation .district was formed, 
to fit vacancies were not legal~ Subsequently, the board pub- but he said to not publicize th~ 
because the two sitting board lished a notice that no election opening and solicit letters of in-
members. making the appoint- was being held as only one can- terest from others only "threw 
ments weren't themselves legal- didate per office bad filed. Jn that fuel on the fire" and reinforced 
ly holcling those offices; and that notice, the prosecuting attorney's a belief many have that the rec-
most recently, the 'board failed complaint notes that the SVCRD reation district board is a "secret 
to take and .document proper ac- . did include information that the organization." 
tions to declare a seat vacant and . offices open for-election were for "You make a good point," 
then filled the seat without prop- subdistricts 1 and 2. Cowles said. 
erly notifying the public. With that declaration. Smith Marguet also said his under-
As things stand now, Davis and then-director Jim Roberts standing was that if Williams 
represents subdistrict 3, Smith were appointed to represent sub- followed through on his threat to 
represents subdistrict 2, and districts 2and1, respectively. sue the board members individu-
Cowles represents subdistrict I. Since then Roberts resigned, ally that recreation district funds 
Davis was first appointed to the and that seat was held for .a few could not be used to defend the 
board on its creation in 1998 and months by Sue Patterson, who board members" 
"That's wrong," Davis said 
before board members again said 
they couldn ' .t discuss what was 
at that time only a threat of suits 
upon the advice of their Boise at-
torney Stephanie Bonney. 
Smith also announced dur-
ing the . meeting that the Boise 
YMCA has ag~ed to come on 
board as a consultant for the rec- · 
reation district as it develops its 
new facility. 
"This is huge," Davis said. 
Smith said he's recently been 
meeting with YMCA officials, 
particularly those involved with 
,·, -.· 
the development of the new 
YMCA camp at Horsethief 
Reservoir east of Cascade, and 
has sliown them conceptual de-
signs of what the recreation dis-
trict has in mind. 
"They liked what they saw, 
liked what they heard and want 
to get on board," he said. · 
He said the YMCA officials 
were going to develop a menu of 
the various levels of involvement 
they coold have with the district 
and expressed a desire to begin 
immediately consulting with the 
board over the project. 
..... i:Jer ldaho law, if the court 
.sides with the prosecutor and af-
firms his allegations, each board 
member could be subjected to a 
$5,000 civil fine. 
· Also, Williams asks the court 
in the suits to · deClare the posi~ 
tions vacant and that Idaho Gov. 
C.L. "Butch" Orter app-oint inter-
im board meH1berS until th·e May 
election is held. 
Williams also asks for court 
costs and attomey's fees from 
the board members. 
............ .,........,,, ........... ,.,. .. -..~ ......  ;,,, ...,,._--::_,,_. __________ __,. _ _ _________________ ____ ____ _ 
";fjditor: · · 
f .. The Rec D~stj:iet :~dmem~ 
~.i!:;~?lf:e:S i 
f:beffig in tlie· p.Qsitions: ili:e.gally. . j 
~"Hesay, he.has lo0lcedat.theRec 
r~-~n~ f h:gally oiri 'the p<$itj,on ;l>Ccause 
i~~~~ 
FW.h9le ,si~~--~s goi.iJ.gl9·be a. 
i ~s ifit is foµd.l.t out i1;1 :t:Q.e )~- • 
( gill ,system. We don ft iieedth~ m 
i ourcity. ·· · 
The YMCA has agreed to 
~- partner with ttie Rec DiStrict 
•  whiCh is a huge . thjng; what are 
· they going to think. about this? · 
.. It appears that there are peo-
;ple on both sid~ of the issue on 
•. all the i~sues confronting the dis-
.tric;t. The b~t wayJo solve this 
}is for all the R.~ Pisttici .  boart;l 
_members to put themselves up . 
Jot re~electfon this May.. Do all 
the discl~11,tes aii<;l 1Dake jt· l~~at 
· 'Ilu! ·o®:Qf.!1~ puts e<verylhiqg to 
rest. 1'be C~tiz-ens gct::to -vote on 
the 4irection the~ ·district showd 
. g? on the project an"· the . people 
.tJiey ·war.t.d.ireciion this. · · · 
Another·thiog ~s, why have not 
the Rec· District board rnctn:bers 
gone tri . ihc ,~fy ~prosecutor 
a.nc:J ~-- with liun ab"out what 
· cillt;bc_-Oon,e?:l<:ailtt-s~. howtrus . 
w:otill:l 'burt snatt¢rs fa me' te8St; It 
seemed to me that tbelctter Matt 
Williams wrote .in . the paper a 
couple wteb ago was a call for 
them to contact ·him before he 
sued. It seems Matt had no other 
choice but to sue since they did 
not cont1J.Ct him. · 
I 
Dennis Marguet . . f: 
~ - -·· · ··-l 
-- " t 'f&'t;ire{r-·fiM:;.1_.:.A~~,~ 
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STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CV2011-48C 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN 
v. ) SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO 
) DISMISS 
MICHAEL SMITH, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
PAUL J. FITZER, being first duly sworn, sayeth as follows: 
1. This affiant is an attorney with the law finn MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRCKE, 
CHARTERED, Boise, Idaho, attorneys of record for Defendants, which was retained for the 
purpose of defending this lawsuit. 
2. I am familiar with the files generated in this case and I have knowledge of the 
contents thereof, and I make this Affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of an excerpt of an email 
from VCPA Matthew Williams to my partner, Stephanie J. Bonney. 
Further this affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this /{a day of March, 2011. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this .................. 
........ ··~~ M. lJ -.,.,~ 
~ .. "~ ......... o-+. "' ....... v. .. 0 ~ ,-::-· ... . ",/.."" 
f ~I ~OTA~r \.,\ 
•:.,,:I ·~· : : .,... : : 
:*. c •*i 
'i \ P(JB i.\ /.I • \ .,..... o I 
.. ./"' .. • ~1.:' "" "•. "1 l' ........ t--~y !!. . ti 
..... , "11 0 F \'O ••"'"' ............... 
--=.......;::;..;;:'--
08/08/2012 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF JOINT 
MOTION TO DISMISS by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
~ail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile: (208)382-7124 





__ Facsimile: (208)287-7529 
E-mail: dcmclaum@adaweb.net 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. mZER IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
From: Matt Williams [mwilliams@co.valley.id.us] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 5:17 PM 
To: Stephanie J. Bonney 
Subject: RE: SVRD 
Stephanie, 
This issue is not about "waging war", but about my responsibility as the 
Prosecuting Attorney. I did not want to get Involved In this issue and turned the 
complaining parties away the first time they came to me. When they came back, 
upon the advice of the Secretary of State's Office, with the statute Indicating this 
was my responsibility, I reluctantly agreed I must look in to their issue. 
What I found In a brief look, supplemented by what you have provided, is the 
Rec District did not follow the requirements necessary to avoid holding an 
election. You are willing to admit this for one District Director and are willing to 
correct It. However, you are not willing to admit the mistakes regarding the 
other District Directors, though there is no question Idaho Code was not 
followed. It makes zero sense fiscally or logically to "wage war" when the Rec 
District has not followed Idaho Code. I have no interest in seeing this go to 
court, and that is why I am willing to take the time to meet with the District 
Directors to see if this issue can be resolved. The last thing I want is for this 
situation to end up in court. 
I know you are at a bit of a disadvantage because you are not a member of the 
community and do not fully understand the dynamics currently at play here. 
There are enough pec)ple upset with the Rec District that there is the beginning 
of a movement in favor of dissolution. Many people In Valley County are hurting 
financially and are struggling to make ends meet. The general attitude towards 
taxes and taxing districts is borderline contemptuous. The Cascade School 
District, to my knowledge, has never lost a levy election. This last levy election 
passed by a very slim margin, despite a campaign from the school detailing how 
the. levy failure would dramatically impact the quality of education at the school. 
If people are willing to vote against the school district levy knowing the vote will 
impact the education their children are receiving, the Directors would. be hard 
pressed to convince people to keep the Rec District in light of perceived 
Incompetence and the chance to cut their tax bill. 
Regardless of what you may think, I want to see the Rec District not only survive 
but flourish. My desire is to see this Issue worked out. As I Indicated to you in_ a 
previous email, I believe the Directors are good people and are in the positions 
they are in because they want to serve the people of the District and not 
because they have personal agendas to push. I believe their errors and 
omissions were unintentional and were the product of not fully understanding . 
what was required of them. There is no guarantee resolving this issue will stem 
the growing movement to dissolve the Rec District. However, I believe admitting 
the mistakes and moving to resolve them rather than ''vehemently" fighting is 
the course of conduct with the best chance to unify the tax payers of the district 
and solidify Rec District's survival. 
I look forward to meeting with the Directors to discuss this further and work to 
find a resolution to this issue. Please get back with me regarding their available 
dates over the next few days. 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Phone (208) 382-7120 
Fax (208) 382-7124 
rrtwilliams@co.valley.id. us 

Paul J. Fitzer, ISB #5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRCKE, CHARTERED 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
ISB Nos.: 5675, 6563 
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY, CLERK 
By Deputy 
APR 2& 2011 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
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PATRICK COWLES, ) 
Defendant ) 
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MICHAEL SMITH, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CV201 l-148C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) AMENDED JOINT MEMORANDUM IN 
V. ) SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
DONALD MICHAEL KEITHLY, ) 
Defendant ) 
) 
AMENDED JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMM(;,JUcCr'«.~r~v 
i ; ; l t ........ I _,,.. ~-. d 
COME NOW, Defendants Yvette Davis, Patrick Cowles, Michael Smith, and Donald 
Michael Keithly ("Directors"), by and through their attorneys of record, MOORE SMITH BUXTON 
& TURCKE, CHARTERED, and hereby submits the following Amended Memorandum in Support 
of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b). 
This Memorandum is supported by the pleadings, the exhibits, and the affidavits previously 
submitted in this action. Defendant Yvette Davis' Response to State's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction is incorporated herein as if stated in full. 
STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the ·affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c) .... [I]f the nonmoving party fails to provide a sufficient 
showing to establish the essential elements of his or her case, judgment shall be 
granted to the moving party .1 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DIRECTORS HOLD THEIR OFFICES WITH AUTHORITY OF LAW 
A. APPOINTMENT OF SUB-DISTRICT (1) and (2) 
Pursuant to J.C. § 6-602, a usurper is one who "holds ... office ... without authority of 
law". Idaho Code § 31-4305 grants the District Board broad appointive powers. Idaho Code § 
31-4305 provides that "[alny vacancy occurring in the office of director, other than by 
expiration of the term of office, shall be filled by appointment of the board for the unexpired 
term." On April 14, 2010 the Southern Valley County Recreation District ("SVCRD") accepted 
the resignation of Sue Patterson, the Sub-District (2) Director.2 The Board appointed Pat Cowles 
as the Sub-District (2) Director to serve for the remainder of the 2009-2013 term, which shall 
1 Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Timothy Hoagland, 147 Idaho 774, 779, 215 P.3d 494, 499 (2009) 
(internal citations omitted); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 471 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91L.Ed.2d265 (1986). 
2 Cowles Affidavit, ii 3. 
AMENDED JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
expire on January 1, 2013. Similarly, on March 8, 2011 the SVCRD Board appointed Mike 
Keithly as the Sub-District (1) Director to replace Mike Smith whose letter of resignation was 
accepted by the Board on February 25, 2011.3 As qualified electors of their respective districts, 
the Sub-District (1) and (2) Directors therefore hold their offices with authority of law pursuant 
to J.C.§ 31-4305. 
B. ELECTION CANCELLATION IF ONE CANDIDATE: SUB-DISTRICT 
(1) and (3) 
Pursuant to LC. § 31-4306(2), if only one candidate has been nominated for each director 
position to be filled and no declaration of intent is filed for a write-in candidate, the election shall 
be cancelled. In such instances, the Board "shall ... declare such candidate elected as director, 
and the secretary ... shall immediately make and deliver to such person a certificate of election." 
In the 2008 election process, only one declaration of candidacy was filed for each sub district; 
Michael Smith for district (1) and Jim Roberts for district (2).4 No declaration of intent was 
received from a qualified write-in candidate. 5 The SVCRD published a notice of cancellation of 
the election on October 22, 2008 in the Long Valley Advocate and Mr. Smith and Mr. Roberts 
were "declared elected as director".6 Therefore, Mike Smith held the office of Sub-District (1) 
with authority of law. He has since resigned, which renders the question as to whether he 
should be ousted as moot. 7 
3 Supplemental Behnke Affidavit, ,7. 
4 Behnke Affidavit, ,9-10. 
5 Id See Complaint, 1 VI. Alas, since the SVCRD's inception in 1998, there has never been an election as there has 
never been more than one candidate. The SVCRD directors are volunteers who have sought to provide recreational 
opportunities for the citizens of the district. Other than the directors, no one else has ever expressed a willingness to 
volunteer their time by becoming a director. Behnke Affidavit, 11 5, 9-11 
6 Id. 
7 "A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest 
in the outcome." Goodson v. Nez Perce County Board of County Commissioners, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 
614, 616 (2000). "A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no 
practical effect upon the outcome." Id. See also Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 509, 
148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006). 
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Yvette Davis has been the Sub-District (3) Director since the SVCRD's inception. For 
the February 6, 2007 election8 the SVCRD duly published the notice of election filing deadline 
on December 20 and December 27, 2006.9 Only one declaration of candidacy was filed by Ms. 
Davis and no declaration of intent was received from a qualified write-in candidate.10 Thus, 
pursuant to LC. § 31-4306(2), the election was cancelled and Ms. Davis was "declared elected as 
director". 11 
C. THE INCUMBENT HOLDS HER POSITION UNTIL A SUCCESSOR IS 
ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: SUB-DISTRICT (3) HOLD OVER 
In 2010, the SVCRD failed to timely publish the notice of candidate filing deadlines for 
the Sub-district (3) position in time for the November 2010 election. 12 When the SVCRD 
became aware that this election was required on September 14, 2010, the notice of candidacy 
filing publication deadlines13 for the November 2, 2010 election had already passed (publication 
Aug 18-25) as had the last day candidates could file written declarations I petitions (Sept 1, 
2010). Thus, the November 2, 2010 election date was precluded. 14 With the advice of the Idaho 
Secretary of State and the Idaho Attorney General's Office, the election was immediately 
rescheduled to the next earliest available election date, May 17, 2011; all notices of which have 
been duly published and the election is scheduled. 15 In the interim, as a matter of law pursuant to 
LC. § 31-4305, an incumbent holds his or her office with authority of law "until a successor is 
elected and has qualified". 16 Ms. Davis is the incumbent sub-district (3) director. No successor 




12 Behnke Affidavit, , 8. 
13 See I.C. §§ 34-704, 34-1404, 34-1405. 
14 Supplemental Behnke Affidavit,, 4-5. 
is Id 
16 City of Heutter v. Keene, 244 P.3d 157 (201 O); Clark v. Wonnacott, 30 Idaho 98, 162 P. I 074 (1917). 
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has been elected and qualified. Therefore, Ms. Davis lawfully holds title to office at least until 
May 2011 pending the outcome of the election. 
II. THE VCPA'S IMPROPERLY CLOTHED ELECTION CONTEST AS BASIS TO 
USURP MIKE SMITH AND YVETTE DAVIS 
The VCPA's sole and purely political basis to declare the former Sub-district (1) Director 
Mike Smith as a usurper is not an attribute on his part or the result of the electoral process, but 
by the SVCRD's unchallenged, de minimus, erroneous publication, three years earlier, of its 
2008 notice of candidate filing deadline. The notice was published five days early.17 Further, 
pursuant to LC. § 34-1405, the notice of filing deadline is required to include not less than "the 
name of the political subdivision, the place where filing for each office takes place, and a notice 
of the availability of declarations of candidacy." The SVCRD's notice of candidate filing 
deadline clearly stated that ... 
declarations of candidacy for the office of Board of Directors of the Southern 
Valley County Recreation District must be filed with the district clerk/secretary 
whose address is ... no later than 5:00 p.m. the 1st day of September, 2008. 18 
The VCPA contends that the entire election process is void and that Mr. Smith and any 
subsequent director appointed by him holds office without authority of law, all because the 2008 
notice did not specify "sub district (1) and (2)". 19 
For Sub-District (3), the SVCRD failed to publish a Notice of Election Filing Deadline 
pursuant to LC. § 34-1405 for the November 2006 election.20 While no one contested this 
17 Complaint,, IX. See also Exhibit C. For the 2009-2013 tenn for sub district (1) and (2), the SVCRD published 
its Notice of Election Filing Deadline for the November 4, 2008 election in the August 13, 2008 edition of the Long 
Valley Advocate. Ironically, it was the County's Election Officer, Jo Ann Fly that specified that the SVCRD's 
notice must be filed in the August 13th, 2008 edition of the Advocate. In 2008, LC.§ 34-1405 provided that "the 
county clerk shall cause to be published the election calendar for the county for the following calendar year." Ms. 
Fly provided the SVCRD the 2008 Local Election Calendar and specified to the SVCRD that it must publish its 
Notice of Election Filing Deadline at least seven days prior to the deadline specified therein, which was August 25. 
As the Long Valley Advocate is a weekly paper, the only edition that was at least seven days prior to the August 25th 
deadline was the August 13th edition. See Affidavit of Lorena Behnke, ,9-10 
18 Id. Ms. Fly also specifically approved the text of the Notice ofFiling Deadline. 
19 Complaint, , IX. 
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procedural error, the SVCRD cured this defect by immediately rescheduling the election to 
February 6, 2007.21 The SVCRD duly published the notice of election filing on December 20 
and December 27, 2006.22 Now, five years after the fact, the VCPA asserts that Ms. Davis and 
any subsequent director appointed by her holds office without authority of law, because the 
notice referenced the position as the "president" not "director". 
A. The VCPA does not have standing to challenge a procedural error. 
The VCPA, in solely challenging procedural errors in the election process that transpired 
at the time of election,23 is attempting to do an end-around the election laws via this usurpation 
action. For several reasons, these alleged procedural errors, even if true, are irrelevant and may 
not serve as the factual basis to oust an officer years after the fact. First, the VCPA does not 
have standing to challenge a procedural error in the election process. The right to challenge a 
procedural irregularity is vested in the individual. This is because, as its name implies, 
procedural due process deals solely with the procedural rights of the particular litigant as 
opposed to the state.24 LC. § 34-2007 unequivocally affords standing to only a qualified elector 
to contest a procedural error in an election. The VCP A is not an elector. Therefore, the VCPA 
does not have standing to bring what is in all respects an election contest. 




23 An election contest alone focuses on the 
facts and conditions that exist at the time of the election ... or that transpired at the election itself 
[whereas an action] against usurpers and intruders into office have reference to conditions that 
exist at the time the action is brought. 
Tiegs v. Patterson, 19 Idaho 365, 369, 318 P.2d 588, 590 { l 957)("Tiegs I"); 
24 See I.C. § 34·2007; regarding procedural due process, see U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV,§ I; Idaho Const. art. I, 
§ 13. As its name implies, procedural due process deals with the procedural rights of the particular litigant. 
"Procedural due process requires that some process be provided to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily 
deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions." Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 
Idaho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 487, 493 (2008). 
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B. The VCPA's procedural challenge is untimely. 
Second, the VCPA cannot escape the statute of limitations applicable to contesting a 
procedural error in the election process by clothing its action as that for usurpation. Pursuant to 
I.C. § 34-2008, a procedural error must be challenged within twenty days. No one brought such 
a challenge. No elector or estranged candidate asserted a denial of due process by virtue of said 
error. Even had a procedural error occurred, the failure to bring a challenge in a timely fashion 
will render even a valid challenge as waived25, lost, or barred by laches.26 "Courts must take 
care in post-election challenges to avoid disenfranchising votes without clear statutory 
warrant."27 A strict statute oflimitations for mere procedural errors reflects an important public 
policy preference favoring electoral stability. 
The public bas an interest in the speedy determination of controversies affecting 
elections, and provisions of the statute limiting the time within which steps may 
be taken are universally regarded as mandatory. Unless they are strictly complied 
with, the court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter. 28 
By the VCPA's interpretation, one could observe a de minimis procedural error in an 
election process, and lie in wait for four years only then springing a usurpation action to oust the 
incumbent. Incredulously, the VCPA further asserts that every act, policy, or decision rendered 
by the incumbent during the term is void as undertaken "without authority of law".29 The law 
25 Due process arguments not timely raised are deemed waived. Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and 
Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 236, 245 P.3d 983, 988 (2010.) 
26 McNamara v. Wayne, 67 Idaho 410, 414, 182 P.2d 960, _ (1947)(Where there was ample time and opportunity 
between the primary and the general election to have had any of the alleged disqualifications of the candidate for the 
office of the prosecuting attorney heard or passed on, but contestant neglected to take any action whatever until after 
the election, contestant could not be heard to urge said objections, which, if permitted, would disfranchise thousands 
oflegal voters. ) 
27 Norman v. Ambler, 35 Fla.L.Weekly 02409, 46 So.3d 178, 181 (2010). 
28 Mansfieldv. McShurley, 911N.E.2d581, 585 (2009). 
29 In the Complaint,, IX, the VCPA argues that Pat Cowles, who was only appointed in May, 2010, is nonetheless a 
usurper subject to the personal $5,000 fine in that: 
The other two board members who appointed Patrick Cowles were not valid board members at the 
time of the appointment (holding and exercising the office without authority oflaw) and therefore 
said appointment was made without authority of law. 
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does not pennit a political opponent to "roll the clock back" four years; the impact of which to 
the law and to the vested rights of the citizenry is incalculable whether it be a councilman's 
approval of a land use application or a judge's sentencing of a felon. 30 
C. DE MINIMUS PROCEDURAL ERRORS DO NOT VOID AN ELECTION 
OR OUST AN INCUMBENT UNLESS MATERIAL IMPACT TO 
ELECTION RESULT. 
The reason for this is that a procedural error, even if timely rendered by one with 
standing, does not render an election void or justify ousting the incumbent. The procedural error 
must be material; the burden of proof on the challenging party to demonstrate that the result of 
the election would have been different but for the procedural error.31 While voters are certainly 
entitled to notice, substantial compliance with the spirit and purpose of the law in such manner to 
afford the public an opportunity to know when and where the election is to be held, and the 
object of the same, is all that is necessary.32 
[W]e are of the opinion that the correct rule, and the one supported by the great 
weight of authority, may be stated as follows: Statutory directions as to the time 
and manner of giving notice of elections are mandatory upon the officers charged 
with the duty of calling the election, and will be upheld strictly in a direct action 
instituted before an election; but after an election has been held, such statutory 
requirements are directory, unless it appears that the failure to give notice for the 
full time specified by the statute has prevented electors from giving a full and free 
expression of their will at the election .... 33 
30 In Huetter, 244 Idaho at 161, the Court cited with approval State v. McDermott, 52 Idaho 602, 609, 17 P.2d 343, 
346 (1932) wherein a defendant challenged his conviction upon the contention that the judge had no authority to 
conduct the preliminary hearing because he had forfeited his office by temporarily moving from the county. 
31 Jaycox v. Varnum, 39 Idaho 78, 226 P. 285 (1924) (Contestant must prove that result of election would have been 
different if illegal votes had not been received.) 
32 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, §40.07 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1970). 
33 Harrison v. Bannock County, 68 Idaho 463, 469-470, 198 P.2d 1013, 1016-1017 (1948)(Emphasis added). 
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Where the "notice was sufficient to apprise voters of the purpose of the election", a notice of 
election will not invalidated.34 "We conclude that the notices of election were sufficient to 
provide reasonable notice of the chief features of the proposal."35 
A showing that election officials failed to follow every election procedure 
precisely, without more, is insufficient under LC.§ 34-2101(1). Noble's evidence 
does not demonstrate that the election process was unfair or that the results are 
contrary to the actual will of the electorate.36 
[T]he burden is upon the party contesting the election to make a prima facie 
showing, to the effect that sufficient illegal votes were cast, or legal votes 
rejected, to change the result of the election, or that serious wrong or fraud existed 
as to make the result of the election doubtful. . ... While it is apparent that there 
were irregularities in the conduct of the election in Idaho Falls, they do not seem 
to make the result of the election doubtful, nor is this court convinced that there 
was intentional wrongdoing or fraud such as to vitiate the election. 37 
The VCP A contends that he may oust an incumbent based upon an unchallenged, de 
minimus procedural error which transpired at the time of election in the absence of any evidence 
of deprivation to an elector or estranged candidate's procedural due process rights or material 
impact to the result of the election process. Even the Court could not set aside the result in an 
election process unless it reasonably believed that the procedural error materially impacted the 
result of the election.38 If a Court of law could not void an election for a de minimus error, how 
can the VCPA attain the same result years after the fact for that very same de minimus error? In 
Nelson39, the Court reasonably determined that the election result was materially impacted by the 
clear procedural error in turning away eligible voters where the result of the election was quite 
close. 
34 Lindv. Rockland School District, 120 Idaho 928, 931, 821P.2d983, 986 (1991). 
35 Id See Durand v. Cline, 63 Idaho 304, 119 P.2d 891 (1941); Corker v. Village of Mountain Home, 20 Idaho 32, 
116 P. 108 (1911); I 5 E. McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations§ 40.07 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1970). 
36 Noble v. Ada County, 135 Idaho 495, 504, 20 P.3d 679, 688 (2000). 
37 Huffaker v. Edgington, 30 Idaho 179, 163 P. 793, 794 (1917). 
38 I.C. § 34-2021. 
39 Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation District, 133 Idaho 139, 143, 983 P.2d 212, 216 (1999). 
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Here, the result of the election is not in question. In each of the above-mentioned 
elections, only one declaration of candidacy was filed and no declaration of intent was received 
from a qualified write-in candidate. Pursuant to LC. § 31-4306(2), the elections were cancelled 
and Ms. Davis and Mr. Smith were "declared elected as director". This result is not in dispute. 
Did a procedural occur in the underlying process? The question is irrelevant as no one timely 
brought a challenge. In short, the VCP A fails to present any evidence or even allege that the 
purported procedural error has a "fairly traceable causal connection" to the deprivation of an 
elector or estranged candidate's procedural due process rights or otherwise materially impacted 
the election process. Without more, the impact of a procedural error is de minimus, speculative,40 
harmless, 41 and, even in a properly plead election contest, ineffectual to void the election much 
less oust the incumbent years after the fact. The usurpation laws do not exist to render the 
election laws superfluous or meaningless.42 
III. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE - THE VCPA's CHALLENGE OF 
APPOINTMENT OF PAT COWLES AND MIKE KEITHLY 
The VCPA's sole basis to oust Pat Cowles and Mike Keithly as usurpers is not for any 
action upon their part, but rather upon the unproven accusation that the SVCRD Board members 
40 Standing to challenge a procedural may not be based on speculation. To present a justiciable case or controversy 
pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, "it must be "likely", as opposed to merely "speculative", 
that the State's "injury" will be "redressed by a favorable decision."" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). "Abstract injury is not enough ... [S]peculation is insufficient to 
establish the existence ofa present, live controversy." Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 105 (1983). "It is 
the realiz Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 
Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). 
41 See Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 272, 207 P.3d 998, 1003 (2009) (holding that an error is 
prejudicial only if it could have affected or did affect the outcome of a proceeding); Crown Point Dev., inc. v. City 
of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 77, 156 P.3d 573, 578 (2007) (same); In re Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 296, 882 
P.2d 457, 463 (Ct. App. 1994) ("This Court will not grant relief for what is, at most, harmless error."). 
42 The objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the 
act. Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 ldaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 
483 ( 1999). Constructions that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Friends of Farm 
to Marketv. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002). "Language ofa particular section need not be 
viewed in a vacuum." Id Statutes and ordinances must be construed so as to give effect to all their provisions and 
not to render any part superfluous or insignificant. id 
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who appointed them were usurpers at the time of appointment and therefore the appointment was 
without authority of law.43 This puts the proverbial cart before the horse. Usurpation is the 
subject of this cause of action. An accusation is just that. One is not a usurper until "adjudged 
guilty" of such. The VCPA is attempting to prove a truth based upon an unproven premise. 
Until declared otherwise, pursuant to LC. § 31-4306(2), where only one candidate puts in for an 
election, the election shall be cancelled and the Board "shall ... declare such candidate elected as 
director". At the time of appointment, the Board was a valid governmental entity. Mr. Smith and 
Ms. Davis hold their positions with authority of law and an appointment carries full authority of 
law. 
Regardless, even assuming arguendo that the SVCRD directors do not lawfully hold 
office as de jure directors, the VCPA patently ignores the de facto officer doctrine. Idaho has 
long recognized that a legal defect in a person's holding of a particular office does not necessarily 
invalidate that person's official acts: 
A de facto officer is "one who actually assumes and exercises the duties of a 
public office under color of a known and authorized appointment or election, but 
who has failed to comply with all the requirements of the law prescribed as a 
precedent to the performance of the duties of the office. "44 
A de facto officer performs his duties under color of right of an actual officer 
qualified in law so to act, both being distinguished from the mere usurper who has 
neither lawful title nor color of right.45 
43 As stated herein, while Pat Cowles, who was appointed in May 20 I 0, obviously could not have participated in any 
of the SVCRD's purported procedural errors asserted herein, the VCPA nonetheless asserts that he is a usurper in 
that: 
The other two board members who appointed Patrick Cowles were not valid board members at the 
time of the appointment (holding and exercising the office without authority of law) and therefore 
said appointment was made without authority oflaw. 
Complaint,~ IX. 
44 State v. Dailing, 128 Idaho 203, 205-206, 911 P.2d 1115, 1117-1118 (1996) citing State v. Whelan, 103 Idaho 
651, 655, 651P.2d916, 920 (1982). 
45 Whelan, 103 Idaho at 655, 651 P.2d at 920. 
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... Generally, the de facto officer doctrine has been applied in the situation where 
an individual's authority to act has been challenged due to some defect, error, or 
irregularity in the individual's appointment to the position. 46 
Broadly speaking, an officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the 
officer he asswnes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. More 
particularly, a de facto officer is a person who is ·surrounded by the insignia of 
office and seems to act with authority or one who is exercising the duties of an 
officer under a color of title, right, or authority, or under color of an appointment 
or' election. As otherwise defined, a de facto officer is one whose title is not good 
in law but who is in fact in unobstructed possession of an office and who is 
discharging the duties thereof in such a manner as not to present the appearance of 
an intruder or a usurper.47 
The acts of a de facto officer are as valid as those of an office de jure; this rule is based on 
considerations of"public policy, necessity, justice, or convenience."48 
Where a person is appointed as a member of the board of highway 
commissioners... and such person is ineligible to hold such office, and such 
person accepts such office and acts in that capacity, until such eligibility of such 
officer is called in question, he acts as a de facto officer, and the action of the 
board is not illegal or void by reason of the fact that such de facto officers as a 
member of such board.49 
"As an officer de facto, he must be submitted to as such until displaced by a regular direct 
proceeding for that purpose."50 Until then, to hold as the VCPA argues that an irregular 
appointment of a director "renders his subsequent official actions null and void", would unduly 
disrupt the orderly function of government.51 "Necessity and public policy compels us to declare 
otherwise."52 
46 Dalling, 128 Idaho at 205-206, 91 l P.2d at 1117-1118 (1996). 
47 67 C.J.S. Officers § 266, pp.801-02 (1978). 
48 Id.,§ 276, pp.812-13. 
49 Shoshone Highway District v. Anderson, 22 Idaho 109, _,125 P. 219, 220 (1912). 
50 Barrett-Smith v. Barrett-Smith, 110 Wash.App. 87, 91, 38 P.3d 1030, 1033 (2009). 
51 id 
52 id. See also Gorman v. Commissioners of Boise County, 1 Idaho 655, 658-659 (1877). The county commissioners 
removed the incumbent assessor, Gorman, and appointed Davis. Gonnan sought payment of the compensation that 
had been paid to Davis during the time he exercised the duties of the office. In rejecting Gorman, the court noted: 
[Davis'] official acts, while acting as an officer de facto, under color of an appointment by the 
board, were binding upon third persons, and upon the people, and no inquiry could be had as to his 
right to compensation for his services so long as he was the acting officer. .. Davis was not a mere 
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By reputation and indicia of office, the directors, the sole applicants duly declared as 
directors pursuant to I.C. § 31-4306, have discharged their duties faithfully under color of title, 
right, or authority and under color of an appointment or election in such a manner as not to 
present the appearance of an intruder or a usurper. From a public policy standpoint, the actions 
of a de facto officer are valid, including appointments upon a vacancy. In such a landscape, 
mere de minimus irregularities in the election process cannot void the actions of de facto officers 
in the discharge of their duties years after the fact. To suggest otherwise would unravel legal 
precedent, the vested rights of applicants, and all but preclude governmental stability. 
IV. THE VCPA'S USURPATION ACTION IS A DISGUISED ELECTION CONTEST. 
Usurpation actions are an extreme remedy, rarely utilized. In fact, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has not substantively addressed the usurpation statutes in over thirty years. 53 This, in and 
of itself, ought to raise skepticism concerning the efficacy and sincerity of this action since 
benign procedural errors as described herein are ridiculously common yet the usurpation of an 
incumbent by virtue thereof is non-existent. In contrast to an election contest which, if timely 
brought, may focus on procedural irregularities in the election process, an action for the 
usurpation of office is a substantive examination of the incumbent himself; his or her eligibility 
to lawfully hold title to an office.54 For example the usurpation statute is the remedy to oust an 
incumbent who refuses to vacate his office when he/she is convicted of a felony or infamous 
crime, for violating a corrupt practices act, for failing to adhere to residency requirements, and 
intruder, without any claim or color of title. He received his appointment from a body authorized 
by law to make it, and was clothed with all the indicia of office. He made the collection in a legal 
manner, and in doing so, his acts were as binding upon the public as they would have been had he 
been acting as an officer de Jure. 
53 People ex rel. Neilson v. Wilkins, 101Idaho394, 396, 614 P.2d 417, 419 (1980). 
54 Neilson, 101 Idaho at 396, 614 P.2d at 419. 
According to Black's, "usurpation of franchise or office" is defined as the "unjustly intruding upon or exercising any 
office, franchise, or liberty belonging to another." The "usurper of a public office" is [ o ]ne who either intrudes into 
a vacant office or ousts the incumbent without any color title." 
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other substantive conditions for an incumbent to lawfully hold a particular office. Where such 
proceedings have related to an elective office, the courts will not inquire into the electoral 
process itself since the law provides another tribunal and an exclusive method for the 
determination of these matters. 55 
The VCP A is challenging the election process not the result of the election; the pertinent 
factor in distinguishing an election contest from a usurpation action. An election contest alone 
focuses on the "facts and conditions that exist at the time of the election ... or that transpired at 
the election itself[ whereas an action] against usurpers and intruders into office have reference to 
conditions that exist at the time the action is brought. "56 In Tiegs, 57 the Board of Directors for the 
Nampa-Meridian Irrigation District canvassed the votes for the 1956 election for sub director #3, 
which resulted in 1,029 votes for Ray Patterson but only 1,027 votes for Elmer Tiegs.58 Tiegs 
requested a recount, which this time resulted in Tiegs receiving 1,030 and Patterson only 1,028 
votes.59 The Board's meeting minutes show that Tiegs was duly declared the winner. However, 
the next day the Board held a meeting and rejected the result of the recount and declared 
Patterson the winner based upon the initial results.60 The Secretary of the Board issued a 
certificate of election to Patterson. Tiegs thereafter brought a usurpation action pursuant to LC. § 
55 Tiegs I, 79 Idaho 365, 318 P.2d 588; Tiegs v. Patterson, 81 Idaho 46, 48, 336 P.2d 687 (l959)("Tiegs II"). The 
VCPA does not seem to grasp this distinction. While the election contest statute is the exclusive remedy to 
challenge a procedural irregularity in the election process, the Tiegs Court noted that the law provides two remedies 
for a substantive challenge to an incumbent's eligibility to hold office: one by contest by an elector and the other by 
usurpation by the State. Any elector, within twenty days, may bring an election contest asserting that a candidate is 
ineligible to hold office, for example, as a convicted felon. The State may even do so thereafter in a usurpation 
action. This does not however permit the inverse; i.e. for the VCPA in a usurpation action to stand in the place of an 
elector to challenge a procedural infirmity committed prior to or at the time of the election; a right conferred solely 
upon the individual. 
5 Tiegs!, 79Idahoat369,318P.2dat590. 
57 Tiegs I, 79 Idaho at 368, 318 P.2d at 589. Here, the VCPA focuses solely on procedural committed during the 
election process. 
58 Tiegs JI, 81 Idaho at 48. 
s9 Id. 
60 Id. 
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6-602.61 The district court dismissed the action for failure to timely file an election contest 
pursuant to LC. § 34-2008. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stressed that Patterson, unlike in this action, was not 
challenging a procedural error in the election process.62 Rather, it was the result of the election 
process; i.e. that Patterson was the substantive winner of the election as evidenced by the actual 
ballot boxes. "(A]ppellant, alleging ... he had received the majority of the votes cast, has brought 
this action under the usurpation statute, and has not in any [way] contested the election."63 
The question before the Court ... goes only to the issuance of a certificate of 
election after the votes are counted. It cannot be said that any discretion would be 
left for the issuance of a certificate of election where the votes had been tabulated 
and the only act left to be done was the issuance of a certificate. This would not 
be an act of discretion, but would be a ministerial duty, and could not be 
considered in any way determinative of the election or the conduct thereof This 
proposition is clearly demonstrated in the case of Sparkman v. Saylor, 180 Ky. 
263, 202 S.W. 649, 651. Saylor had received a majority of votes in an election for 
justice of the peace, but the election commissioners refused to issue him a 
certificate of election because he was late in filing a statement of expense. He 
brought action for a mandatory injunction requiring the board to issue the 
certificate. After holding the time for filing a statement of expense was directory, 
not mandatory, the Court said: 
'An election contest is a distinct and peculiar proceeding, required to 
be filed in the time and manner prescribed by law. This action is not 
such a proceeding, as between the plaintiff and the election 
commissioners, and the duties of the election commissioners are 
purely ministerial. '64 
This is not a usurpation action. The procedural errors that the V CPA asserts transpired in 
the election process as much as five years earlier are simply irrelevant. Unlike Tiegs, the result 
of the election process, i.e. the incumbent's substantive right to office, is not in dispute.65 To 
61 Tiegs I, 79 Idaho at 366-367, 318 P.2d at 588-589. 
62 Id, 79 Idaho at 372, 318 P 2d at 592. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 371-372, 318 P.2d at 592 (emphasis added). 
65 See also Neilson where Wilkins ran for seat (No. 1) on the Gooding County Board of Commissioners. To be 
eligible, residency within the district is required. Wilkins was elected by a majority in November, 1976 and sworn 
in the following January. Jn February, 1977 the district boundaries were changed such that only then was Wilkin's 
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prevail, the VCPA must demonstrate that at the time of this action, the directors held office 
without authority of law. Former Sub-District (1) Director Mike Smith and Sub-District (3) held 
office pursuant to LC. § 31-4306(2) since they were the only candidates and thus were 
"declare[d] elected as director". At present, Ms. Davis is the incumbent sub-district (3) director 
and shall hold office "until a successor is elected and has qualified". 66 
Upon a vacancy, LC. § 31-4305 unequivocally empowers the Board to appoint a 
replacement director for "any vacancy" but for the expiration of the term of office. The SVCRD 
Board is a valid governmental entity and no court of competent jurisdiction has declared 
otherwise. Whether as de jure or de facto officers, Mike Keithly and Pat Cowles therefore hold 
their offices with authority of law pursuant to LC. § 31-4305. Whether a procedural error 
occurred years before in the election process is irrelevant. The time to contest such an error has 
long since passed, and the impact of said error on the election process is entirely speculative. 
The elections and the appointment carry full authority of law. 
V. SCIENTER: THE DIRECTORS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH 
Although a candidate or incumbent is in no way responsible for conducting the election 
process, the VCPA believes it can bring a usurpation action against the incumbent, years later, 
subjecting them to potential arrest (LC. § 6-603), a fine in an amount not to exceed $5,000.00 if a 
director is "adjudged guilty" (I.C. § 6-608), and an order to pay all costs of the action (LC. § 6-
603 ). As a quasi-criminal action, legal sci enter is at issue in usurpation actions. While generally 
residence located in District No. I. In June, l 977 the attorney general brought a usurpation action asserting that, at 
the time of the election, he was ineligible to run for office. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the usurpation 
action since, at the time the action was brought, Wilkins resided within the district. The usurpation action was thus 
not based upon purported procedural errors in the election process, but rather a substantive challenge to the 
Commissioner's eligibility. Nonetheless, the prosecutor focuses on this purported ineligibility at the time of the 
election not at the time the action was brought. Neilson, 101 Idaho at 395-396, 614 P.2d at 418-419. 
66 I.C. § 31-4305; City of Reutter v. Keene, 244 P.3d 157 (2010); Clark v. Wonnacott, 30 Idaho 98, 162 P. 1074 
(1917). 
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malfeasance is palpably evident in usurpation cases, a 2008 Ohio Supreme Court decision noted 
the impact of its absence: 
[F]irefighter was not entitled to a writ of quo warranto to remove fire chief from 
office, even if alleged irregularities in fire chiefs appointment involved 
noncompliance with the Open Meetings Act, where fire chief was a good-faith 
appointee who was not aware of and did not participate in any irregularities in the 
... proceedings appointing him, and [the pfaintifi] failed to [timely] take 
affirmative action to challenge fire chiefs appointment until after expiration of 
fire chiefs six-month probationary period.67 
The VCPA, Matt Williams, freely admits in two separate emails to SVCRD's legal counsel that 
I believe the Directors are good people and are in the positions they are in because 
they want to serve the people of the District and not because they have personal 
agendas to push. I believe their errors and omissions were unintentional and were 
the product of not fully understanding what was required of them. 68 
If usurpation actions focus on the conditions at the time of the action, the VCPA's relief to oust 
the directors for procedural irregularities that predate their terms illustrates that this is not a valid 
usurpation claim. In good faith, the directors submitted their declarations of candidacy and 
thereafter duly exercised their duties of office. The absence of legal scienter precludes the 
efficacy of this usurpation action as an untimely, improperly clothed election contest. 
The VCPA ignores this fundamental prerequisite to adjudging one guilty of an offense. 
As a criminal usurper is "adjudged guilty", there must be some evidence of intent and the act 
must in some fashion be attributable to the usurper. 
LC. § 18-114. Union of act and intent. In every crime or public offense there 
must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence. 
LC. § 18-115.Manifestation of intent. Intent or intention is manifested by the 
commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the 
offense. 
67 State ex. Rel. Newell v. City of Jackson, 118 Ohio St.3d 138, 140-141, 886 N.E.2d 846, 848 (2008) (quoting taken 
from Headnote 4). 
68 Exhibit G. 
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I.C. § 18-201.Persons capable of committing crimes. All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes: 
1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an 
ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent. 
2. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious 
thereof. 
3. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through 
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was not evil design, 
intention or culpable negligence. 
Here, neither the act nor the intent is attributable to the incumbent or appointee. At the very 
worst, the failure to publish notice in time for the November election is the SVCRD's procedural 
irregularity; not the fault of the candidate. Unlike Neilson where the prosecutor asserted that the 
incumbent was ineligible due to residency requirements, or in Tiegs69 where Patterson argued 
that Tiegs was ineligible to hold office because he lost the election, the VCPA does not allege a 
single act that is attributable to a director. 
VI. THE VCPA LACKS JURISDICTION TO BRING A USURPATION ACTION 
AGAINST A DISTINCT BODY POLITIC OF THE STATE. 
Pursuant to the plain text ofl.C. § 6-602, the State ofldaho, by and through the Office of 
the Attorney General, has sole statutory authority to bring a usurpation action against a 
recreation district or other such body politic of the state. Pursuant to LC. § 6-602, a county 
prosecuting attorney's jurisdiction is limited to an «office or franchise [that] relates to a county, 
precinct or city". Contrary to the VCPA's assertion, a government officer, whether it be a 
federal judge, state senator, or recreation district director, is not an "office ... [that] relates to a 
county, precinct, or city" merely because, for example, the judge's chambers are physically 
located in a particular county.7° Further, the VCPA contends that they are the jurisdictional 
69 Tiegs, 79 Idaho at 371-372, 318 P.2d at 592 
70 In matters of statutory interpretation, this Court exercises free review. 
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authority merely because the recreation district statutes are codified in Title 31 and the county 
commissioners take part in a recreation district's creation. 
A recreation district is a distinct independent body politic and public corporation of the 
State of Idaho. 71 The legislature has conferred multiple derivative powers to recreation districts 
none of which "relates" to a "county, precinct, or city".72 A district may sue or be sued, make 
and execute all contracts, buy and sell property, and enact and enforce all rules and regulations 
for the operation and use of the district's facilities. 73 It may incur debt,74 levy and apply taxes,75 
and is even empowered to annex territory irrespective of county lines.76 The VCPA assertion 
that it has jurisdiction over a recreation district is akin to a municipality asserting jurisdiction 
over an urban renewal district. As we know from Yick Kong, this is certainly not the case. In 
fact the arguments asserted in that action are quite similar to the VCPA's arguments herein.77 As 
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and "give effect to legislative intent." 
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of a statute, which are the best guide to 
determining legislative intent. The words of a statute should be given their plain meaning, unless 
a contrary legislative purpose is expressed or the plain meaning creates an absurd result." 
KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 236 P.3d l 284 (20 l 0) (internal citations omitted). 
71 J.C.§ 31-4317. Similarly, fire protection districts are also located in Title31. Pursuant to J.C.§ 31-1416, a fire 
protection district is a governmental subdivision of the State ofldaho and bodies politic and corporate. Although the 
district is initially fonned by the County Board of Commissioners, does the VCPA believe it may assert jurisdiction 
over a fire protection district as well? 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 I.C. § 31-4314 
75 LC.§ 31-4318. 
76 J.C.§ 31-4319. 
77 A City does not exercise jurisdiction over an urban renewal agency merely because the Urban Renewal Law is 
codified in Title 50, Chapter 20. Urban Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 222 P.3d 467 
{Idaho) citing Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 (1972). 
Article VIII, § 3 of the Jdaho Constitution is not applicable to the Boise Redevelopment Agency. An urban renewal 
agency although created pursuant to the Idaho Urban Renewal Law is not the alter ego of the City of Boise, even 
though the city participates in the agency's creation and in the selection and removal of its commissioners. The 
agency is an entity of legislative creation, and thus its powers and operations are not controlled by the City. 
We conclude that the statutory provisions allowing a local voice in the creation of the [urban 
renewal agency] do not result in a finding that [the urban renewal agency] is simply the alter ego 
of the City .... The degree of control exercised by the City ... does not usurp the powers and duties 
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in Yick Kong, the mere fact that a recreation district may happen to be located within a particular 
county and formed by that county at most "shows two independent entities closely cooperating 
for valid public purposes."78 As a recreation district, fue district, or urban renewal agency are 
distinct body politics of the State of Idaho, the Attorney General is the proper jurisdictional 
entity. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The SVCRD may recover its reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-117 
where it can show that the non-prevailing party acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law". 
In 2004, the Idaho Supreme Court summed up the operation of the statute: 
The purpose of I.C. § 12-117 is two-fold: First, it serves "as a deterrent to 
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy for 
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending 
against groundless charges .... "An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 has 
been distilled into a two-part test. Attorney fees must be awarded if (1) the Court 
finds in favor of the person, and (2) the [non-prevailing party] ... acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 79 
This Court may decide that attorney fees are also warranted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l). A 
party may be subject to sanctions if its signed legal document (1) is not well grounded in fact; (2) 
is not warranted by existing law or a good-faith extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; and (3) was interposed for an improper purpose.8° For the reasons stated herein, the VCPA 
has brought this action without a reasonable basis in fact or law nor reasonable extension thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
of the [urban renewal agency], and the close association between the two entities at most shows 
two independent public entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes. 
94 Idaho at 881-82, 499 P.2d at 580-81 (footnote omitted). 
78 id. 
79 Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004). 
80 Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 504, 236 P.3d 1257, 1264 (2010) citing Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 
371, 209 P.3d 661, 668 (2009) 
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For the reasons stated herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court dismiss this 
action and award attorney fees against the County. 
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1 /1 
COME NOW, Defendants Yvette Davis, Patrick Cowles, Michael Smith, and Donald 
Michael Keithly ("Directors"), by and through their attorneys of record, MOORE SMIIB BUXTON 
& TURCKE, CHARTERED, and hereby submits the following Reply Memorandum. This 
Memorandum is supported by the pleadings, exhibits, and affidavits previously submitted herein. 
STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate 
"if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." If the nonmoving 
party fails to provide a sufficient showing to establish the essential elements of his 
or her case, judgment shall be granted to the moving party. 1 
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest upon mere 
allegations and denials, but must set forth specific facts by affidavit that shows a genuine issue for 
trial.2 Further, issues not supported by propositions of law or authority are deemed waived and 
will not be considered by this Court.3 To avoid an award of attorney fees pursuant to l.C. § 12-
117, the non-prevailing party must demonstrate that it acted with a reasonable basis in law. In its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, the VCPA fails to 
cite to a single case, affidavit, or piece of evidence. 
1 Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Timothy Hoagland, 147 Idaho 774, 779, 215 P.3d 494, 499 (2009) 
(internal citations omitted); I.R.C.P. 56(c) and (e); 
2 I.R.C.P. 56(e); Martin v. Camas County, 2011 WL 538750 (Idaho 2/17/2011) citing Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 
166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). 
3 Ginther v. Boise Cascade Corp., 244 P.3d 1229, 1234 (2010); Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 
P.3d 450, 454 (2008). Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support his 
position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. Bach v. 
Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010); Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 
95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004). The petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate error, and the Court will not search the 
record to find it. Everhart v. Washington County Road & Bridge Dep't, 130 Idaho 273, 939 P.2d 849 (1997). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. YVETTE DAVIS, AS THE INCUMBENT, LAWFULLY HOLDS HER POSITION 
UNTIL A SUCCESSOR IS ELECTED AND QUALIFIED. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 31-4305, an incumbent holds office with authority of law ''until a 
successor is elected and has qualified".4 Ms. Davis is the incumbent sub-district (3) director. No 
successor has been elected and qualified. Therefore, Ms. Davis lawfully holds title to office at 
least until the May 2011 election. The VCP A fails to offer legal authority refuting this 
established maxim and controlling authority as articulated in City of Heutter v. Keene, 244 P.3d 
157 (2010) and Clark v. Wonnacott, 30 Idaho 98, 162 P. 1074 (1917).5 Rather, the VCPA 
merely challenges the Board's authority to appoint following a "vacancy". Citing to Title 59, 
Chapter 9 Idaho Code, the VCPA overtly fails to disclose to this tribunal6 that I.C. § 59-901(6) 
limits even a ''vacancy" to a 
4 See also I.C. § 67-303 which similarly provides: 
Holding office after expiration of term. Every officer elected or appointed for a fixed term shall 
hold office until his successor is elected or appointed and qualified, unless the statute under which 
he is elected or appointed expressly declares the contrary. 
Cited in Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho 380, 263 P. 45 (1927) Clarkv. Wonnacott, 30 Idaho 98, 162 P. 
1074 (1917), McGrane v. Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho 714, 112 P. 312 (1910), and People v. Green, l Idaho 235 
(1869)(the Right of the incumbent to hold office until his successor is elected and qualified was as much a part of 
the estate in office as the original term). 
5 As noted in Clark, 30Idahoat103-104, 162 P. at 1074 citing to several sources. (Emphasis added): 
"Under this provision of the statute it appears clear that it provides, not simply for a term of two 
years, but for two years and any additional time which may elapse before a successor is elected 
and qualified. The duly elected and qualified superintendent, after the expiration of the two years 
from his entering upon the duties of the office, unless a successor was duly elected and qualified, 
was entitled to occupy the office and perform its duties with precisely the same force and effect as 
though he himself had received the new certificate of election and qualified anew. That this is the 
law is well established by a vast number of authorities. Under a statute like ours, holding over 
pending the election and qualification of a successor is as much a part of the term of office to 
which the superintendent is elected as are the first two years, where he continues in office. [Citing 
numerous cases.] Unquestionably this statute was enacted with a view to preventing the office of 
superintendent of schools from becoming vacant during any part of the time, and unquestionably it 
means just what it says-in effect that one, once lawfully elected and qualified, continues to hold 
the office until his successor is elected and qualified." 
6 IRPC 3.3. 
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failure to elect at the proper election, there being no incumbent to continue in 
office until his successor is elected and qualified, nor other provisions relating 
thereto. 
This is academic. Here, there is an incumbent. Thus, there is no vacancy. As unequivocally 
articulated in Heutter, "[t]here can be no appointment unless there is a vacancy; there can be no 
vacancy where there is an incumbent." 
The VCP A fails to present a justiciable case or controversy as this issue is completely 
irrelevant, harmless, and moot. There is no vacancy and thus whether I.C. § 31-4305 does or 
does not permit an appointment following a vacancy is moot. Further, if the incumbent retains 
her office "until a successor is elected and has qualified", what relief is the VCP A afforded by a 
judicial determination that Ms. Davis' redundant appointment is void? What in.i.YrY shall this 
redress? In Clark, the Court determined that the Kootenai County Commissioner's appointment 
of someone other than the incumbent was "ineffectual and void"; not "voidable", but ''void". 7 
Had the SVCRD or the Governor appointed someone other than Ms. Davis, the appointment 
would similarly be "ineffectual and void". Here, Ms. Davis' redundant appointment, even if 
erroneous, would mean that Ms. Davis has usurped herself. To avoid disenfranchisement, the 
incumbent holds office regardless if the SVCRD or the governor appointed someone else. The 
issue is a complete nullity, moot, and amounts to harmless error.8 
A. Standing: Injury cannot be based upon speculation. 
Failing to cite to any authority, the VCPA rather feebly questions whether it is "legally 
clear" that Ms. Davis is the incumbent due to an unchallenged de minimus irregularity in the 
election process five years before. Ms. Davis is the incumbent. The VPCA failed to present any 
7 Clark, 30 Idaho at 108, 162 P. at 1074. 
8 See Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 272, 207 P.3d 998, 1003 (2009) (holding that an error is 
prejudicial only if it could have affected or did affect the outcome of a proceeding); Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City 
of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 77, 156 P.3d 573, 578 (2007) (same); Jn re Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 296, 882 
P.2d 457, 463 (Ct. App. l 994) ("This Court will not grant relief for what is, at most, hannless error."). 
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evidence that the purported procedural error has a "fairly traceable causal connection" to the 
deprivation of an elector or estranged candidate's procedural due process rights or otherwise 
materially impacted the result of the election process rendering the incumbent· a usurper. 
Absent this required nexus, the impact of an unchallenged, unadjudicated, de minimus 
procedural irregularity is speculative9 and ineffectual to void an election much less oust an 
incumbent years after the fact. 1011 As the sole candidate, J.C. § 31-4306(2) mandated that the 
2007 was cancelled and Ms. Davis declared "elected as director" as a matter of law. 
II. SUBDISTRICT 1 & 2: THE APPOINTMENT OF MIKE KEITHLY AND PAT 
COWLES 
On page 4 in one short paragraph bereft of authority, the VCP A articulates his sole basis 
to oust Pat Cowles and Mike Keithly as usurpers. Evidently, every act, policy, or decision 
rendered by an incumbent during the term is void as undertaken "without authority of law". 12 
9 Standing to challenge a procedural may not be based on speculation. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). "Abstract injury is not enough ... [S]peculation is insufficient to 
establish the existence of a present, live controversy." Los Angeles v. Lyons, 46 l U.S. 95, l 01, 105 ( 1983); Harris v. 
Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 
P.2d 757, 763 (1989). 
10 A showing that election officials failed to follow every election procedure precisely, without more, is insufficient 
under J.C. § 34-2101(1). Noble v. Ada County, 135 Idaho 495, 504, 20 P.3d 679, 688 (2000). "While it is apparent 
that there were irregularities in the conduct of the election in Idaho Falls, they do not seem to make the result of the 
election doubtful, nor is this court convinced that there was intentional wrongdoing or fraud such as to vitiate the 
election." Huffaker v. Edgington, 30 Idaho 179, 163 P. 793, 794 (1917). 
11 The remainder of the VCPA's attack regarding "secref' meetings and a "secret process" is frivolous. Without 
citing to statutory authority for its asserted legal "black shadow on democracy", the VCPA claims that a "notice of 
the vacancy was not provided to the public and the appointment gives the appearance of a rigged or pre-decided 
event." The VCPA further asserts the Board rejected a citizen petition and request by the SVCRD patrons to have 
the SVCRD Board investigate and report on the lack of election; that the SVCRD engaged in a secret process to 
avoid meeting with the VCP A on this issue. This "petition" was included in the stack of stuff in the April 20, 2011 
Affidavit of Kenneth Arment. The petition is dated October 26, 2010. At the very next SVCRD meeting, 
November l 8, 2011, SVCRD's legal counsel addressed all of these issues in open session after her "secret" 
consultation with the Idaho Attorney General and the Idaho Secretary of State. See Behnke Affidavit, , 8. As to 
not meeting with the VCPA, the SVCRD attorney invited the VCPA to consult with the Attorney General and the 
Idaho Secretary of State. He refused. Any further discussion is palpably futile. 
12 In the Complaint,, IX, the VCPA argues that Pat Cowles, who was only appointed in May, 2010, is nonetheless a 
usurper subject to the personal $5,000 fine in that: 
The other two board members who appointed Patrick Cowles were not valid board members at the 
time of the appointment (holding and exercising the office without authority of law) and therefore 
said appointment was made without authority oflaw. 
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The VCPA bases this action upon an unproven accusation that the SVCRD Board members who 
appointed them were usurpers at the time of appointment and therefore the appointment was 
without authority of law. This position is wholly unsupported by law and the VCPA patently 
ignores the election laws and the de facto/de jure officer doctrine.13 
I.C. § 31-4305 unequivocally empowers the Board to appoint a replacement director for 
"any vacancy" but for the expiration of the term of office. In May 2010 and March 2011 
respectively, the Board appointed Pat Cowles and Mike Keithly to fill the vacancies created by 
the resignation of their predecessors. The VCP A attempts to prove a truth based upon an 
unproven premise. The Board appointed the replacement directors with authority of law. One is 
not a usurper until "adjudged guilty" of such. 14 Regardless, even assuming arguendo that the 
Board directors did not lawfully hold office as de jure directors at the time of appointment (an 
unadjudicated claim), the VCPA patently ignores the de facto officer doctrine. 
The VCPA's position, that an unchallenged de minimus error in an election process could 
"render [the director's] subsequent official actions [including appointments] null and void'', 
would unduly disrupt the orderly function of government. 15 "Necessity and public policy 
compels us to declare otherwise."16 "As an officer de facto, he must be submitted to as such 
13 The VCPA's position would precipitate chaos whether it be a councilman's approval ofa land use application or a 
judge's sentencing ofa felon. In Huetter, 244 Idaho at 161, the Court cited with approval State v. McDermott, 52 
Idaho 602, 609, 17 P.2d 343, 346 (1932) wherein a defendant challenged his conviction upon the contention that the 
judge had no authority to conduct the preliminary hearing because he had forfeited his office by temporarily moving 
from the county. The felon did not overturn his conviction. 
14 Pursuant to J.C. § 31-4306(2), where only one candidate puts in for an election, the election shall be cancelled and 
the Board "shall ... declare such candidate elected as director". At the time of appointment, the Board was a valid 
governmental entity as Mr. Smith and Ms. Davis held their positions with authority of law. 
15 Barrett-Smith v. Barrett-Smith, 110 Wash.App. 87, 91, 38 P.3d 1030, 1033 (2009). 
16 Id See also Gorman v. Commissioners of Boise County, I Idaho 655, 658-659 (1877). The county commissioners 
removed the incumbent assessor, Gorman, and appointed Davis. Gorman sought payment of the compensation that 
had been paid to Davis during the time he exercised the duties of the office. In rejecting Gorman, the court noted: 
[Davis'] official acts, while acting as an officer de facto, under color of an appointment by the 
board, were binding upon third persons, and upon the people, and no inquiry could be had as to his 
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until displaced by a regular direct proceeding for that purpose." 17 The acts of a de facto officer 
are as valid as those of an office de jure; this rule is based on considerations of "public policy, 
necessity, justice, or convenience." 18 
A de facto officer is "one who actually assumes and exercises the duties of a 
public office under color of a known and authorized appointment or election, but 
who has failed to comply with all the requirements of the law prescribed as a 
precedent to the performance of the duties of the office." 19 · 
... Generally, the de facto officer doctrine has been applied in the situation where 
an individual's authority to act has been challenged due to some defect, error, or 
irregularity in the individual's appointment to the position. 20 
The Directors, Yvette Davis and Mike Smith, were the sole applicants duly declared 
"elected" pursuant to LC. § 31-4306. By reputation and indicia of office, they have discharged 
their duties faithfully under color of title, right, or authority in such a manner as not to present 
the appearance of an intruder or a usurper. From a public policy standpoint, the actions of dejure 
and even a de facto officer are valid, including appointments upon a vacancy. In such a 
landscape, mere de minimus irregularities in the election process cannot void the actions of de 
facto officers in the discharge of their duties years after the fact. To suggest otherwise would 
unravel legal precedent, the vested rights of applicants, and all but preclude governmental 
stability. The VCPA refutes none of this with even a semblance oflegal reason or authority. 
17 Id. 
right to compensation for his services so Jong as he was the acting officer ... Davis was not a mere 
intruder, without any claim or color of title. He received his appointment from a body authorized 
by law to make it, and was clothed with all the indicia of office. He made the collection in a legal 
manner, and in doing so, his acts were as binding upon the public as they would have been had he 
been acting as an officer de jure. 
is 67 C.J.S. Officers§ 276, pp.812-813 (1978). 
19 State v. Dailing, 128 Idaho 203, 205-206, 911 P.2d 1115, 1117-1118 
651, 655, 651P.2d916, 920 (1982). 
20 Dailing, 128 Idaho at 205-206, 911 P.2d at ll l 7-l 118 (1996). 
(1996) citing State v. Whelan, 103 Idaho 
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CONCLUSION 
Failing to cite to a single case, affidavit, or the record, the Directors are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law and its attorney fees. This is an abuse of process. Usurpation 
actions are an extreme remedy, rarely utilized, and reserved for only the substantive examination 
of an incumbent's eligibility to lawfully hold title to office. Here, the VCPA challenges the 
"facts and conditions that exist at the time of the election . . . or that transpired at the election 
itself' not the substantive result of the election; i.e. the "conditions that exist at the time the 
action is brought."21 As a matter of law and public policy, a usurpation action may not be 
utilized to do an end-around the election laws to untimely challenge the election process.22 
Unlike Tiegs, the result of the election process is not in dispute. Former Sub-District (1) 
Director Mike Smith and Sub-District (3) held office pursuant to I.C. § 31-4306(2) since they 
were the only candidates. and thus were "declare[d] elected as director". Ms. Davis was the 
incumbent sub-district (3) director and shall hold office "until a successor is elected and has 
qualified". Upon a vacancy, LC. § 31-4305 unequivocally empowers the Board to appoint a 
replacement director for "any vacancy" but for the expiration of the term of office. The SVCRD 
Board is a valid governmental entity and no court of competent jurisdiction has declared 
otherwise. Whether as de jure or de facto officers, Mike Keithly and Pat Cowles therefore hold 
their offices with authority of law pursuant to I.C. § 31-4305. 
21 Tiegs/, 79 Idaho at 369, 318 P.2d at 590. 
22 Tiegs/, 79 Idaho 365, 318 P.2d 588; Tiegs v. Patterson, 81 Idaho 46, 48, 336 P.2d 687 (1959)("Tiegs II"). The 
VCPA does not seem to grasp this distinction. While the election contest statute is the exclusive remedy to 
challenge a procedural irregularity in the election process, the Tiegs Court noted that the law provides two remedies 
for a substantive challenge to an incumbent's eligibility to hold office: one by contest by an elector and the other by 
usurpation by the State. Any elector, within twenty days, may bring an election contest asserting that a candidate is 
ineligible to hold office, for example, as a convicted felon. The State may even do so thereafter in a usurpation 
action. This does not however permit the inverse; i.e. for the VCPA in a usurpation action to stand in the place of an 
elector to challenge a procedural infinnity committed prior to or at the time of the election; a right conferred solely 
upon the individual. 
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Whether a procedural error occurred years before in the election process is irrelevant. 
The VCPA failed to present any evidence or even allege that the purported procedural error had a 
"fairly traceable causal connection" to the deprivation of an elector or estranged candidate's 
procedural due process rights or otherwise materially impacted the election process rendering the 
incumbent a usurper. Without more, the impact of a procedural error is de minimus, speculative, 
harmless, and, even in a properly plead election contest, ineffectual to void the election much 
less oust the incumbent years after the fact. The usurpation laws do not exist to render the 
election laws superfluous or meaningless. 
The SVCRD has borne an unjustified financial burden. While the taxpayers ultimately 
are responsible for these costs, it is pertinent that the VCPA, who instituted this action rather 
than work with the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and the SVCRD, bear the costs for its 
frivolous undertaking. What was the point? This entire action arose during the interim five 
month period awaiting the May election with preliminary injunctive relief sought (in violation of 
the IRCP) a mere three weeks before the election. Supported by the affidavit of the political 
opponent in the election, it is clear that the action was brought for an improper political purpose; 
a complete waste of resources. The SVCRD is a small taxing entity and its funds should be 
utilized for the recreational programs of the community not to play these political games with the 
VCPA. 
DATED this \l1AG day of May, 2011. 
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COMES NOW, Defendant Yvette Davis, ("Defendant") by and through her undersigned 
counsel of record, Paul J. Fitzer, of the law finn of MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, 
CHARTERED, and hereby submits the following Response to State's motion for preliminary' 
injunctive relief, disqualification of legal counsel, and declarative relief in regard to the May 
2011 election. This Memorandum is supported by the pleadings, legal memoranda and affidavits 
already submitted in this action and incorporated herein as if stated in full. 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEt ~ IP )f 
ARGUMENT 
The determination whether a preliminary injunction1 should issue is a matter of discretion 
for the trial court.2 As such, this Court must act within the outer bounds of its discretion through 
an exercise of reason. Preliminary injunctions do not issue upon a whim. A preliminary 
injunction "is granted only in extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that 
irreparable injury will flow from the refusual".3 It is the party that seeks injunctive relief that 
bears the burden of proving a right to such relief.4 Therefore, this Court must find that the 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney ("V CPA") has carried his burden demonstrating that he is 
entitled to the relief that he seeks and that absent the granting of the preliminary injunction he 
will suffer an irreparable injury; an injury recognized under the law. "The substantial likelihood 
of success necessary to demonstrate that appellants are entitled to the relief they demanded 
cannot exist where complex issues oflaw or fact exist which are not free from doubt."5 
I. LIKELIHOOD OF PREV AILIING ON THE MERITS 
A. "With Authority of Law"; An incumbent holds her position "until a successor is 
elected and has qualified". 
The VCPA will not prevail upon the merits. Pursuant to LC. § 6-602, a usurper is one 
who "holds ... office ... without authority of law". As a matter of law, an incumbent holds his 
1 See I.R.C.P. 65(e)(J)-(3) which provides for injunctive relief: 
(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or any 
part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited 
period or perpetually. 
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act during the 
litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring 
or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending 
to render the judgment ineffectual. 
2 Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 994 (1984). 
3 Id See also Brady v. City of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d 740, 743 (1997). 
4 Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 ldaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965). 
5 Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 994 (1984) (quoting First National Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 495 F.Supp. 154 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
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or her office with authority of law "until a successor is elected and has qualified". 6 Ms. Davis is 
the incumbent sub~district (3) director. No successor has been elected and qualified. Therefore, 
Ms. Davis lawfully holds title to office at least until May 2011 pending the outcome of the 
election. 
It is serendipitous that on November 24, 2010 the Idaho Supreme Court released its 
decision in City of Reutter v. Keene, 244 P.3d 157 (2010); one week after the SVCRD, at its 
November 18, 2010 regular meeting, announced that it would appoint an interim director, i.e. the 
incumbent. The SVCRD appointed the incumbent rendering any issue pertaining to the 
appointment as a nullity, moot, and harmless. In Reutter, the Court cited with approval its 
decisioninC/arkv. Wonnacott, 30Idaho98, 162P.1074(1917)wherein 
Wonnacott was the incumbent county assessor. At the next election, McFarland 
was elected county assessor, but he died shortly after the election and before his 
term of office would have commenced. At the time of his death, he had not taken 
the oath of office and had not given the required bond. The county commissioners 
declared the position vacant and appointed Clark to be county assessor 
commencing on the date that McFarland would have taken office. On that date, 
Clark demanded possession of the office, but Wonnacott refused to surrender it. 
This Court held that Clark could not be appointed to the office because there was 
no vacancy. 
11 There can be no appointment unless there is a vacancy; there can be no 
vacancy where there is an incumbent." There was in effect a statute providing that 
every person elected for a fixed term "shall hold office until his successor is 
elected .... and qualified." Thus, Wonnacott was entitled to hold the office until 
his successor was elected and qualified. "[U]nder our statutes the person elected 
to an office does not become the incumbent of the office until he qualifies." We 
held "that if an officer under the law is entitled to hold his office until his 
successor is elected and qualified, that the election of the officer does not create a 
vacancy, but it requires his election and qualification coupled with the expiration 
of his predecessor's term to create a vacancy." ... We held that Wonnacott 
remained the incumbent because McFarland had not qualified. "Had Mr. 
McFarland lived and failed to qualify there would have been no vacancy, under 
our statutes, because there was an incumbent to continue in office, whose right it 
was to hold the office until his successor was not only duly elected, but also 
6 LC. § 31-4305. 
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qualified ... 7 
Thus, the regularly scheduled election, while not cancelled, was rendered void as if it had 
never occurred due to McFarland's failure to qualify. The same is true here. Through no fault of 
a candidate, one can envision any number of situations where an election, for whatever reason, is 
cancelled, voided, or otherwise not conducted, including a flood, earthquake, political upheaval, 
death of a candidate, or human error (failure to provide enough ballots, notices, etc.). Here, the 
SVCRD failed to timely publish the notice of candidate filing deadlines for the sub-district (3) 
position in time for the November 2010 election.8 Having missed the November election date 
through no fault of the candidate, Ms. Davis, as the incumbent holds office with authority of law 
until a successor is elected and qualified. 
B. An incumbent's lawful right to hold office is supported by public policy. 
This policy makes sense and the VCPA's position is untenable. Declaring that an 
incumbent is rendered a usurper merely because of a procedural irregularity such as a missed 
election violates public policy. The VCPA's legal premise would disenfranchise the citizenry, 
deprive a governmental entity of its leadership, and render a governmental entity incapable of 
conducting its affairs. What relief is the VCPA seeking? The reality is that one governmental 
entity is seeking to prevent another from operating. By seeking preliminary injunctive relief 
against two of three directors, the impact will not prevent an injury but cause it. If injunctive 
relief is granted, the SVCRD will be devoid of leadership and unable to grant approval or fund 
its spring-summer recreational programs including youth baseball, adult soft ball, pilates, yoga, 
7 Heutter, 244 P.3d at 159-160 (Internal citations omitted). 
8 Dehnke Affidavit, ~ 8. 
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youth golf scholarships, sponsorships for youth fishing, and other such programs and 
partnerships.9 This reasoning is not supported in the law as the Court in Clark noted: 
"Under this provision of the statute it appears clear that it provides, not simply 
for a term of two years, but for two years and any additional time which may 
elapse before a successor is elected and qualified The duly elected and qualified 
superintendent, after the expiration of the two years from his entering upon the 
duties of the office, unless a successor was duly elected and qualified, was 
entitled to occupy the office and perform its duties with precisely the same force 
and effect as though he himself had received the new certificate of election and 
qualified anew. That this is the law is well established by a vast number of 
authorities. Under a statute like ours, holding over pending the election and 
qualification of a successor is as much a part of the term of office to which the 
superintendent is elected as are the first two years, where he continues in office. 
[Citing numerous cases.] Unquestionably this statute was enacted with a view to 
preventing the office of superintendent of schools from becoming vacant during 
any part of the time, and unquestionably it means just what it says-in effect that 
one, once lawfully elected and qualified, continues to hold the office until his 
successor is elected and qualified. 1110 
LC. § 31-4305's unequivocal mandate that an incumbent holds office with authority of 
law "until a successor is elected and has qualified" is mirrored elsewhere in the Code. LC. § 67-
303 similarly provides: 
Holding office after expiration of term. Every officer elected or appointed for a 
fixed term shall hold office until his successor is elected or appointed and 
qualified, unless the statute under which he is elected or appointed expressly 
declares the contrary .11 
The VCPA's interpretation results in an overt contradiction v.ithin the statute itself. With the 
goal to avoid the disenfranchisement of an entire sub district, J.C. § 31-4305 provides that "each 
district shall be governed by a board of three (3) directors". 12 Read in conjunction \.\ith the 
9 Cowles Affidavit,~ 5. 
1° Clark, 30 Idaho at 103-104, 162 P. at l 074 citing to several sources. (Emphasis added). 
11 I.C. § 67-303 (Emphasis added) cited in Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho 380, 263 P. 45 (1927) Clark 
v. Wonnacott, 30 Idaho 98, 162 P. 1074 (1917), McGrane v. Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho 714, 112 P. 312 (1910), 
and People v. Green, I Idaho 235 {1869){the Right of the incumbent to hold office until his successor is elected and 
qualified was as much a part of the estate in office as the original term). 
12 I.C. § 31-4305 (Emphasis added). 
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mandate that a director holds office until a "successor is elected and qualified", the statute's 
obvious intent is to retain the incumbent until a successor is elected. 
C. The issues pertaining to appointment following a vacancy is moot. 
Where a missed, cancelled, voided, annulled, or set aside election results in a vacancy in 
office, the VCPA and the SVCRD wholly disagree as to the remedy. The Heutter decision13 
thankfully renders the issue moot and hypothetical. "A case becomes moot when the issues 
presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."14 "A 
case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no 
practical effect upon the outcorne."15 
13 By citing with approval many of these old cases like Clark, the SVCRD's concerns regarding such "old" law was 
alleviated. Pre-Reutter, the SVCRD was reluctant to rely upon such old decisions amidst the VCPA's steadfast 
position that an incumbent is rendered a usurper due to a missed election. Was there or was there not a vacancy? 
This is exactly why the SVCRD consulted with the Idaho Secretary of State as represented by the Idaho Attorney 
General's Office, which, to be discussed supra, is the jurisdictional authority vested with power to interpret the 
elections laws; not the VCPA. The SVCRD and the Attorney General did not believe that appointment was required 
as 1.C. § 31-4305 mandates that the director position "shall continue until a successor is elected and has qualified." 
The issue then becomes for how long ... until the next available election, the next general election, or for 
the duration of the term? The resolution of this question was a driving force as to whether the SVCRD needed to 
clarify or take some overt action in emphasizing that the election should be rescheduled for the next available 
election. (For an excellent discussion on an appointee or elector's term of office see Winter v. Davis, 65 Idaho 696, 
706, 152 P.2d 249, 259 (1944)). The SVCRD was under political attack by the VCPA and others who accused the 
SVCRD of refusing to "investigate the lack of elections". This is completely false belied by even the VCPA's 
argument. The VCPA accuses the SVCRD of refusing to investigate the missed election as presented to the Board 
on October 26, 2010 but then notes that at the very next monthly meeting in November, the Board through its legal 
counsel, addressed the public concerning the resolution of these issues with the Idaho Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General's Office. The VCPA contends that the law requires that this must be conducted in an open forum, 
i.e. we have to bring them up here so the public can ask questions. There is no such requirement. In fact, we 
practically begged the VCPA to also call the AG on the phone. He refused to do so. 
In Winter v. Davis, 65 Idaho 696, 698, 152 P.2d 249, 251 (1944), the Court noted a distinction between 
elected versus appointed positions: 
The tenure of an officer filling a vacancy is, if elected, to the full unexpired term, if appointed, 
only until his successor is elected and qualified. The appointee is not invested with the duties of 
office to the end of the term but merely until the vacancy is filled by election at the next general 
election. . . . Democratic principles of government require that elective offices shall, so far as 
possible, be filled at all times by incumbents chosen by the electors, and it is the general policy of 
the law that vacancies in elective offices should be filled at an election as soon as practicable after 
the vacancy occurs, and appointments to fill vacancies should be effective only until the people 
may elect. 
14 Goodson v. Nez Perce County Board of County Commissioners, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614, 616 (2000). 
15 Id. See also Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 509, 148 PJd 1247, 1255 (2006). 
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The appellants have received all the relief to which they might have been found to 
be entitled. Only hypothetical questions remain. It being impossible for this court 
to grant appellants other or additional relief, we will not proceed to formal 
judgment on the hypothetical issues but will dismiss the appeal. 16 
The SVCRD with the aid of the Attorney General believes that LC. § 31-4305 empowers 
the district board to appoint a replacement following a vacancy. The VCPA believes that LC. § 
59-912 empowers the governor to make such replacement. While the VCPA and the SVCRD 
have argued over this issue over months and we shall never agree, the Heutter decision has 
mooted the debate unequivocally. "There can be no appointment unless there is a vacancy; there 
can be no vacancy where there is an incumbent." 17 Per LC.§ 31-4305, the incumbent retains her 
position "until a successor is elected and has qualified". 
Title 59, Chapter 9 Idaho Code governs the myriad of "vacancies" and thus does not 
apply in this matter. The VCPA cites to LC. § 59-912 which is merely a catch-all provision 
governing only vacancies that are otherwise note provided for, i.e. where "no mode is provided 
by law for filling such vacancy, the governor must fill such vacancy by appointment". 18 The 
16 Dorman v. Young, 80 Idaho 435, 437, 332 P.2d 480, 481 (1958). 
17 Heutter, 244 P.3d at 159-160 citing to Clark, 30 Idaho at 102 citing to several sources. (Emphasis added). 
18 A mode is provided for filling vacancies pursuant to J.C.§ 31-4305. That section grants broad appointive powers 
to the Board. LC. § 31-4305 provides in part that "[a]ny vacancy occurring in the office of director, other than by 
expiration of the term of office, shall be filled by appointment of the board for the unexpired term." I.C. § 31-4305 
(Emphasis added). While academic, it is this excerpt that is the source of much of our disagreement and worth at 
least a footnote. 
First, per Heutter, there has been no "vacancy". Second, per Heutter, there has been no or "expiration" as 
an incumbent retains her position "until a successor is elected and has qualified". The VCPA misconstrues the text 
which, read as a whole, is merely to preserve the electoral process and provide the only preclusion to an appointment 
regarding the expiration of the term of office. No one disputes that the director's four year ''tenn of office" is 
detennined by election. We all agree that every four years this election must be conducted. However, absent fraud, 
deceit, or any act of a candidate, procedural errors sometimes happen. Through no fault of the candidate, the 
November election was precluded. Whether by natural supervening factors or by human error, the question is what 
are we to do about it. No one is contending that the SVCRD, by appointment, can supplant this election. Certainly, 
had the Board attempted to appoint a director to a four year term, this would violate the statute. This is not the case. 
The election shall still occur, but due to an error, the election is delayed only to the next available election date. 
Thus, the interim appointment is not "for the unexpired term" intended to supplant the required election, but rather 
only to address the interim delay awaiting this election due to a procedural irregularity. 
Regardless, this issue is moot as the law has already remedied this problem by mandating a hold over by 
the incumbent. Moreover, the SVCRD resolved this issue with the Attorney General. There is no requirement that 
the SVCRD must bring a declaratory judgment action before the Court. There is also no reason to force an elector 
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VCPA's argument is betrayed by that very same section. LC. § 59-901(6) provides that a 
vacancy is deemed to have occurred where there is a 
failure to elect at the proper election, there being no incumbent to continue in 
office until his successor is elected and qualified, nor other provisions relating 
thereto. 19 
There is an incumbent. There is no vacancy. The issue is moot. 
II. IRREPARABLE INJURY CANNOT BE BASED UPON SPECULATION OR 
HARMLESS ERROR: THERFORE THE VCPA LACKS STANDING 
The VCPA lacks standing to bring this action against Ms. Davis due to a lack of a 
cognizable irreparable injury. The VCPA bears the burden to demonstrate redressability; that the 
relief sought shall redress the VCPA's alleged injury.20 In Clark, the Court determined that the 
Kootenai County Commissioner's appointment of someone other than the incumbent, 
to bring an action for the Court to order a new election. We can clean up our own mess. The VCPA does not have 
standing to bring this usurpation action. At best, an elector can bring this before a judge who can a new election (as 
we already have) provided he can make the affirmative finding that the procedural error materially impacted the 
result of the election. See Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation District, 133 Idaho 139, 143, 983 P.2d 212, 216 
(1999). 
19 J.C. § 59-901(6) {Emphasis added). By explicitly stating that a missed election creates a vacancy only where 
there is not an incumbent, by necessary implication, the law of statutory construction negates a finding that a 
vacancy has occurred where there is an incumbent. 
'lt is a universally recognized rule of the construction that, where a constitution or statute specifies 
certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others," a maxim commonly known as 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Idaho Code section 67-6515A(l )(a) does not use "including" 
or some similar term to indicate that development-rights transfers may be authorized for any 
specific goal of the municipality beyond those listed. Instead, section 67-65 l 5A provides a 
specific and exhaustive list of the interests that will justify the enactment of a TDR ordinance. 
KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 236 PJd 1284 (2010). The maxim is based on the 
rationale that when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded., i.e. 
if the Legislature had intended to accommodate a particular remedy or allowance, it would have done so expressly; 
if the Legislature did not provide for such an allowance or event, it should be assumed that it meant not to. While 
there may be occasions where a list in a statute is merely illustrative, as opposed to exclusionary, the Legislature 
must manifest such an intent by the inclusion of a word such as "including" or "such as." 
20 To present a justiciable case or controversy pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, "it must be 
"likely'', as opposed to merely "speculative", that the State's "injury" will be "redressed by a favorable decision."" 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Harris v. Cassia 
County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 
757, 763 (l 989). 
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Wonnacott, was "ineffectual and void".21 "Thus, Wonnacott was entitled to hold the office until 
his successor was elected and qualified. "22 What relief is the VCPA afforded in declaring Ms. 
Davis a usurper and her "illegal" appointment as void? Who has she usurped? If the incumbent 
retains her office "until a successor is elected and has qualified", her redundant appointment, if 
erroneous, would mean that Ms. Davis has usurped herself. The issue is a complete nullity. By 
appointing the incumbent, the error, if any, is entirely harmless.23 More importantly, the VCPA 
lacks standing to even assert such an injury. Had the SVCRD or the Governor appointed 
someone other than Ms. Davis, the only party with standing to seek redress for this "irreparable 
injury" would be Ms. Davis. 
The VCPA wholly ignores this requirement. In fact, the VCPA does not present a 
cognizable injury at all. The VCP A amorphously asserts to prevent an injury to "integrity"; 
integrity of the SVCRD office of director, the SVCRD electorate, the taxpayers, the treasury, and 
the State. Not surprisingly, the VCPA fails to cite to any authority bolstering its assertion that 
the preservation of "integrity" is a cognizable injury in the law, or how the VCPA is clothed with 
standing to assert such an injury on behalf of said entities. 24 
It is just disingenuous for the VCP A to claim an injury on behalf of the taxpayers and the 
treasury. The resources expended in this action were only expended because the VCPA initiated 
this frivolous action ... also with tax payer funds. The irony is that it is the SVCRD that is 
21 Clark, 30 Idaho at 108, 162 P. at 1074. 
22 Reutter, 244 P.3d at 159-160. 
23 See Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 272, 207 P.3d 998, 1003 (2009) (holding that an error is 
prejudicial only if it could have affected or did affect the outcome of a proceeding); Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City 
of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 77, 156 P.3d 573, 578 (2007) (same); In re Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 296, 882 
P.2d 457, 463 (Ct. App. 1994) ("This Court will not grant relief for what is, at most, harmless error."). 
24 A party waives an issue if argument and authority is lacking in its initial briefing. Ginther v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 244 P.3d 1229, 1234 (2010) citing Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 357 (1982) and 
Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185, 190, 125 P.3d 1061, 1066 (2005); See also Bach v. Liponis, 149 Idaho 372, 
374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010) (requiring compliance with I.A.R. 35's requirement of argument supported by 
authority); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (holding that a party waives an issue on 
appeal if argument or authority is lacking); State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 336, 193 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(holding that the court will not ordinarily consider issues raised for the first time in the reply brief). 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF- 9 
trying to protect its office of the director and its electorate from this politically motivated attack. 
An election was missed and was immediately, without costing an elector or the Court time or 
money, rescheduled to the very next election date. What more is there to do? In the interim five 
month period awaiting this election, the VCPA has cost its taxpayers countless resources in this 
action. Five months. Does the VCPA not realize that the election is in less than one month; the 
outcome of which will render these issues moot?25 Now, on the eve of this election, the VCPA 
seeks preliminary injunctive relief; i.e. an injunction against Ms. Davis with a useful life of two 
weeks before Ms. Davis or a successor will be elected to office. 
Lastly, it is hypocritical for the VCPA to assert that it seeks to preserve "integrity". The 
only possible motive to justify expending these resources two weeks before the election for such 
a minimal remedy is to influence this election, "mothball"26 the SVCRD, and interfere with a 
public works project. The VCPA all but admits this political agenda in its Complaint and by 
including as exhibits a myriad of editorials and even a hearsay-laiden affidavit by a disgruntled 
layperson purportedly represented as paraphrased legal authority. (Hoi polloi politics). To be 
discussed infra, the VCPA's "integrity" is all but plain by its motion to disqualify opposing legal 
counsel which is but an attempt to separate the directors from their legal counsel. By 
correspondence and in its briefing, the VCPA even threatens the directors that if they do not 
accept the VCPA's "invitation" to meet and accede to their demand to step down, they will be 
25 See Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation District, 133 Idaho 139, 143, 983 P.2d 212, 216 (1999)(In Nelson, a 
number of qualified electors were turned away. The Court, deeming that the election results were very close, 
exercised its discretion in voiding the election and ordering a new election. Rescheduling the election in which 
"Ellwein was elected resolves the primary dispute of the parties. The other articulated issues become moot with this 
resolution.") 
26 See Supplemental Affidavit of Lorena Behnke, ~ 6, Exhibit A. Exhibit A is a plea to the public and the 
Commissioners for a townhall meeting to "mothball" the SVCRD by Dick Carter, who is also a signatory on the 
October Petition asserting that the VCPA directors are usurpers (See Petition in VCPA's Exhibit (no #)). The 
VCPA, who has a private fiscal relationship with the City of Cascade, is clearly motivated to harass the SVCRD. 
The VCPA cannot begin to assert that it is mere coincidence that only now, on the eve of approving a public works 
project and negotiate a lease with the City, that it has chosen this point to try to oust all three directors for procedural 
errors committed as much as five years earlier. 
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charged with usurpation and a felony for misappropriation of funds if they accept legal 
representation from the SVCRD attorney. 
III. THE STATE LACKS STANDING; TITLE 34 GOVERNS PROCEDURAL 
ERRORS IN THE ELECTION PROCESS 
A. Challenges to Procedural Error in the 2010 Election 
As a matter of law, a criminal usurpation action is an inappropriate medium in which to 
challenge what is distinctly within the purview of the election laws. The SVCRD first became 
aware of this procedural error at its September 14, 2010 SVCRD meeting where various 
members of the public addressed whether the sub district (3) position should be up for election.27 
Right or wrong, there was some confusion as to when or if the current four year term, which 
began in February 2007, would expire.28 The SVCRD immediately consulted with the Idaho 
Attorney General's Office and the Idaho Secretary of State. This was the proper course of action 
to have undertaken. 29 
Pursuant to Title 34, Idaho Code, the Idaho Secretary of State is the chief election officer 
of the State who alone has the "responsibility to obtain and maintain uniformity in the 
application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws".30 The Idaho Secretary of State 
provides all such comprehensive directives and election laws to all county clerks.31 Each county 
27 Behnke Affidavit, ii 8. 
28 Id. Why this occurred is not relevant as a procedural error in the election process can in no way be imputed to a 
candidate. The simple fact is that neither the County Clerk nor the SVCRD election officer believed that an election 
was required in November, 2010. Because of this assumption, the SVCRD election officer did not receive the 20 IO 
election manual until January, 2011. Pursuant to the previous version of LC. 34-1405, "[a)nnually in December, 
the county clerk shall cause to be published the election calendar for the county for the following calendar year." 
The election manual was not provided to the SVCRD until January, 2011. This is by way of explanation only; not to 
assess blame. The SVCRD and the County simply made a mistake. The remedy of which is to simply reschedule 
the election to the next available election; not prosecute the incumbents in their individual capacity as usurpers. 
Supplemental Behnke Affidavit, ~4. 
29 Id. 
30 1.C. § 34-201. 
J1 Id. 
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clerk is required to comply with such directives and instruction by the secretary of state. The 
Idaho Secretary of State receives its legal advice from the Idaho Attorney General's Office.32 
The SVCRD's election officer also immediately consulted with the Office of the County 
Clerk; specifically the Election Officer, Jo Ann Fly.33 Pursuant to LC. § 34-206, the county clerk 
exercises general supervisory authority pertaining to the 
administration of the election laws by each local election official in his county for 
the purpose of achieving and maintaining a maximum degree of correctness, 
impartiality, efficiency, and uniformity in such administration by local election 
officials. 34 
Because the notice of candidacy filing publication deadlines35 for the November 2, 2010 election 
had already passed (publication Aug 18-25) as had the last day candidates could file written 
declarations I petitions (Sept 1, 2010), the SVCRD and the County election officer determined 
that the November 2, 2010 election date was precluded.36 The SVCRD and the Office of the 
County Clerk thereafter noted that the election would have to be re-scheduled at the next earliest 
available election date which they mistakenly believed to be February 2011 unaware that the 
newly revised election laws had vacated the February election date as well.37 The earliest 
available election date was May 17, 2011; all notices of which have been duly published and the 
election is scheduled.38 In the interim, the incumbent retains her position exactly as in 2006.39 
32 I.C. § 67-1401. 
33 Behnke Affidavit , 8. 
34 LC. § 34-206. 
35 See J.C.§§ 34-704, 34-1404, 34-1405. 
36 Supplemental Behnke Affidavit,, 4-5. 
37 Id. See also Behnke Affidavit, ,5-8. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. The fact that the County purportedly addressed this issue via its election officer, the VCPA 's independent legal 
action countermanding this resolution raises obvious equitable remedies including estoppel, waiver, and unclean 
hands. The doctrine of "unclean hands" allows a "court to deny equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that his 
conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at issue." 
Swordv. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251, 92 P.3d 492, 501 (2004). A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment 
of a known right and "the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and that 
he thereby has altered his position to his detriment." Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 
(2006). Quasi-estoppel prevents a party from asserting to another party's disadvantage a right that is inconsistent 
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Regardless, pursuant to Title 34, the SVCRD, the County Clerk's Office, the Idaho Secretary of 
State's office (Tim Hurst, Chief Deputy) and the Idaho Attorney General's Office (Brian Kane, 
Assistant Chief Deputy) all worked cooperatively to interpret the election laws in order to 
resolve this procedural irregularity in a uniform manner. This is the proper process and remedy. 
The VCPA, while invited, refused to participate or cooperate with the attorney general's office or 
the SVCRD; other than to declare the directors as usurpers who must step down. 
The VCPA insinuates that the SVCRD is legally required to intervene in this usurpation 
action and seek declaratory relief. There is no such requirement. Certainly, an elector, as 
opposed to the VCPA, has standing to bring a timely civil action against the SVCRD for the 
SVCRD's failure to properly publish notice in time for the November election. In a timely filed 
election contest by one v.ith standing (an elector), the Court is empowered to order a new 
election to be held at a time and place as determined by the Court40• This is not necessary and in 
fact a governmental entity should be encouraged to fix its own procedural errors short of the time 
and expense to the Court, the SVCRD, and/or an elector to await a determination by the Court. 
Where an election is missed due to a procedural error, the SVCRD, with the aid of the Idaho 
Secretary of State, is perfectly capable of fixing its own mistakes by rescheduling the election to 
the next available election date. Would this Court have ordered otherwise, and if so, would it 
have occurred as expeditiously in order to preserve the May 17 election date? 
with a previous position. Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006) (quoting C & G, Inc. v. 
Canyon Highway Dist No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003)). It applies when it would be 
unconscionable to allow the party to maintain the inconsistent position. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 437, 80 
P.3d 1031, 1038 (2003). 
40 J.C. § 34-2021. 
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B. 2007 Election Process 
Purported procedural errors committed in the 2007 election process are wholly irrelevant, 
waived, and the VCPA lacks standing to challenge any such error.41 Pursuant to J.C. § 31-
4306(2), if only one candidate has been nominated for each director position to be filled and no 
declaration of intent is filed for a write-in candidate, the election shall be cancelled. In such 
instances, the Board "shall ... declare such candidate elected as director, and the secretary ... 
shall immediately make and deliver to such person a certificate of election." Since the SVRCD's 
inception, there has never been an election as there has never been more than one candidate. 42 
Unfortunately, since 1998, other than the directors, no one else has ever expressed a willingness 
to volunteer their time by becoming a director.43 Yvette Davis has been the Director for sub 
district (3) since the SVRCD's inception. 
The SVRCD failed to publish a Notice of Election Filing Deadline pursuant to LC. § 34-
1405 for the November 2006 election for the 2007-2011 term of the sub district (3) director 
position.44 While no one contested this procedural error, the SVRCD cured this defect by 
immediately rescheduling the election for February 6, 2007.45 The SVRCD duly published the 
notice of election filing deadline for this election in the Long Valley Advocate on December 20 
and December 27, 2006.46 Only one declaration of candidacy was filed by Ms. Davis and no 
declaration of intent was received from a qualified write-in candidate. Thus, pursuant to LC. § 
41 An election contest alone focuses on the "facts and conditions that exist at the time of the election ... or that 
transpired at the election itself [whereas an action) against usurpers and intruders into office have reference to 
conditions that exist at the time the action is brought." Tiegs v. Patterson, 79 Idaho 365, 369, 318 P.2d 588, 590 
(I 957)("Tiegs 1"). 
42 Behnke Affidavit, ii 5. 
43 Id. 
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31-4306(2), the election was cancelled and Ms. Davis was "declared elected as director" in 
February, 2007.47 
Now four years after the fact, the VCPA believes it has standing to challenge a purely de 
minimus procedural error in the published notice in the 2007 election process. The VCPA 
asserts that the notice did not reference the position as a "director", but as the office of the 
president of the SVCRD. Even if true, this de minimus "injury" is entirely speculative.48 The 
VCPA fails to present any evidence or even allege that the purported procedural error has a 
"fairly traceable causal connection" to the deprivation of an elector or estranged candidate's 
procedural due process rights or otherwise materially impacted the election process.49 Without 
more, the impact of a procedural error is de minimus, speculative, and, even in a properly plead 
election contest, ineffectual to void the election much less oust the incumbent years after the fact. 
While voters are certainly entitled to notice, substantial compliance with the spirit and 
purpose of the law in such manner to afford the public an opportunity to know when and where 
the election is to be held, and the object of the same, is all that is necessary. 50 
47 Id. 
[W]e are of the opinion that the correct rule, and the one supported by the great 
weight of authority, may be stated as follows: Statutory directions as to the time 
and manner of giving notice of elections are mandatory upon the officers charged 
with the duty of calling the election, and will be upheld strictly in a direct action 
instituted before an election; but after an election has been held, such statutory 
requirements are directory, unless it appears that the failure to give notice for the 
48 Standing to challenge a procedural may not be based on speculation. To present a justiciable case or controversy 
pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, "it must be "likely", as opposed to merely "speculative", 
that the State's "injury" will be "redressed by a favorable decision."" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560, I 12 S.ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 3 5 I (1992). "Abstract injury is not enough ... [S]peculation is insufficient to 
establish the existence of a present, live controversy." Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, l 05 (l 983). "It is 
the realizHarris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681P.2d988, 991 (1984); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 
Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). 
49 Jaycox v. Varnum, 39 Idaho 78, 226 P. 285 (1924) (Contestant must prove that result of election would have been 
different if illegal votes had not been received.) 
50 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, §40.07 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1970). 
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full time specified by the statute has prevented electors from giving a full and free 
expression of their will at the election .... 51 
Where the "notice was sufficient to apprise voters of the purpose of the election", a notice of 
election will not invalidated.52 "We conclude that the notices of election were sufficient to 
provide reasonable notice of the chief features of the proposal."53 
A showing that election officials failed to follow every election procedure 
precisely, without more, is insufficient under I.C. § 34-2101(1). Noble's evidence 
does not demonstrate that the election process was unfair or that the results are 
contrary to the actual will of the electorate.54 
[T]he burden is upon the party contesting the election to make a prima facie 
showing, to the effect that sufficient illegal votes were cast, or legal votes 
rejected, to change the result of the election, or that serious wrong or fraud existed 
as to make the result of the election doubtful. .... While it is apparent that there 
were irregularities in the conduct of the election in Idaho Falls, they do not seem 
to make the result of the election doubtful, nor is this court convinced that there 
was intentional wrongdoing or fraud such as to vitiate the election. 55 
Absent any evidence of deprivation of an elector or estranged candidate's procedural due 
process rights or an otherwise material impact to the election process, the VCPA nonetheless 
contends he has standing and the authority to circumvent this required "injury" and oust an 
incumbent for a de minimus error years after the fact. Even the Court could not set aside the 
result in an election process unless it reasonably believed that the procedural error materially 
impacted the result of the election.56 In Nelson, 57the Court reasonably determined that the 
election result was materially impacted by the clear procedural error in turning away eligible 
voters where the result of the election was quite close. Here, no one has ever expressed a 
willingness to run for office other than the directors. 
51 Harrison v. Bannock County, 68 Idaho 463, 469-470, 198 P.2d 1013, 1016-1017 (l 948)(Emphasis added). 
· 
52 Lindv. Rockland School District, 120 Idaho 928, 93 I, 821 P.2d 983, 986 (1991). 
53 Id See Durand v. Cline, 63 Idaho 304, 119 P .2d 891 (1941 ); Corker v. Village of Mountain Home, 20 Idaho 32, 
116 P. 108 (1911); 15 E. McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations§ 40.07 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1970). 
54 Noble v. Ada County, 135 Idaho 495, 504, 20 P.3d 679, 688 (2000). 
55 Huffaker v. Edgington, 30 Idaho 179, 163 P. 793, 794 (1917). 
56 I.C. § 34-2021. 
57 Nelson, 133 Idaho at 143, 983 P .2d at 216. 
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This is academic for the VCPA lacks standing to even challenge a procedural error in the 
election process, much less years after the fact. Pursuant to I.C. § 34-2008 only an elector is 
vested with standing to bring such a procedural challenge provided said challenge is lodged 
within twenty days. This reflects an important public policy preference for strict adherence to 
statute of limitation periods for procedural challenges to the election process. The failure to 
bring a challenge in a timely fashion will render even a valid challenge as waived, lost, or barred 
by !aches. 58 Public policy favors electoral stability. "Courts must take care in post-election 
challenges to avoid disenfranchising votes without clear statutory warrant."59 
The public has an interest in the speedy determination of controversies affecting 
elections, and provisions of the statute limiting the time within which steps may 
be taken are universally regarded as mandatory. Unless thelo are strictly complied 
with, the court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter. 0 
By the VCPA's interpretation, one could observe a de minimis procedural error in an 
election process, and lie in wait for four years only then springing a usurpation action to oust the 
incumbent. Although a candidate or incumbent is in no way responsible for conducting the 
election process, the VCPA believes it can bring a usurpation action against the incumbent, years 
later, subjecting them to potential arrest (I.C. § 6-603), a fine in an amount not to exceed 
$5,000.00 if a director is "adjudged guilty" (LC. § 6-608), and an order to pay all costs of the 
action (LC. § 6-603). Incredulously, the VCPA further asserts that every act, policy, or decision 
rendered by the incumbent during the term is void as undertaken "without authority of law".61 
58 McNamara v. Wayne, 67 Idaho 410, 414, 182 P.2d 960, _ (1947)(Where there was ample time and opportunity 
between the primary and the general election to have had any of the alleged disqualifications of the candidate for the 
office of the prosecuting attorney heard or passed on, but contestant neglected to take any action whatever until after 
the election, contestant could not be heard to urge said objections, which, ifpennitted, would disfranchise thousands 
of legal voters. ) 
59 Norman v. Ambler, 35 Fla.L.Weekly D2409, 46 So.3d 178, 181 (2010). 
60 Mansfield v. McShurley, 911 N.E.2d 581, 585 (2009). 
61 In the Complaint,, IX, the VCPA argues that Pat Cowles, who was only appointed in May, 2010, is nonetheless a 
usurper subject to the personal $5,000 fine in that: 
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The law does not permit a political opponent to "roll the clock back" four years; the impact of 
which to the law and to the vested rights of the citizenry is incalculable whether it be a 
councilman's approval of a land use application or a judge's sentencing of a felon. 62 
IV. CRIMINAL USURP A TI ON DOES NOT APPLY TO PROCEDURAL ERRORS 
COMMITED DURING THE ELECTION PROCESS 
In contrast to an election contest which, if timely brought, may focus on procedural 
irregularities in the election process, an action for the usurpation of office is a substantive 
examination of the incumbent himself; his or her eligibility to lawfully hold title to an office.63 
For example the usurpation statute is the remedy to oust an incumbent who refuses to vacate his 
office when he/she is convicted of a felony or infamous crime, for violating a corrupt practices 
act, for failing to adhere to residency requirements, and other substantive conditions for an 
incu~bent to lawfully hold a particular office.64 Where an election contest addresses the facts 
and conditions that transpired at the time of the election, a usurpation action focuses on the 
conditions that exist at the time the action is brought.65 Thus, usurpation actions do not have a 
statute of limitations. This makes sense as an incumbent could lawfully enter office and only 
thereafter became ineligible due to a felony. 
The other two board members who appointed Patrick Cowles were not valid board members at the 
time of the appointment (holding and exercising the office without authority of law) and therefore 
said appointment was made without authority of Jaw. 
62 In Huetter, 244 Idaho at 161, the Court cited with approval State v. McDermott, 52 Idaho 602, 609, 17 P.2d 343, 
346 (I 932) wherein a defendant challenged his conviction upon the contention that the probate judge had no 
authority to conduct the preliminary hearing because he had forfeited his office by temporarily moving from the 
county. 
63 People ex rel. Neilson v. Wilkins, IOI Idaho 394, 396, 614 P.2d 417, 419 (1980). 
According to Black's, "usurpation of franchise or office" is defined as the "unjustly intruding upon or exercising any 
office, franchise, or liberty belonging to another." The "usurper of a public office" is [ o ]ne who either intrudes into 
a vacant office or ousts the incumbent without any color title." 
64 Id. 
65 Id. Here, the VCPA focuses solely on procedural committed during the election process. In 2007, the notice 
referred to "president". In 20 I 0, the SVCRD failed to publish the notice of candidacy filing and thus, before the 
November election, determined that the election was precluded. 
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Usurpation actions are an extreme remedy, rarely utilized. In fact, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has not substantively addressed the usurpation statutes in over thirty years. 66 This, in and 
of itself, ought to raise skepticism concerning the efficacy and sincerity of this action since 
benign procedural errors as described herein are ridiculously common yet the usurpation of an 
incumbent by virtue thereof is non-existent. Where such proceedings have related to an elective 
office, the courts will not inquire into the electoral process itself since the law provides another 
tribunal and an exclusive method for the determination of these matters. 67 
The VCP A does not seem to grasp this distinction. While the election contest statute is 
the exclusive remedy to challenge a procedural irregularity in the election process, the Tiegs 
Court noted that the law provides two remedies for a substantive challenge to an incumbent' s 
eligibility to hold office: one by contest by an elector and the other by usurpation by the State. 
Any elector, within twenty days, may bring an election contest asserting that a candidate is 
ineligible to hold office, for example, as a convicted felon. The State may even do so thereafter 
in a usurpation action. This does not however permit the inverse; i.e. for the VCPA in a 
usurpation action to stand in the place of an elector to challenge a procedural infirmity 
committed prior to or at the time of the election; a right conferred solely upon the individual. 
As a criminal usurper is "adjudged guilty", there must be some evidence of intent and the 
act must in some fashion be attributable to the usurper. 
LC. § 18-114. Union of act and intent. In every crime or public offense there 
must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence. 
LC. § 18-115.Manifestation of intent. Intent or intention is manifested by the 
commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the 
offense. 
66 Neilson v. Wilkins, 101Idaho394, 396, 614 P.2d 417, 419 (1980). 
67 Tiegs v. Patterson, 79 Idaho 365, 318 P.2d 588, (1957)("Tiegs I"); Tiegs v. Patterson, 81 Idaho 46, 48, 336 P.2d 
687 (l 959)("Tiegs Il"). 
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LC. § 18-201.Persons capable of committing crimes. All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes: 
1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an 
ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent. 
2. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious 
thereof. 
3. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through 
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was not evil design, 
intention or culpable negligence. 
Here, neither the act nor the intent is attributable to the incumbent. At the very worst, the failure 
to publish notice in time for the November election is the SVCRD's procedural irregularity; not 
the fault of the candidate. Unlike Neilson where the prosecutor asserted that the incumbent was 
ineligible due to residency requirements, 68 or in Tiegs69 where Patterson argued that Tiegs was 
ineligible to hold office because he lost the election, the VCPA does not assert that Ms. Davis is 
ineligible to hold office. The "question before the Court ... could not be considered in any way 
determinative of the election or the conduct thereof ... [A]ppellant...has not in any [way] 
contested the election."70 Rather. the focus is on the actions of the incumbent himself; i.e. the 
result of the election renders the incumbent a usurper. Here, the result, i.e. improper notice 
resulting in a cancelled election, results in the incumbent holding over said office until a 
successor is elected at an election. 
V. THE VCPA'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SVCRD COUNSEL 
68 In Neilson, 101 Idaho at 396, 6 J 4 P .2d at 419 the attorney general lost its usurpation action against the incumbent 
Gooding County Commissioner. The prosecutor asserted that, at the time of the election, he failed to meet the 
residency requirements and thus was ineligible to hold office. Wilkins was elected by a majority in November, 1976 
and sworn in the following January. Only in February 1977 however did he and the other commissioners change the 
district boundaries such that Wilkin's residence was located in the proper sub-district. Thus we see a marriage 
between intent and the act. Wilkins definitely played a substantive role in this affair. Yet, the Idaho Supreme Court 
dismissed the usurpation action since, at the time the action was brought, Wilkins resided within the district. 
69 Tiegs, 79 Idaho at 371-372, 318 P.2d at 592 
10 Id 
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The VCP A ironically notes that a trial court should address a motion to disqualify 
opposing legal counsel with caution in that an opposing party may attempt to utilize the 
professional rules as a procedural weapon for an improper purpose. 71 The VCPA further 
recognizes that a motion for disqualification should be denied where "the motion is being made 
for purposes of harassing the defendant."72 It is hard to imagine a more apt example than herein. 
Having failed to persuade the SVCRD directors to vacate their elected positions, the 
VCPA is now seeking to separate the SVCRD directors from their legal counsel by harassment, 
intimidation, and threatened felony prosecution. Coupled -with its refusal to consult with the 
Idaho Attorney General's Office, the VCPA's purpose in bringing this motion is not to remedy a 
missed election pursuant to the civil election laws, but rather to continue its political agenda to 
outrage the citizenry, manipulate a public works project, impact the May election, and force the 
directors, who are volunteer retirees, to simply quit or defend themselves at their own expense 
for actions which, at best, are attributable to the SVCRD. 
Incredulously, the VCPA freely admits to threatening to charge the directors with a 
felony pursuant to LC. § 18-5701 should they receive legal advice from the SVCRD attorneys. 
For example, the newest director, Mike Keithly, who was appointed barely two weeks earlier, 
received correspondence from the VCPA on March 23, 2011 "inviting" Mr. Keithly to meet with 
the VCPA.73 The VCPA's position clearly was to require Mr. Keithly to step down since he was 
purportedly appointed without authority of law. As incentive, the VCPA insinuated that since 
the "other individual defendants decided not to meet with us ... we had no alternative but to [file 
a criminal usurpation action against them] under I.C. § 6-602."74 It is arguably prosecutorial 
71 Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 31-32 (2007). 
12 Id. 
73 Exhibit B. 
74 Id. 
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misconduct to influence the resolution of a civil matter, i.e. the election process, with a threat of 
criminal prosecution. 
Worse still, the VCPA further pressed Mr. Keithly that while he is free to bring legal 
counsel to this meeting with the prosecutor at his own expense, should he continue to receive 
legal advice from the SVCRD on such "private defenses, then the law is clear that such action 
would be a misuse of public moneys by public officers .... which provides for a felony charge 
..• "
75 The directors are all volunteers seeking to provide recreational opportunities for the 
community. Mr. Keithly is a retired United States Marine Corps colonel with over twenty-five 
years of service. A felony would disqualify his retirement benefits, preclude public service, and 
preclude his right to carry fire arms. Similarly, Mr. Cowles is a retired Ada County Sheriff. Ms. 
Davis is a homemaker. The purpose of this correspondence and now this motion is purely to 
harass and intimidate the directors. This cannot be tolerated. 
The VCPA's legal basis to disqualify legal counsel is absurd. The VPCA contends that 
as a matter of law a governmental entity's attorney has an inherent conflict of interest and is 
therefore precluded from representing both the governmental entity and its directors where the 
action is brought against the directors individually. The VCPA never actually articulates what 
this conflict is supposed to be and further fails to cite to any legal authority for this bogus legal 
theory. 76 Deliberately, the VCPA wholly ignored the most salient factor: whether the alleged 
bad acts are attributable to the directors acting within the "course and scope" of their SVCRD 
duties. As a matter oflaw, pursuant to LC. § 6-903(b) 
1s Id. 
A governmental entity shall provide a defense to its employee, including a 
defense and indemnification against any claims brought against the employee in 
the employee's individual capacity when the claims are related to the course and 
scope of employment, and be responsible for the payment of any judgment on any 
76 A party waives an issue if argument and authority is lacking in its initial briefing. Ginther, 244 P.3d at 1234. 
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claim or civil lawsuit against an employee for money damages arising out of any 
act or omission within the course and scope of his employment ... 
In fact, I.C. § 6-903(c) only relieves the governmental entity of liability if the agent acts with 
malice or criminal intent, which, as stated herein, is wholly absent. 77 
The VCPA's sole factual basis supporting its usurpation claim is purported procedural 
errors in the election process. A candidate or incumbent is in no way responsible for the conduct 
of the election process including whether the notices for said election are published properly. At 
the very worst, the failure to hold an election or publish a legal notice is the SVCRD's 
procedural irregularity; not the fault of the candidate. Unlike a true usurpation action, the VCPA 
does not allege a single act attributable to a director. There is absolutely no reasonable basis in 
fact or law however to assert that said claims are in any way unrelated to the course and scope of 
the SVCRD's duties. 
As a matter of law, the SVCRD is required to defend its officers in this action; the failure 
to do so can and should subject the SVCRD to liability from its directors. LC. § 6-903 is 
consistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. Pursuant to 1.7 and l.13(g), a lawyer 
may represent both the governmental entity and its directors provided there is no concurrent 
conflict of interest. The VCPA asserts the conflict exists but fails to specify what it is. There is 
no such conflict. The representation of the SVCRD and its directors are not adverse to one 
another. The VCPA has attacked the SVCRD's directors seeking to oust them for procedural 
errors in the election process committed, at best, by the SVCRD. The VCPA cannot bring a 
usurpation action against a governmental entity. The defense is thus a united front absent of 
conflict. The SVCRD's procedural issues can only be resolved pursuant to the civil election 
laws to which the VCPA lacks standing. 
77 Sprague v. City of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 669, 710 P.2d 566, 579 (1985); Limbert v. Twin Falls County, 131 
Idaho 344, 346, 955 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Ct. App. 1998) .. 
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The VCPA's motion to disqualify opposing counsel is brought as a procedural weapon 
for the purposes of harassment and intimidation. The VCPA's "invitation" to meet is but a 
demand to step down; the failure of which will result in criminal usurpation charges and felony 
charges should the director receive legal advice from the SVCRD. Threatening criminal 
prosecution to resolve a civil attempt to motivate an elected official to put his seat up for election 
is prosecutorial misconduct and an abuse of process. The motion to disqualify opposing counsel 
should be denied. 78 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The SVCRD may recover its reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-117 
where it can show that the non-prevailing party acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law". 
In 2004, the Idaho Supreme Court summed up the operation of the statute: 
The purpose of LC. § 12-117 is two-fold: First, it serves "as a deterrent to 
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy for 
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending 
against groundless charges .... " An award of attorney fees under LC.§ 12-117 has 
been distilled into a two-part test. Attorney fees must be awarded if (1) the Court 
finds in favor of the person, and (2) the [non-prevailing party] ... acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law.79 
The SVCRD has born an unjustified burden in defending these groundless charges. Every dollar 
spent takes away from the SVCRD's recreational programs. The VCPA never waivered from his 
demand that the directors are usurpers that must step down. The SVCRD did not attempt to 
78 The remainder of the VCPA's briefing is irrelevant. The VCPA cites to newspaper articles and hearsay from 
disgruntled laypersons purportedly on questions of law as if it were legal authority. While not germane to this 
action, the VCPA's reference to "secret meetings" and "whispers" is ridiculous. The VCPA wholly misrepresents 
the proper application of the open meetings laws. An attorney need not advise its client on threatened or active 
usurpation actions in open session. The SVCRD is not required to consult with the Attorney General's Office in 
open session. Regardless, such accusation are not dispositive in this action. 
While it is unclear what purpose it serves, we also note the misrepresentation of the status of McCall v. 
Buxton; presided over by this Court I would add. The VCPA cites to statutes that don't exist (J.C. 31-1541 ). Lastly, 
a great many of the factual averments are completely false. However, as the VCPA does not deem it pertinent to 
submit briefing with references to exhibit numbers or page numbers, it is of marginal value and does not impact the 
legal analysis. While we have received the memorandum, we were not provided a copy of any of said exhibits or 
affidavits until April 20, 2010. 
79 Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004). 
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supplant an election and did not shirk its responsibility in admitting fault in missing the election. 
Immediately upon learning of the error, the SVCRD contacted the County Clerk, the Idaho 
Attorney General, and the Secretary of State. The election was immediately rescheduled for 
May. This action centers on this five month period which renders the whole issue moot. 
Seeking preliminary injunctive relief on the eve of this election is complete idiocy. 
Suggesting the VCP A was "forced" or "obligated" to bring this action is a complete 
falsehood other than political pressure to do so. We repeatedly asked the VCP A to participate in 
the curative process by calling the attorney general. In a January 10, 2011 email, Stephanie 
Bonney wrote:, 
I suggest you discuss this with the Attorney General's office before you proceed. 
Again, on January 12, 
I again urge you to consult with the Attorney General's office and/or the 
Secretary of State's office on your legal position because I cannot find a factual or 
legal basis for it. 
One phone call. He refused. As to his claim that we would not discuss the issue with him, 
Regardless, I will speak with my clients to see if they are willing to meet with 
you. The only dates I have available are this Friday and next Friday. Please let 
me know your availability on these dates and if my clients want to meet with you, 
I will try to coordinate at meeting. 
He never did and as hostility grew, it became pointless. 
Threatening to bring a felony to resolve the issues in this action crosses the line. This 
Court may decide that attorney fees are also warranted pursuant to I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l). A party 
may be subject to sanctions if its signed legal document (1) is not well grounded in fact; (2) is 
not warranted by existing law or a good-faith extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
and (3) was interposed for an improper purpose.8° For the reasons stated herein, the VCPA has 
80 Lattin v. Adams County, 149 ldaho 497, 504, 236 P.3d 1257, 1264 (2010) citing Readv. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 
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brought this action without a reasonable basis in fact or law nor reasonable extension thereof, but 
rather for an improper purpose. Therefore, the SVCRD is entitled to attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny the 
State's sought after relief and award attorney fees against the County. None of the circumstances 
articulated in Rule 65(e) apply as the State wholly fails to present a justiciable case or 
controversy. The issues herein are moot; issues which are wholly governed by the civil election 
laws; not the criminal usurpation statutes. The State's highly volatile pleadings do not 
demonstrate entitlement to the relief sought, but are a continued attempt to outrage the public and 
taint the upcoming election. 
DATED this 2 2.day of April, 2011. 
371, 209 PJd 661, 668 (2009) 
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